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/ 

THE PRINCIPLES OF 



Descartes' Philosophy 



BY 

BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA 

(the philosopher's earliest work) 



TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN, 

WITH AN INTRODUCTION 

BY 

HALBERT HAINS BRITAN, Ph.D. 






CHICAGO 
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY 

LONDON AGENTS 

Keg an Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., ^td. 
1905 






LIBRARY 

L)CL 20 3905 
<jopy s. 



^/•/ 




.-' 



Copyright 1905 

by 

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO. 

CHICAGO 









As a token of gratitude for his kindness and 
for his help, I dedicate this book 

TO 

Professor George M. Duncan, LL.D. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



INTRODUCTION. 

PAG! 

The Significance of Spinoza's Early Writings . 
The Publication of " The Principles of Descartes' 

Philosophy " ii 

The Geometrical Method, its Purpose .... ix 

The Geometrical Method the Outcome of Deduction x 

Deduction and the Concept of God xix 

Spinoza's Idea of God, influenced by His Early Life xx 

The Early Influence of Descartes' Philosophy . xxiii 
An Analysis of the Concept of God found in the 

Cogitata Metaphysical 

The Eternity of God xxv 

There is but One God xxviii 

The Greatness of God xxix 

The Immutability of God xxx 

The Simplicity and Life of God xxxi 

The Omniscience of God xxxii 

The Will of God xxxv 

The Power of God xxxviii 

The Concurrence of God xxxviii 

God's Attributes identified xl 

The Necessity under which God Acts .... xli 

God's Determinism leads to Pantheism .... xlvi 

Spinoza a " Rationalist " lii 

Descartes' Dualism liv 

Three Factors turning Spinoza to Pantheism : . l'ix 

(i) His Allegiance to Deduction, 

(2) His Idea of God, 

(3) The Influence of Descartes' Philosophy. 
Deduction, the Source of the Weakness of Spino- 
za's System lxvi 

Problem of Evil lxvii 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Determinism lxviii 

Was Kant influenced by This Early Work of 

Spinoza? » Ixxi 

The Principal Truth in Spinoza's Pantheism . . lxxv 
Its Influence in the Main Current of Philosoph- 
ical Truth . . . ■ . . Ixxvi 

Its Influence on Art Ixxviii 

Preface of Dr. Meyer i 

the principles of descartes' philosophy 

PART I. 

Prolegomenon n 

Definitions : Thought, Idea, Substance, Mind, Body, 

God, etc 20 

Axioms -. 22 

The Fundamental Principle of All Knowledge . . 23 

Axioms taken from Descartes 25 

God's Existence demonstrated ... 30 

The Attributes of God 41 

Whatever is clearly conceived is True 46 

Other Attributes of God . 51 

Extended Substance 54 

PART 11. 

concerning the physical world. 

Definitions 57 

Axioms and Lemmata 60 

The Essential Nature of Matter 63 

Concerning Motion . 69 

God the Cause of Motion 79 

Moving Bodies tend to move in Straight Lines ... 81 

The impact of Moving Bodies 87 

PART III. 

Introduction . . 107 

A Postulate 109 

Definitions and Axioms . . . .111 

The First Division of Matter 112 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



APPENDIX. 

THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA. 

PART I. 

PAGE 

Chapter I. Division of Being 115 

Chapter II. Essence, Existence, Idea and Power Ex- 
plained 120 

Chapter III. The Terms Necessary, Contingent, Im- 
possible and Possible Explained 124 

Chapter IV. Concerning Duration and Time . . . 129 
Chapter V. Concerning Opposition, Order, etc. . . . 130 
Chapter VI. Concerning Unity, Truth and Goodness 131 

part 11. 



Chapter I. Concerning the Eternity of God 
Chapter II. Concerning the Unity of God . 
Chapter III. Concerning the Greatness of God 
Chapter IV. Concerning God's Immutability 
Chapter V. Concerning the Simplicity of God 
Chapter VI. Concerning the Life of God 
Chapter VII. Concerning the Understanding > 
Chapter VIII. Concerning God's Will . . 
Chapter IX. Concerning the Power of God . 
Chapter X. Concerning Creation .... 
Chapter XI. Concerning the Concurrence of God 
Chapter XII. Concerning the Human Mind 



139 
142 

143 
146 
148 
150 
God 152 
156 
159 
161 
168 
170 



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PREFACE 

This translation, undertaken at the suggestion of 
Professor George M. Duncan of Yale University, has 
been made from the Latin text of Vloten's and Land's 
Benedict de Spinoza Opera, 1895. A careful study of 
this work such as a translator must needs make has 
convinced me that more attention should be given to 
the early writings of Spinoza for the help they give 
in understanding his Pantheism. By this means, by 
seeing how his ideas followed naturally if not always 
quite logically, from personal factors, and from Des- 
cartes' philosophy, some of the most obscure points 
in his system of philosophy are materially elucidated 
and explained. But a historical or genetic study of 
any subject today needs no apology. The only re- 
markable thing about this is that so little attention 
has been given to this method of clearing up the ob- 
scurities of Spinoza's though# 

In my introduction I have not attempted to make 
an exhaustive analysis of the work translated so much 
as I have endeavored to fasten the attention upon some 
of the points which throw light upon Spinoza's Pan- 
theism. Little reference is made to Part II. or to 
Part III. of the Principles because they treat of mat- 
ter that has but little importance in understanding the 
Ethics. And the contents of Part I. being better pre- 
sented in the Cogitata Mctaphysica, we have confined 
our analysis mainly to the appendix. If some added 
light is thrown upon the two or three points to which 



PREFACE 

we have especially directed our attention, and the pos- 
sibilities of this method of studying Spinoza's thought 
are made clear, the main purpose of this book will have 
been attained. In obtaining a better translation for 
certain passages help has sometimes been found by 
consulting the standard Histories of Philosophy such 
as Erdmann's, Kuno Fisher's, and Ueberwig's as well 
as Torrey's and Veitch's translation of Descartes' 
works, and Elwes' translation of the earlier 
works of Spinoza. My thanks are also due to Pro- 
fessor Duncan for his suggestion upon some points, 
and to Professor C. R. Melcher of Hanover College 
for reading over a portion of my MSS. 

HALBERT HAINS BRITAN. 
Hanover, Indiana, January, 1905. 



INTRODUCTION 

§ i. In Histories of Philosophy Spinoza's name 
stands inseparably associated with Pantheism if it has 
not become practically synonymous with that term. 
His earlier writings, therefore, are of value primarily 
for the light they throw upon his later thought. While 
it is true that some of them have intrinsic worth, for 
the most part it is because they illumine the mysteries 
of his mystical Pantheism that these early writings 
are preserved and read. We need not hesitate to say 
that this is pre-eminently true of the Principles of 
Descartes' Philosophy translated below. At the very 
beginning of this work we are confronted with the 
assertion that this professes to be only a new, a more 
logical presentation of the truth which Descartes had 
already set forth with such admirable clearness. 
Nevertheless, as we hope will appear, while the con- 
tent of this work may not be absolutely essential for 
understanding Spinoza's Ethics, it is still far too im- 
portant to be neglected. 

It has long been a tacit assumption that Spinoza's 
system of philosophy is found complete in the Ethics, 
that since this was the latest, most mature product of 
his thought there is little need to refer to anything out- 
side of this work in order to understand his system of 
Pantheism. Such an assumption, however, would be 
very difficult to justify, for, while it is true that the 
Ethics contains the outline of a theory of reality and of 
human experience, it is not in mastering the outline 
that the trouble appears. The chief difficulty in under- 
standing the Ethics is not in mastering the broad out- 



ii INTRODUCTIOX 

lines of its doctrines, but in gaining clear and adequate 
conceptions of the terms in which the thought is ex- 
pressed. This, together with the unusual method of 
treatment, are the cruces which the average student 
of Spinoza finds hardest to overcome. As far as the 
general plan of the work is concerned, the one all inclu- 
sive idea first, and then the descent to particular ideas 
and objects, this need offer no serious occasion for 
stumbling, if it is but remembered that this work is 
the product of a deductive age and of a deductive logic. 
The difficulties of Spinoza's terminology and the ap- 
parent grotesque inaptitude of the geometrical method, 
can largely be removed by a genetic or historical study 
of his system. The fundamental conceptions of the 
Ethics were the outcome of years of earnest, patient, 
careful study and their full content cannot be appre- 
ciated by reading over the terse language in which 
they are defined in their mathematical setting. To 
appreciate them we must know something of their 
actual development and of the ideas with which they 
were habitually associated. Unless we can by this 
historical investigation get into the atmosphere of his 
thought, as it were, his main tenets must of necessity 
seem artificial and remain obscure. 

So, also, by such a study we will derive the most 
important aid in understanding and even in appre- 
ciating that most generally reprehended feature of the 
Ethics, the method in which it is expressed. 

The importance of this historical study of Spinoza 
is recognized in some of the more recent writers on 
this ethical system. Joachim hints at it while Pro- 
fessor Duff gives this as one of three essentials for 
the mastery of Spinoza's Pantheism. 1 The soundness 

1 Joachim, A Study of The Ethics of Spinoza. Duff, Spino- 
za's Political and Ethical Philosophy. 



INTRODUCTION iii 

of such an opinion cannot be questioned ; concepts that 
require years to form cannot be fully contained in any 
brief and formal definition. The more radical the 
idea (and some of Spinoza's possess this attribute in 
no small degree) the more important this historical 
study becomes for understanding its full significance, 
and the more fundamental the concept, the more es- 
sential it is that we do not neglect any help that we 
may have in fully understanding that on which so 
much depends. 

§ 2. The work on Descartes' philosophy translated 
below, the earliest of all his writings, was published 
in 1663 under rather unusual circumstances. It was 
the only work to which Spinoza ever subscribed his 
name, and yet he warns us that we must not accept this 
as an expression of his own belief. The story of its 
composition and publication is as follows : Spinoza 
about the year 1662-3 had a pupil to whom he was 
teaching Descartes' philosophy, being at that time 
unwilling to impart his own opinions to any one ex- 
cept to a few of his special friends with whom he 
was accustomed to discuss his philosophical views. 
Well founded conjecture makes this pupil to be Albert 
Burgh, who, being in later years converted to the 
Roman Catholic faith, takes his former instructor se- 
verely to task for his heresies. Be this as it may, the 
fact remains that the " Principles of Descartes' Philoso- 
phy " was not meant to be an expression of Spinoza's 
own belief at the time it was written. Not wishing 
his own opinions to be known at that time he con- 
ceives the plan of teaching his pupil the philosophy 
of Descartes, which he could do conscientiously and 
without any unpleasant results to himself. This work 
was written, therefore, more to conceal than to ex- 



iv INTRODUCTION 

press his own belief. Spinoza, as it seems, solely for 
the benefit of his pupil, had put the second part of the 
Principles in geometrical form. Some of his phil- 
osophical friends, seeing this, and being impressed 
with the method in which it was expressed asked him 
to put the first and third parts in the same form, 
and, appending the Cogitata Metaphysica, to permit 
the whole to be published. This Spinoza readily con- 
sented to do, if some one of them would go over the 
work perfecting the phraseology, and would write a 
preface explaining that this work was not meant to 
be an expression of his own belief, but that it was a 
faithful presentation of the philosophy of Descartes, 
either what he had said explicitly or that which could 
logically be inferred from his premises. 

Thus we are forewarned lest we should accept the 
propositions given below as an expression of Spinoza's 
own thought. Some of the ppsitions taken, we are 
told in this Preface, do express his own belief, but 
there are others to which he holds exactly the contrary 
opinion. We are not at liberty, therefore, to subscribe 
Spinoza's name to all that is said in this work but 
must sift out as best we can that with which he agreed 
from that which he rejected. 

Dr. Ludwig Meyer, a physician in Amsterdam, and 
a man intimately acquainted with Spinoza's opinions, 
gladly agreed to write such a preface as Spinoza de- 
sired, and this is given as an introduction to the work 
in question. Spinoza immediately set to work and in 
two weeks' time had the first part also in geometrical 
form and sent it to be published with the rest. Another 
reason why he entrusted its publication to his friend 
was that he had left Amsterdam in 1660 on account 
of persecution and was at this time dwelling in Rheins- 



INTRODUCTION v 

burgh, near Leyden. The following letter to Olden- 
burgh gives us his own version of the publication of 
the work : 

Distinguished Sir: — 

I have at length received your long wished for 
letter, and am at liberty to answer it. But before I 
do, I will briefly tell you what has prevented my re- 
plying before. When I removed my household goods 
here in April, I set out for Amsterdam. While 
there certain friends asked me to impart to 
them a treatise containing, in brief, the second 
part of the principles of Descartes treated geo- 
metrically, together with some of the chief points 
treated in metaphysics, which I had formerly 
dictated to a youth, to whom I did not wish 
to teach my own opinions openly. They further re- 
quested me, at the first opportunity, to compose a 
similar treatise on the first part. Wishing to oblige 
my friends I at once set myself to the task, which I 
accomplished in a fortnight, and handed over to them. 
They then asked leave to print it, which I readily 
granted on the condition that one of them should, 
under my supervision, clothe it in more elegant phrase- 
ology, and add a little preface warning readers that 
I do not acknowledge all the opinions there set forth 
as my own, in as much as I hold the exact contrary to 
much that is there written, illustrating the fact by one 
or two examples. All this the friend who took charge 
of the treatise promised to do, and this is the cause for 
my prolonged stay in Amsterdam. Since I returned 
to this village I have hardly been able to call my time 
my own, because of the friends who have been kind 
enough to visit me. At last, my dear friend, a moment 



vi INTRODUCTION 

has come when I can relate these occurrences to you, 
and inform you why I allow this treatise to see the 
light. It may be that on this occasion some of those 
who hold the foremost positions in my country will be 
found desirous of seeing the rest of my writings, 
which I acknowledge to be my own, they will thus take 
care that I am enabled to publish them without any 
danger of infringing the laws of the land. If this be 
as I think, I shall doubtless publish at once ; if things 
fall out otherwise, I would rather be silent than ob- 
trude my opinions on men, in defiance of my country, 
and thus render them hostile to me. I therefore hope, 
my friend, that you will not chafe at having to wait a 
short time longer ; you shall then receive from me the 
treatise printed, or the summary of it you ask for. 
If meanwhile you would like to have one or two copies 
of the work now in the press I will satisfy your wish 
as soon as I know of it and of means to send the book 
conveniently. 1 

Thus by Spinoza's own words we are told that this 
work is not meant for an expression of his own be- 
lief. It was written, ostensibly, for the benefit of his 
pupil, but really that he might not be required to 
teach him his own opinions. His reticence in express- 
ing his own belief can be readily understood if we re- 
member what sacrifices he was willing to make for the 
sake of undisturbed meditation and how his opinions 
only a few years before, when but verbally expressed, 
had brought down upon him the wrath and curses of 
the Jewish synagogue, and a persecution that drove 
him from Amsterdam to the little village of Rheins- 
burgh. In order that he might not be compelled to 

1 Letter XIII. Elwes' Trans. Spinoza's Works. 



INTRODUCTION vii 

express his own belief he resorts to the expedient of 
teaching his pnpil not his own but Descartes' phil- 
osophy. 

From this hesitancy in expressing his own opinions 
we infer that even at this early period Spinoza had 
already departed from the philosophy of Descartes, 
which as far as the concept of God was concerned, 
was comparatively orthodox. It is doubtful if Spinoza 
ever followed Descartes very far in his opinions. The 
great service of Descartes in the development of phil- 
osophy was to establish the firm basis of epistemo- 
logicat truth, while Spinoza's interests were along an \^^ 
entire 1 y different line. When we remember that pre- 
vious to his study of Descartes Spinoza had already 
spent some time in the study of Theology, and that 
his main interest was always in the concept of God, 
it is a question whether he ever followed the teachings 
of his illustrious predecessor further than to accept 
certain metaphysical distinctions which Descartes had 
pointed out with his usual perspicuity. Spinoza's 
earliest reflection was upon the nature of God. Both 
his early training and taste and the ultra deductive 
nature of his thinking demanded that it should be so. 
Just what the specific nature of his reflections were 
we can infer from the second of his published works, 
the Theologico-Political Treatise. He well knew that 
the conclusions to which he was coming would hardly 
receive a kind reception in a world where religious 
toleration either in act or thought was scarcely known. 
Therefore he preferred, as he told Oldenburgh in the 
letter quoted above, to remain forever silent rather 
than to obtrude his opinions upon men not willing to 
receive them. 

For the purposes of our consideration two points 






viii INTRODUCTION 

stand out above all others in importance in the work 
which it is our purpose to examine. These are the 
form in which Spinoza chooses to remold Descartes' 
philosophy, and the constant and emphatic stress laid 
upon the concept of God. It is not too much to say 
that in these two thoughts which appear in definite 
form in this the earliest of Spinoza's works, we find 
the principal causes which led him to accept Panthe- 
ism as the most satisfactory theory of God and of the 
World. Though the opinions expressed in the Prin- 
ciples, as we have seen, are not always Spinoza's own 
belief, the significance of this work is by no means 
destroyed. More significant than any new item of 
truth in this presentation of the Cartesian philosophy 
is the method employed in presenting it ; and more 
significant than any novelty in the discussion of the 
attributes of God is the constant stress laid upon this 
idea as the fundamental concept of Philosophy. More 
than any other factor, and possibly more than all other 
factors combined, these two facts, the geometrical 
method and this concept of God, explain his Panthe- 
ism. Let it be granted, then, that this work, the 
Principles of Descartes' Philosophy, is an expression 
of Descartes' thought rather than of his own, still we 
have by no means destroyed nor hardly impaired its 
usefulness as a means to a fuller understanding of 
Spinoza's philosophy. The purpose of his employment 
of the geometrical method, and its general significance, 
is not at all changed by the fact that he used it first to 
present not his own but Descartes' philosophy. The 
important thing is that he did actually employ at this 
early period, the method of geometry to express not 
mathematical but philosophical truth. What we are 
interested in discovering is not the demonstrable cer- 



INTRODUCTION ix 

tainty of his propositions, this we have given over 
long ago, but his purpose in using this method, how 
he justified his action and whither its employment 
logically leads. In our consideration of the geomet- 
rical method, therefore, no restrictions whatever are 
imposed by the apparently disconcerting fact that the 
Principles is primarily an expression of Descartes' 
philosophy. 

And yet, while this work is so truly an expression of 
the Cartesian philosophy, we shall find both in the 
Principles and more especially in the Co git at a ample 
expression of Spinoza's own belief to enable us to see 
his point of departure from the philosophy of Descar- 
tes, and to understand why he turned not to Theism 
but to Pantheism as a conception of the World- 
Ground. As we proceed we shall find elements which, 
taken in connection with some of the metaphysical ten- 
ets of Spinoza's early reflections, led him logically 
and, as it seems, almost necessarily to a pantheistic 
conception of God. Sufficient data will also be found 
to throw much light upon the content of this, the most 
fundamental as well as the most difficult concept of 
his philosophy, the idea or concept of God. 

§3. The geometrical method in Spinoza's Ethics 
has long been to students of that work both a stumb- 
ling-block and foolishness. To the modern mind in- 
grained with scientific principles and prejudices the 
method of geometry seems utterly inapt and unfitted 
for the presentation of philosophical truth. It can but 
be of the greatest importance, therefore, if we can 
learn from this early work, our only precedent in 
Spinoza's writings for the method used in the Ethics, 
just why Spinoza used the geometrical method in the 
Principles. And this is our sole chance for learning 



> 



x INTRODUCTION 

why he employed this method ; there is little help to be 
gained by even the most careful study of the Ethics 
alone. When he wrote that work, Spinoza's opinions 
and habits of thought had so far become crystalized 
that he did not introduce any comment that would 
serve to make this point clear. Our answer to this 
question, therefore, must be found in the work below 
or it will not be found at all. 

When we turn, now, to the Principles to consider 
the method in which it is presented we are soon forced 
to the conclusion that this geometrical method was 
not employed because Spinoza thought he could thus 
present an irrefragable body of truth. He did not use 
this method because of the apodeictic character of its 
proof. This is conclusively shown by the fact that he 
used the method alike to present propositions in which 
he believed and those to which as he said he held the 
exactly opposite opinion. In the latter cases the proof 
is no less rigid, the argument no less logical than when 
he has given propositions which held his hearty as- 
sent. Let us then get this idea firmly fixed in our 
minds, that Spinoza did not regard the geometrical 
method, either in the work translated below or in the 
Ethics, as an apodeictic demonstration of the opinions 
he thus expresses. Such an opinion is flatly contra- 
dicted in his first use of this method, and we have no 
reason for believing that it was in any way different in 
the case of its later use. Whatever his purpose may 
have been, it was not to present by its use a philosoph- 
ical system that would not win, but compel assent. Not 
a little of the difficulty in understanding the Ethics 
arises from the failure to properly comprehend the 
purpose of the method in which it is presented. So 
long as we think of it as a presentation of truth as in- 



INTRODUCTION xi 

dubitable as geometry, and yet as general as philo- 
sophical principles must needs be, so long will we be- 
come entangled in the meshes and fail to see the true 
significance of the matter contained in these unyielding 
forms. 

But if it is true as we have said that Spinoza did 
not employ the geometrical method for the sake of its 
unassailable cogency, wherein was its virtue? If it 
could be used, as was indisputably the case, to prove 
error as well as truth, propositions which were directly 
opposed to his belief, as well as propositions in which 
he firmly believed, why was it used at all? And why 
did Spinoza's friends see such virtue in it that they 
requested the immediate publication of every frag- 
ment of Descartes' philosophy which Spinoza had put 
in this form? The answer to these questions which 
apply primarily to the Principles will throw a flood 
of light upon the Ethics. 

To state it briefly, Spinoza's purpose in employing 
the geometrical method was pedagogical not philo- 
sophical. That is, he put the Principles of Descartes 
in this close form of Proposition and Demonstration 
not to establish the truth of the conclusions but that 
the pupil whom he was instructing in that 'system 
might more readily and more clearly comprehend what 
Descartes was endeavoring to establish. Truth and 
error did not enter into his consideration at all, for he 
used the same form and the same kind of proof to 
express what he disbelieved as well as what he re- 
garded as true. The circumstances under which 
the " Principles of Descartes' Philosophy " was written 
absolutely preclude any other conclusion. When 
Spinoza began this work he apparently had no idea 
of publication, but it was done solely for the benefit of 



xii INTRODUCTION 

his pupil to whom he was teaching the Cartesian phi- 
losophy. So far as there was any justification for a 
new presentation of the truth which Descartes had al- 
ready so well expressed it was in the method alone. 
What advantage could it be to repeat the same con- 
clusions, relying always upon the same argument if 
it was not to present in a clearer way what were not 
otherwise so easily comprehended? Spinoza put Des- 
cartes' Principles in geometrical form because he 
believed that was the form best adapted to the re- 
quirements of his pupil's mind. His purpose was to 
present the conclusions of Descartes in their most log- 
ical form so that they might be easiest learned and 
most thoroughly understood. This method, therefore, 
was not employed as a method of proof, for Spinoza, at 
that time, was not interested in that, but in order that 
he might be in his presentation strictly logical and con- 
sistently pedagogical. Considered in this way the 
difficulty in reconciling the discrepancy between the 
method Spinoza employed, and his position upon some 
of the propositions given, disappears. The method is 
true and sound but the premises upon which the 
conclusions are grounded were not well taken. This 
fact, however, does not destroy the value of this 
method in presenting logically and pedagogically a 
conclusion be it never so weak when judged upon the 
grounds of belief and well reasoned judgment. There 
is a clear and a forceful way to present a seeming 
truth as well as that which is indubitable. Hence, we 
affirm that the only possible virtue in the geometrical 
method was its conformity to the demands of the think- 
ing mind. It was pedagogically a superior method of 
presenting conclusions logically to the mind. That 
this same purpose was the chief one that led Spinoza 



INTRODUCTION xiii 

to employ this method in the Ethics is the logical in- 
ference. Although his other works had not been 
written under this form, when he comes to write what 
he regarded as his last and master work he returns to 
this method. This time he is to express only what he 
firmly believed, but can we think that he was dogmatic 
enough to think that his conclusions must forever re- 
main indisputable? Such a conclusion is not in har- 
mony with his catholic sympathies and even temper. 
But here as in the former case the most satisfactory 
conclusion is, that this was the most direct method of 
expressing his opinions, and above all it was in accord 
with the great principles of Mediaeval Logic. 

§ 4. In order to appreciate Spinoza's motives in 
using the geometrical method, and to see its cogency 
we must remember that this was an age of deduction. 
If we are seeking the real causes that led Spinoza to 
believe in this method and to accept it as the best form 
in which to express not only mathematical but philo- 
sophical truth, we will find it in the fact that at this 
time the old Aristotelian Logic dominated his mind 
completely. The leaven which Bacon had introduced 
into the world of reflective thought had not leavened f CY ^ <\^ 
the whole, but Spinoza still held to Deduction as the- 
great Organon of truth. For him the warrant for 
truth was rational not empirical. Explanations of 
phenomena were deductive not inductive. The proof \s ^^ 
of any proposition did not consist in an appeal to facts ' 
empirically obtained, but in a syllogistic deduction from 

tenor of thought on the continent was still deductive, 
and whatever did not conform to this method was \ 
illogical and untrue. 

In confirming Spinoza in this belief the influence of 



xiv INTRODUCTION 

Descartes was important. He had proven that in- 
dubitable truth does not lie in the field of objective 
experience but in the subjective assertion that I, a 
thinking being, exist. Philosophy must begin with 
an assertion that cannot be doubted and then proceed 
to build a system founded upon this truth. According 
to his formula Epistemology must precede Meta- 
physics. The next step was to establish the verity 
of God in order that we might be justified in our be- 
lief in the external world. Such was the position of 
philosophic thought when Spinoza began to reflect 
upon the problems of human experience. There was 
no serious attention paid to the Novum Organum of 
Bacon but Spinoza took his problem from the old 
scholastics and with this, their ideas of logical, me- 
thodical proof. 

Instead of accepting the conclusions of Descartes 
as the starting point, viz., his cogito ergo sum, and 
his proof of God's veracity, by which empirical knowl- 
edge is made credible, and employing the method of 
Bacon to build upon this foundation already laid, 
Spinoza turns back a step and begins anew the 
impossible task of deducing the world in thought. 
Instead of following the role of an humble learner in 
a world whose mysteries are unfathomable he aspired 
to be a system maker in the most didactic way. The 
task he imposed upon himself was the old task of de- 
ductive thought. Individual facts of human experi- 
ence were not data on which conclusions could be 
based, but phenomena to be explained by deducing 
them from some primary, and fundamental principle. 
The world was not something to be taken as it is and 
studied empirically, but it was regarded as a problem 
to be explained dialectically. Spinoza was dominated 



INTRODUCTION xv 

completely by this deductive ideal of truth. His idea 
of philosophical explanation was deductive, his logic 
was deductive, his proof was deductive, hence his 
method also was deductive. When this fact is suffici- 
ently emphasized and consistently remembered we 
may still regret the method Spinoza used in the Ethics, 
but we must commend his strict adherence to the prin- 
ciples of Mediaeval Logic. In this dry, stilted form of 
Axiom, Definition, Proposition, Demonstration, and 
Corollary, deductive logic reaches the height of con- 
sistency. 

From the standpoint of deductive thought, therefore, 
and this is the point of view from which it was used, 
the geometrical method, we venture to affirm, was the 
most logical presentation of truth, mathematical or 
philosophical, that could be made. It was wellnigh if 
not perfectly in accord with the strictest demands of 
Deduction and seemed so at first sight to those accus- 
tomed to the logic of that time. It seems stiff and un- 
natural to us because we are so inured to the modern 
method of science that anything out of harmony with 
this seems artificial and unreal. With our eyes fastened 
upon individual facts as the starting point and general 
principles as the goal, to follow Spinoza we must run 
with our eyes behind us. What he saw ahead we" 
see behind, and what we look forward to as the goal 
of philosophical explanation he had accepted as the 
starting point of reflection. So complete is the in- 
version that there is no way to harmonize his method 
with present ideas of proof and logical procedure. 
Reconciliation is impossible ; either we must give up 
one and cling to the other, or we must reject the one 
in to to and rely wholly upon the other. While he ac- 
cepts the most fundamental principles as true and tries 



xvi INTRODUCTION 

to show how the phenomena of experience result from 
these, we accept the facts of experience as the primary 
truths, and correlating and analyzing these, seek for 
more general conclusions. The rigidity of deductive 
logic, therefore, gave rise to this method and instead of 
being censured for his application of this method of 
geometry in philosophy Spinoza should be commended, 
for his close conformity to the principles of the thought 
of his time. If Deduction is the correct Organon of 
truth, and we must ground our belief not on observa- 
tion and experiment but upon some rational principle, 
then the geometrical method is the most logical and 
consistent form in which to present philosophical truth. 
Mathematics, a deductive science, has not discarded 
this method and never will. And just as soon as we 
can get the deductive point of view, Spinoza's method 
will not seem artificial nor inapt, but perfectly logical 
and perfectly suited to the purposes for which it was 
employed. But from the modern standpoint it will 
always be regarded as an attempt to commensurate 
what is incommensurable. 

To Spinoza's associates, however, men accustomed 
to the deductive point of view the geometrical method 
used in this early work did not seem strange or inapt. 
On the other hand, to them this method, as soon as 
it appeared, appealed as a great improvement even 
over the sunclear method of Descartes, and they at 
once sought to have him put the remainder of Des- 
cartes' Principles in this form and allow it to be pub- 
lished. From the Preface of Dr. Meyer we might in- 
fer that they considered this an infallible method of 
presenting truths ; but this is not essential. All that 
we now wish to show is that to minds whose thoughts 
were habitually deductive, the geometrical method ap- 



INTRODUCTION xvii 

plied to philosophy did not seem artificial nor inappro- 
priate, but well devised and the best possible method 
of presenting any truth logically and forcibly. 

We thus come to the real causes that led Spinoza 
to make use of the geometrical method in his philo- 
sophical system. He believed that this method was 
pedagogically the correct one because he believed de- 
duction was the correct way to establish truth. It 
matters but little whether we say that Spinoza believed 
the method of geometry was the best method to pre- 
sent truth to the learning mind, because it conformed 
so perfectly to the principles of deduction, or whether 
we say because Deduction is the Organon of truth 
the geometrical method is the acme of logical consist- 
ency. The truth that we wish to make clear is that the 
geometrical method had its real causes in Deduction, 
and the immediate occasion of its use in a desire to 
conform strictly to the requirements of the mental 
processes of the student. Spinoza was correct in his 
reasoning, therefore, and abundantly justified in his 
use of this method. It was the climax of logical pur- 
pose and failed to receive the approval of succeeding 
ages not from any weakness in itself nor because it was 
ill applied, but because the whole process of thought 
has been reversed. Had Deduction retained its hold 
upon the minds of the thinking few, Spinoza's inno- 
vation would have been praised as it has since been 
censured. 

Reference to this early work of Spinoza, then, offers 
a very considerable aid in understanding the method 
of the Ethics. We have found the purpose, I believe, 
he had in view when he employed it both in his earliest 
and in his latest works. As we have seen he certainly 
did not regard this method in the nature of a proof of 



xviii INTRODUCTION 

the positions taken in the Principles, and we find no 
reason for believing that he did in the Ethics. Be- 
sides, in this last work his purpose was practical rather 
than speculative or theoretical. He did not give his 
life to meditation like Descartes, primarily for the 
sake of truth, but ultimately that he might point out 
to man the way of blessedness and peace. His purpose 
was, as the title of the work indicates, ethical not 
metaphysical. He uses demonstration in his work and 
yet not for the sake of the demonstration but that he 
might convince. With his logical mind, so little in- 
fluenced by prejudice of any kind, conviction followed 
demonstration, and he thought that it was always so. 
However, Spinoza did not depend upon this method to 
produce conviction in his readers but upon the truth in 
the premises from which he started. The geometrical 
method would enable others to see clearly what he had 
learned through years of reflection. If once we under- 
stand why it was used, that it rested upon an implicit 
faith in scholastic logic, and that it was the crowning 
attempt of a logical mind to conform absolutely to the 
strictest demand of this iron-clad reason, there need 
be but little difficulty in following his argument and 
to some degree at least in appreciating his presenta- 
tion. But to do this the essential thing is to get rid just 
as far as we can of our scientific prejudices, and grasp 
the problem as it was envisaged by Spinoza, with its 
mediaeval atmosphere. Otherwise the method will re- 
main, as it seems at first, an incomprehensible appli- 
cation of geometrical method to subject matter which 
has no relation at all to the form into which it is put. 
But remembering that that was a deductive age, even 
philosophical truth, we see, was thought to be not dis- 
similar to the mathematical truth which geometry ade- 



INTRODUCTION xix 

quately demonstrates. Back of Spinoza's attempt to 
apply the geometrical method to philosophy was the 
more fundamental attempt to make philosophy as truly 
deductive as geometry. This method, therefore, was 
the logical method, the method best adapted to the 
thought of the age, or as we have expressed it above, 
it was used because of its pedagogical correctness. 

§ 5. Spinoza's complete reliance upon Deduction as 
the true order of all methodical thought and of proof, 
calls attention to another thought of fundamental im- 
portance in understanding his philosophy. Instead of 
building upon the great conclusion of Descartes ac- 
cording to the method of the Novum Organum he 
turns back to the long tried logic of the Scholastics and 
seeks by a more perfect adherence to the principles 
of their logic to deduce a system and explain experi- 
ence, and, Pantheism is the result. To be true to 
Deduction, and it was Spinoza's purpose to be per- 
fectly so, the starting point for reflective thought must 
be a concept which includes all that is to be deduced. 
The logical starting point of Spinoza's system, there- 
fore, is with the concept of God. Since the attempt is 
to be made to follow in thought the plan of creation 
the first step will be to learn everything possible of the 
Creator. So in the Ethics we find Spinoza, true to the 
demands of deductive thought, dividing his work ex- 
actly the reverse of what modern philosophical treat- 
ment demands. In Part I. he treats of God, in Part II. 
of the Origin and then the nature of mind and then in 
Part III. of its affects, etc. Before we study the mind 
we must study God, before we study its nature we 
must study its origin. In every way the order is just 
the reverse of that followed today in attempts to solve 
the mysteries of Reality or to understand Experience. 



xx . INTRODUCTION 

And yet from his point of view his order is the only 
logical one. Attention has been called to these facts 
to show the supreme logical importance of this concept 
of God, in Spinoza's philosophical system. His thought 
so hinges upon this idea for the reasons we have just 
mentioned, that its mastery is the prerequisite for an 
intelligent comprehension of the main tenets of his 
Pantheism. If we wish to understand why Spinoza's 
reflection led him from a Deistic conception of God 
to Pantheism rather than to Theism, or if we wish to 
adequately appreciate the truth in Pantheism we must 
preface our study with the closest investigation pos- 
sible of the idea of God. The key that has not yet 
been used for such study is the historical develop- 
ment of that idea. We cannot appreciate Spinoza's 
definition of God, for example, unless we are ac- 
quainted with some of the prior conceptions of sub- 
stance and with the various attempts to explain Des- 
cartes' Dualism. Nor can we — and this is the region 
in which our inquiry lies — appreciate or rightly com- 
prehend the attributes of Spinoza's God unless we see 
how his ideas on this subject developed from the more 
orthodox theology of a previous period. 

§ 6. In order to get the true starting point of 
Spinoza's ideas concerning God we should remember 
that he had in his veins five thousand years of Mon- 
otheism. A Jew by birth and early training, the pure 
Monotheism of the Hebrew people would be his ear- 
liest conception of God. Soon after completing the 
usual Jewish course of study, with its emphasis upon 
this idea, he turned his attention to Jewish theology 
and for some time was a diligent student of that branch 
of study. His opinions, therefore, were more than in- 
cidently influenced by the theology of the Jewish re- 



INTRODUCTION xxi 

ligion. The influence of this study, however, did not 
seem to confirm him in his earlier, filial acceptance of 
the religion of his fathers. On the other hand we 
know that for his opinions, when still at an early age, 
he was excommunicated for heresy from the syna- 
gogue and anathematized with all the opprobrious 
epithets of that body. The ground of his dissent is 
not hard to see. His philosophic mind, so free at all 
times from passion or prejudice, demanded a broader 
conception of God than the Jewish religion as ordinar- 
ily interpreted supplied. The limited love of God, 
the unsympathetic, uncharitable pride that led the Jews 
to regard themselves as the chosen people of God 
would repel a mind of Spinoza's temperament. The 
very exclusiveness in which the Hebrews so delighted, 
the special favor which they claimed as their peculiar 
birthright from God, was opposed to unprejudiced, re- 
flective thought, as it was also to the principles of 
Christian truth. Philosophy demands a human broth- 
erhood that includes both Jew and Gentile, Barbarian 
and Greek. But such a brotherhood presupposes the 
Fatherhood of God. Such a conception, however, was 
opposed to the traditions of the Hebrew people ; while 
they might acknowledge Jehovah as the creator of all 
people, His love and special care were for their nation 
alone. The history of this people is one long story 
where the safety and welfare of the Hebrews was 
placed above every humanitarian consideration. In 
the Theolo gico-P olitical Treatise, published only a few 
years later than The Principles of Descartes' Philos- 
ophy, etc., we see how strongly this exclusiveness of 
the Jews affected his thought. In the opening words 
of Chapter III. we have these words : " Every man's 
true happiness and blessedness consists solely in the 



xxii INTRODUCTION 

enjoyment of what is good, not in the pride that he 
alone is enjoying it to the exclusion of others. He 
who thinks himself the more blessed because he is 
enjoying benefits which others are not, or because he 
is more blessed^or more fortunate than his fellows, 
is ignorant of true happiness and blessedness, and the 
joy which he feels is either childish or envious and 
malicious. For instance, a man's true happiness con- 
sists only in wisdom and the knowledge of the truth, 
not at all in the fact that he is wiser than others or that 
others lack such knowledge ; such considerations do not 
increase his wisdom or true happiness. 

Whoever, therefore, rejoices for such reasons, re- 
joices in another's misfortune, and is, so far malicious 
and bad, knowing neither true happiness nor the peace 
of the true life." 1 

Beneath this trenchant criticism of the Jewish re- 
ligion there is an implied stricture upon the Jewish 
idea of God. A God who would answer to their de- 
mands for special favor at the expense of other nations, 
was not a God in whom Spinoza could believe. The 
philosophical and rationalistic bias of his mind de- 
manded a God in every attribute, perfect, and in every 
expression of his power infinite. Thus he was early 
led to see the inconsistencies of the traditional Jewish 
conception of God and to seek an idea of Him free 
from personal or national prejudices and in closer ac- 
cord with the highest demands of his rational nature. 
And as he understood these demands, they required a 
God of more universal providence than the ordinary 
conception of Jehovah. With this dissent from the 
Jewish idea of God we find also an attitude of mind 
which we know today under the term " higher criti- 
1 Spinoza's Works, Elwes' Translation, Vol. I. 



INTRODUCTION xxiii 

cism." The influence of this spirit, best seen in the 
treatise mentioned before, was to lead Spinoza away 
from the Jehovah of the Jewish belief to a more ra- 
tionalistic conception of His nature. In the study of 
theology Spinoza had been led to examine this belief 
closely and critically, with the consequent separation 
from much of their most cherished belief. Through- 
out his early study of Jewish theology he was actuated 
by the most liberal interpretation of scriptural dogma. 
Thus while in that theology there were elements of 
monotheism, which we know Spinoza thus far accepted, 
there were also in the traditional side of that teaching 
ground for a most determined dissent. 

We know, too, that Spinoza was also more or less 
influenced by the Christian concept of God ; in all his 
published work the New Testament is accorded an 
equal place with the Old as an expression of the Word 
and Will of God. 

However, since the Jewish and the Christian con- 
cepts of God are practically the same, judged from the 
philosophical point of view, we need not pause to em- 
phasize this fact. All that we need to note is that it 
was from this concept that his later ideas developed. 

§ 7. The other element in Spinoza's early life that 
shaped his thought and determined the character of 
his philosophy, was the widely prevalent doctrines of 
Descartes. So far, almost all that we have seen has 
been a spirited dissent from the current ideas of his 
time without any very definite constructive tenets to 
replace those he was so rapidly rejecting. But this 
was but a clearing away of the debris preparatory to 
the structure soon to be begun. In giving positive 
character to his new ideas and in turning his thoughts 
from a purely theological to a constructive philosoph- 



xxiv INTRODUCTION 

ical character the Cartesian philosophy has its place. 
It was to this work that he turned after his reflection 
led him to part with the synagogue and so give over 
his special work in theology. Much has already been 
written upon Descartes' influence upon Spinoza, and 
yet there is one aspect of it that has not been suffi- 
ciently noted. This, however, is hardly to be won- 
dered at for it is an aspect which the study of Spinoza's 
earliest writings alone reveals. It was not the Dualism 
of Descartes that had the earliest influence upon Spin- 
oza ; neither was it any other of the ontological tenets or 
conclusions of the system that first interested him. 
But as we see by reference to the main theme in his 
early discussion of Descartes' philosophy, the thought 
that first appealed to him and stamped itself upon his 
thought indelibly, was Descartes' concept of God. 
Whether this continued to be of prime importance or 
not in moulding his opinions it was the first great 
factor to gain his serious attention. This was made 
all but inevitable by Spinoza's previous interests and 
study, which, we have seen, were from the first con- 
cerned with questions relating to God. His earliest 
interest, therefore, would be to get the opinions of 
Descartes upon those topics in which he was already 
interested. And not only would his interests be cen- 
tered in this subject, but it would be along this line 
that he could be most directly and most potently in- 
fluenced. It is important, therefore, that we get 
clearly before us Descartes' idea of God, in order that 
we may see how Spinoza's opinions were influenced 
by contact with his theory of the Absolute Being. 
The question for us to answer, if we wish to under- 
stand his Pantheism, is, how did he pass logically from 
these earlier views to the more radical, and heterodox 



INTRODUCTION xxv 

opinions found in the Ethics? We must turn, then, 
to a consideration of Descartes' ideas concerning God 
as they were understood by Spinoza. 

§ 8. Descartes' conception of God, as Spinoza un- 
derstood it, we find most clearly expressed in the Cogi- 
tata Metaphysica, an essay upon certain metaphysical 
subjects, given as an appendix to the " Principles of 
Descartes' Philosophy." The essay itself suggests 
the importance of the concept of God in Spinoza's 
mind, for the whole of the second part is given up 
entirely to this one idea and a good part of Part I. is 
really a prolegomenon to these thoughts. So while 
this discussion is far more independent of Descartes' 
order than is the " Principles," we know that Spinoza 
wrote it more as an expression of Descartes' belief 
than as his own at the time it was written. Still we 
might say for the most part there is in Spinoza's lan- 
guage the ring of conviction, and in his earlier years 
he would probably have accepted even a greater pro- 
portion of it as his own belief. But be this as it may, 
we find in it a wealth of suggestive matter upon the 
idea of God. And this matter if used aright will 
throw much light upon Spinoza's later thought. In 
order to get as much help as possible in understanding 
Spinoza's concept of God, we shall notice this essay 
rather carefully. 

In Part II. of the Cogitata, the part that treats 
more specifically of God and his attributes, there are 
twelve chapters and all except one discuss some char- 
acteristic of His being. The first chapter discusses 
the et entity of God. What is said concerning this 
attribute depends upon the distinction, that must first 
be made clear, between essence and existence, and be- 
tween the essence of created objects and the essence of 



xxvi INTRODUCTION 

God Himself. " Essence," he says, " is nothing else 
than the mode by which created objects are compre- 
hended in the attributes of God. * * * Exist- 
ence is the essence of things considered in themselves 
apart from God, and is attributed to things after 
they have been created by God." 1 The difference be- 
tween essence and existence in created or finite objects 
then is this: The essence of an object concerns its 
reality, not merely as an individual thing, but as it 
stands related to its primary or efficient cause. This 
term lays the emphasis upon the ontological nexus be- 
tween an object and the Absolute Being, and, does not, 
therefore, consist in any sensible quality or attribute. 
The term existence is not so fundamentally ontological. 
When using this term no question is raised as to the 
connection between an object and God, but it is re- 
garded simply as an object of our cognitive experience. 
I do not regard it in its relation to Nature, but in its 
relations to me as an intelligent subject. The first 
term regards its ontological reality, the second its 
sensuous nature; the former expresses its relation to 
and dependence upon the Absolute, the latter its re- 
lation to me a cognitive, knowing subject. 

The other point necessary to understand the Eternity 
of God is the distinction between the essence and ex- 
istence of created objects and the essence and exist- 
ence of uncreated substance or of God. As appears 
from the definitions just given, in created objects or 
in all things except God these terms must be distin- 
guished. But in God this ground of difference disap- 
pears and His essence, His existence, and, indeed, His 
understanding, His will, His decrees, etc., are one. 
There is not one fact that can be used to support our 

1 Cogitata Metaphysica, Pt. I., Chap. II. 



INTRODUCTION xxvii 

belief in the existence of God, that does not have an 
equal importance as an expression of some truth con- 
cerning His essence. In a Being absolutely infinite 
each attribute enfolds all the others so that as objective 
facts they are indistinguishable. This is a proposition 
to which we may well give the most serious attention 
for it not only serves to make clear what is said con- 
cerning the eternity of God, but it is a principle which, 
we shall see, led Spinoza toward his conception of an 
impersonal God. 

With this distinction between essence and existence 
kept in mind we find no difficulty in understanding- the 
eternity of God. Duration pertains only to the exist- 
ence of objects, not to their essence. It relates to the 
sensible qualities of objects and is cognized by our 
powers of sense perception. Eternity, on the other 
hand, belongs to the infinite essence of things, and 
therefore can belong properly but to God. Duration 
and eternity are wholly distinct, and each sui generis. 
Duration applies only to created objects, i. e. to ob- 
jects, the essence of which is not in themselves but in 
God, while the latter term applies only to a Being 
whose essence is wholly self-contained. The temporal 
idea, the essential one in duration, is not so funda- 
mental in the term eternity. The latter term since it 
relates to an attribute of God, embraces by implication 
all the attributes of God. Therefore, though created 
objects should have existed from the beginning, coeval 
with God, we could not ascribe eternity to them unless 
their existence was self-contained and necessary. 
The real ground of distinction, is not temporal there- 
fore, but an essential, ontological differentiation be- 
tween substance that is self-contained, necessary, and 
absolute, and substance that is contingent and depend- 



xxviii INTRODUCTION 

ent. Eternity can be predicated of God alone, not, 
however, merely because He has existed for an in- 
finite time, but because He is the one necessary, abso- 
lute, self-contained, eternal Being. 

From what has been said it follows that the present 
existence of an object does not insure or even imply 
its future being. This depends upon its essence, and 
its essence in turn depends upon God. We today are 
wont to assume that having the bare " stuff " of the 
world once given the rest is easily explainable by nat- 
ural physical law. As both Descartes and Spinoza 
saw the problem it was not so simple. But back of 
every object and of every event stands the power of 
God. His concurrence is necessary in order that these 
objects may exist even for a moment. In every case 
there is a submerging of the finite in the infinite, an 
absolute dependence of every created object upon the 
power and will of God. So dependent becomes the 
finite, and so absolute the infinite that we may well 
ask ourselves if this did not help to turn Spinoza to- 
ward his later conception of God and the world. But 
this thought will appear again before we finish our in- 
vestigation into Descartes' idea of God. 

The other point of interest to us in this discussion of 
duration and eternity is, that it is one step toward 
a complete identification of the attributes of God, which 
leads finally to the necessary or determined character of 
all of God's acts and decrees. But this, too, will be- 
come clearer further on, so we need do no more than 
call attention to it here. 

In Chapter II. of the second part of the Cogitata 
Metaphysica the following argument is given to prove 
that there is but one God. Since omniscience is a nec- 
essary attribute of God, if there were many Gods each 



INTRODUCTION , xxix 

one must have a perfect understanding of all things. 
Each god, therefore, must understand perfectly him- 
self and all the other gods besides. But under such 
conditions the cause of all perfection would not be 
self-contained in God, but would exist partly in Him- 
self and partly in another. This, however, is contrary 
to the concept of God. Therefore, there is but one 
God. 

The significance of this proof does not lie in the 
truth it professes to establish ; to one who did not al- 
ready believe in monotheism this argument would not 
be convincing. Nor does any cogency appear unless 
we accept the method of deductive logic, and acknowl- 
edge the power of the mind to form a priori, a concept 
of God which must be true. It is interesting to us 
here because it is so strictly in accord with the deduc- 
tive character of thought at that time and because it 
shows how all philosophy and all truth is contained in 
this one central idea of God. It foreshadows Spinoza's 
attempt to derive a whole system of philosophy, and to 
explain a world of experimentive facts, by drawing 
upon this concept of God. Besides this, there is the im- 
plied truth, more positively affirmed in another place, 
that God's omniscience is nothing but self knowledge. 
He does not know an objective world as we do, but His 
knowledge is simply knowledge of His own will, and 
of His decrees. From this one idea all things are to 
be deduced, and it is not hard to pass from this knowl- 
edge of things in God, to their existence in Him, which 
is the usual formula for Pantheism. 

The next attribute of God discussed is His greatness. 
This cannot be predicted of God so far as we regard 
Him as an absolutely perfect or infinite Being, but only 
as He is regarded as the efficient cause of the world 



xxx INTRODUCTION 

around us. It is hardly correct to assign magnitude 
at all to infinity, for any assignable magnitude what- 
ever before infinity pales to insignificance and is lost. 
However, the world is a manifestation of the power of 
God, hence since He appears in the effect we may in- 
fer His nature as " first " cause. The cause must be 
adequate for the effect. Since, therefore, there is no 
object by which He may be limited or determined, in 
this respect we may properly apply this term to His 
being. When we use this term to describe His being, 
however, we are regarding the objects in which His 
power is manifested more than His own true character. 
As a " first " cause He is great but per se He is in- 
finite. 

The fourth attribute discussed is the immutability 
of God. In this chapter we are told that God is un- 
changeable and absolutely so. All changes arise 
either from some external cause, the subject being 
either willing or unwilling*, or from some internal 
cause. God is not changed by an external cause for 
He is Himself the cause of all things and can be 
changed by none of them. Neither is there in God 
any self-caused change, for all changes that depend 
upon the will of the subject arise from an attempt to 
pass to a more perfect state of being. But this is im- 
possible in God who is in every way absolutely per- 
fect. God, therefore, is immutable. 

The inferences to be drawn from this conclusion 
are far reaching and for our purposes exceedingly im- 
portant. Practically, there is little difference between 
an unchangeable God, and a God whose acts are all 
determined ; as far as the external world is concerned 
there is no difference at all. There is no more direct 
way to universal Determinism than to affirm, as is 



INTRODUCTION xxxi 

done in this discussion, that God is the sole cause of 
all being, both that it is, and what it is, and that He 
is unchangeable, that His decrees are eternal. If 
God is the efficient cause of all being, not in a general 
way being' simply its creator, but in a concrete, re- 
sponsible way determining the act of every object, we 
have granted all the determinism in Nature that 
Spinoza's system demands. And if we agree with 
this Cartesian philosophy so far as to say that God's 
understanding, and power, and will, and decrees, are 
one, and that He is unchangeable we have little more 
to admit to be in agreement with Spinoza's teaching 
concerning the determined nature of all of God's de- 
crees. The ground for distinguishing between an ab- 
solute, unchangeable God, and a God whose thoughts 
and acts are necessarily what they are, is hard to de- 
fine. In the first case the sequence of events is fixed 
because God in His infinite wisdom has foreseen all 
contingencies and foreordained those changes which 
best accord with His will ; in the latter case the result 
is the same, but God's decrees and the changes in na- 
ture are conceived to be determined, as it were, by 
some hypostasized necessity. 

The matter given in Chapters V. and VI. is so purely 
of scholastic interest that we will do no more than 
note it, for the sake of completeness, in the briefest 
possible way. In the first of these two chapters we 
are told that God is not a composite but a simple Be- 
ing. This conclusion rests upon the distinction intro- 
duced in the first paragraph between " real " and 
" modal " and " rational " being. All composite being 
must be composed of some one combination of these 
three forms. But God is not thus composite, there- 
fore, etc. 



xxxii INTRODUCTION 

The sixth chapter speaks of the life of God, and the 
prime object is to secure a definition broad enough to 
include the life of plants and animals as well as the 
life of men and the life of God. After showing that 
two from Aristotle are unsatisfactory he gives the 
following: ." Life is the force by which objects pre- 
serve their own being." x 

In striking contrast to the two chapters just noted 
the contents of the following three are replete with 
suggestion and worthy of the most careful considera- 
tion : Omniscience, the first attribute of God dis- 
cussed, throughout the whole development of the 
monotheistic idea of God has always been regarded as 
one of His most Godlike attributes. From the re- 
flective or philosophical point of view well may it be 
given this place of prime importance. Upon this at- 
tribute all the other attributes depend. Without om- 
niscience omnipotence is nerveless, His will and His 
decrees are blind and even His love has lost half its 
virtue. For philosophy, therefore, God's omniscience 
assumes the importance of a postulate. Correlated 
with this in importance follows a discussion of the 
will of God. For its bearing, therefore, upon 
Spinoza's universal Determinism it yields in impor- 
tance to no other attribute. 

His remarks in this chapter upon the problem of 
good and evil, another vital question in Pantheism, 
also call for consideration for we find here in this 
chapter the germs of Spinoza's later position in the 
Ethics. But we turn now to notice these points more 
specifically. 

God's omniscience, as we are now almost ready 
to infer, is not a conclusion warranted by induction 

1 Cogitata Metaphysial, Pt. II., Ch. VI. 



INTRODUCTION xxxiii 

but a truth deduced from the idea of an absolutely 
perfect God. God is a being absolutely and infinitely 
perfect. Omniscience is a mark of such perfection. 
Therefore, God is omniscient. This attribute is thus 
established as are all His others, purely deductively. 
God's knowledge, however, is not like ours, derived 
through logical processes of thought, either inductive 
or deductive, but is direct, immediate and infallible. 
Human knowledge is of two kinds, knowledge of ob- 
jective facts and knowledge of subjective states. Des- 
cartes had shown that our knowledge of the external 
world depends upon the veracity of God; that He is 
by nature so true that it would be contrary to His 
character to create us so that our senses are constantly 
deceiving us in their account of the objective world. 
Knowledge of self, on the other hand, is true and cer- 
tain whether God be a deceiver or not. Indeed, so 
certain is the starting point of his philosophy, his 
cogito ergo sum that God Himself, we are told, could 
not deceive me in this one thing. So long as I do 
not go beyond my own conscious states therefore, my 
knowledge is indubitable and sure. God's knowledge, 
as far as it is comparable to finite, human understand- 
ing, is like this latter kind. God even in His om- 
niscience does not pass from His own being, but His 
knowledge is all knowledge of Self. As Spinoza says 
in the second paragraph of this Chapter VII : " Porro 
ex perfectione Dei etiam sequitur, ejus ideas non 
terminari, sicuti nostrae, ab objectis extra Deum po- 
sitis." Based upon this distinction of Descartes be- 
tween the character of knowledge of one's own sub- 
jective states, and a knowledge of the external world, 
God's knowledge is wholly of His own being. It 
therefore has the directness, the completeness, and the 



xxxiv INTRODUCTION 

certainty of self-consciousness. He is the " first " 
and sole cause of all things, therefore, the world is 
contained in His understanding. The world of cre- 
ated things is but a visible expression of His thought, 
or as it is forcibly stated, " He is Himself the object 
of His knowledge, indeed He is that knowledge." 1 

This conclusion, logically developed, leads us far 
toward Pantheism.- There is a great deal more than 
a mere epistemological truth, implicated in its terse as- 
sertion. Besides this, it contains a whole system of 
ontology. If God's knowledge is of Himself alone 
and not of the external world, either His understand- 
ing is imperfect or all things are in some way con- 
tained in Him. The latter alternative is, of course, 
the one Spinoza accepts. But this connection between 
God and the world cannot be simply that between an 
object and its creator unless it is assumed that crea- 
tion is always in progress but never complete. In 
other words, this conception of the understanding of 
God requires that the power and the presence of God 
in nature today be just as real and just as vital as it 
was when Nature was being created. We need not be 
content, however, with our own inference, for this is 
exactly the position we will find maintained when we 
come to notice the chapter on the concurrence of God. 
This conclusion, therefore, if consistently maintained 
is the death-knell to all deistic conceptions of God, 
and leads either to Theism or to the more literal doc- 
trines of Pantheism. It demands a relation between 
God and the world so close that Deism utterly fails 
to supply it. The world does not perdure by virtue of 
some property of inert stuff and God is not a Deus ex 
machina. To satisfy this conclusion, therefore, we 
1 Cogifatct Mctaphysica, Pt. II, Chap. VII. 



INTRODUCTION xxxv 

must turn either to the idealistic conception of Theism 
or to the mystical, materialistic identification of God 
and the world in Pantheism. Just which of these it 
will be, or why it was the latter, we will see depend- 
ed upon factors to be noted later on. 

It wi'll be worth while to mention, since the subject 
occurs in this chapter, God's knowledge of good and 
evil. God, we are told, must know these since He is 
the cause of their being and since they could not ex- 
ist even for a moment without His concurrence. 
These terms, however, are not distinctions grounded 
in reality, but they arise as the mind consciously com- 
pares one object with another. The ground of their 
reality, therefore, is not in God but in the human mind. 
Thus the ontological character of these terms is de- 
stroyed, and the way is paved for Spinoza's doctrine 
of the relativity of good and evil as it is taught in his 
latest work. 

God's will, by which He chooses to love Himself, 
follows from His infinite understanding of His own 
being. But how this will differ from His understand- 
ing or His essence we cannot say. This distinction 
which w r e recognize in the attributes of God is not a 
distinction in God Himself, but arises from the char- 
acter of the human mind. It is, as it is called else- 
where, a distinction of reason. Objectively or in God 
Himself, His understanding, His power, His essence, 
and His will are one. 

It is interesting, too, that Spinoza, in this connec- 
tion, makes special mention of the word personality 
which theologians had introduced to make this dis- 
tinction clear. But, he says, while he was not ig- 
norant of the term itself he was wholly unable to get 
its meaning or to give it any connection that would 



xxxvi INTRODUCTION 

help to explain the difficulty. From the later devel- 
opment of his thought we are compelled to agree with 
him in this and to admit that he was unable to har- 
monize the term with his thought. The subject is 
worthy of consideration, for it perhaps will help us 
somewhat to understand his impersonal God. The 
essential element in personality is intelligent agency, 
or rational free will. But Spinoza, for the reasons 
we have already mentioned and others which we shall 
find as we proceed, could recognize but one agency, 
that is God. One of the signal defects of Pantheism 
is just this, that it fails to recognize this fundamental 
truth concerning man's nature, the fact of his free 
agency. It is easy to understand why this was so ; 
Spinoza's reflection we must remember began not 
with the direct testimony of all our conscious experi- 
ence, but with the concept of God, a being whose at- 
tributes were swallowed up in His infinity. Wrapped 
up as he was in this concept of God, God considered 
primarily as a " first cause," he was never able to 
descend logically to the idea of free finite beings. A 
God whose power and decrees could be hampered in 
the least by the action of moral agents was not a God 
absolute in the way Deduction demanded that its Ab- 
solute should be. This absoluteness of God, insisted 
upon from first to last, excluded from his system the 
existence of free, rational, beings. Such an idea was 
not included in the concept of God, hence it could not 
be derived through deduction nor reconciled with this 
concept when found externally. His strict adherence 
to deductive logic did not in this case at least allow 
him to surreptitiously introduce into his philosophy 
what was not logically deduced from his premises. 
Nor can we wonder at his dilemma. One of the most 



INTRODUCTION xxxyii 

difficult problems theology or philosophy has ever 
known is just upon this point. It is the problem of evil ; 
it is the mystery of freedom ; it is the problem of the one 
and many ; it is the sphinx of philosophy. Spinoza 
encountered it and solved it logically, but merely shift- 
ed the contradiction to another place where it has since 
been speedily found and shifted again and again. We 
have an example, therefore, in connection with this 
word of the drift of all his thought, how in everything 
he was urged on by his logical consistency and his 
early opinions, to the system of his mature age. 

Another significant feature of this early chapter on 
the will of God is found in some further remarks upon 
the problem of evil. It is, as we have learned now to 
expect, in accordance with the eternal, absolute, char- 
acter of God that this problem is solved. As was seen 
in the chapter upon the understanding of God, good 
and evil are terms relative to human thought. We 
might, perhaps, reconcile in some way this statement 
with the ethical character of God, but when we are 
told as we are now that it is only in a very figurative 
sense that we can say that God approves of some acts 
and disapproves of others, our last hope of regarding 
God as an ethical being is destroyed and we are on the 
verge of Pantheism. Destroy the ground of the dis- 
tinction of good and evil in the Absolute, making it 
purely relative to human thought, and there is left to 
God only those attributes which Pantheism emphasizes, 
His understanding, and His power. If it be true that 
all things good and evil alike express God's infinite 
understanding, that they are determined by His will 
and preserved by His power, and above all that no 
moral distinctions are made by God, we must radically 
change our concept of His being. With these propo- 



xxxviii INTRODUCTION 

sitions granted the change must almost necessarily be 
toward the concept Spinoza gives us in the Ethics. 

The purport of Chapter IX. concerning the power 
of God, is to show that His power is commensurate 
with His understanding, and that in respect to His 
decrees, all things are necessary. It cannot be said 
that some things are contingent and others necessary, 
but if God is in all things absolute and, if by His 
power and by His decrees the world is what it is, then 
all things without any exception are forever deter- 
mined to be as they are. Nothing can be except as 
God has willed that it should be. If now it be asked 
whether God has determined that the world should 
be as it is from free choice, Descartes answers this 
question in the affirmative. This position, however, is 
plainly one with which Spinoza would not and could 
not agree. It is a statement out of harmony with his 
belief and even hardly reconcilable with the conclusions 
to which these chapters are leading us. The identifica- 
tions of God's attributes as it is insisted upon makes 
this impossible. If God's understanding, and His 
power, and His essence and His will are one, His 
decrees are as absolute, and as necessary as His under- 
standing or His power. 

The next chapter (Chapter X.), since it presents no 
new facts concerning the nature of God, need not delay 
us here. Merely referring the reader to the transla- 
tion of the chapter given below, we pass on to the last 
attribute of God discussed in the Cogitata. 

This attribute Spinoza, using a Cartesian term, calls 
the concurrence (concursus) of God. This term he 
uses to express the conserving power which God at all 
times manifests in the world. With this attribute the 
chain which establishes an indissoluble connection be- 



INTRODUCTION xxxix 

tween God and nature both in its manifestations of 
mind, and in its manifestations of matter, is complete. 

So vital is this connection that the world is, as it 
were, created anew every single moment of its exist- 
ence. Or, to express the thought in another way, 
God's power and His presence in the world at all times 
is no whit less real or less powerful than it was in the 
act of the first creation. Created objects do not have 
in themselves the power of existence, or of determining 
any of their actions. But all things depend, and 
depend absolutely upon the power and the presence of 
God for their reality and for their continuance of 
being. Thus, as Spinoza restates the philosophy of 
Descartes we encounter propositions that are almost if 
not quite pantheistic. They are, to say the least, so 
anti-deistic that Deism can no longer in the face of so 
powerful a refutation, be maintained. This conception 
of God must yield place to a concept that lays more 
stress upon the vital necessity of God's constant pres- 
ence in the world. Theism, or Pantheism, therefore, 
becomes the only tenable hypothesis of the World 
Ground. Why Spinoza rejected Theism and accepted 
Pantheism as the more rational conception we shall 
now proceed to inquire. 

Although at the time this work was written Spinoza 
had doubtlessly advanced further toward Pantheism 
than this discussion indicates, still, we have every rea- 
son to believe that only a few years earlier than this 
he held essentially the position we have outlined. The 
conception of God we have given was Spinoza's view 
of the Cartesian philosophy, which system he studied 
and at an early date partially accepted. It is our 
purpose to see, so far as we can, why he rejected his 
earlier concept of God, and accepted Pantheism as 



xl INTRODUCTION 

a more logical, more satisfactory conception. It is of 
but little moment, therefore, whether it was a few 
months earlier or a few months later that his mind 
left the opinions we have presented and started on an 
independent course. The essential thing is that he at 
one time accepted the opinions here expressed, and, as 
we believe and hope to show, found in them elements 
that led him finally to the conception of God found in 
the Ethics. Beside this, there is, in the different points 
presented, in the order in which they are arranged as 
well as in the general method of treatment, a reflection 
of Spinoza's own thought showing through his at- 
tempted concealment. 

Especially is this true in the Cogitata Metaphysica 
which is a less formal treatment than the first Part of 
the " Principles " where the same subject is discussed. 
Although there are cases, even here, where Spinoza's 
opinions are directly opposed to the view presented, 
there are others where he is expressing his own con- 
viction. 

Recalling, then, the points we have noted in this 
brief review of the concept of God we ask, are there 
any general principles involved that will help us to 
understand Spinoza's Pantheism ; why he came to ac- 
cept that idea of God, and what its essential doc- 
trines are? In answer to this inquiry we at once 
assert that there are. Throughout our examination of 
this essay, point after point has appeared, all converg- 
ing toward Pantheism. In connection with almost 
every attribute of God discussed some truth has been 
found which plainly suggested, if it did not demand, 
a pantheistic idea of God. 

§ 9. One of the things that was insisted upon from 
the beginning, was the identification of all divine attri- 



INTRODUCTION xli 

butes in God. Although for human thought it is nec- 
essary for us to speak of God's understanding, or of 
His power, or of His decrees, or of His will, this is a 
necessity arising from the modes of finite thought not 
from the true character of God. In Himself God 
knows no such distinctions. His understanding is His 
will, and His power is identical with his decrees. In 
God as He really is, His attributes are one and indis- 
tinguishable. The perfection of the one implies the 
presence and perfection of all the others, so that any 
attempt to conceive of the existence of one apart from 
all the others is hopelessly futile. We may note, too, 
in this connection, that this idea of the indistinguishable 
unity of God's attributes is Spinoza's idea, not Des- 
cartes's. We are told in the Preface of Dr. Meyer 
that Spinoza did not believe with Descartes that the 
will is something distinct from the understanding, 
much less that it has the freedom which Descartes 
maintained that it possesses. 1 The logical inferences 
that, follow from this identification, therefore, may be 
accepted without reserve, and we may point to it as a 
factor that helped to determine Spinoza's later thought. 

§ 10. The most important deduction to be drawn 
from this identification of God's attributes, is the de- 
termined or necessary character of all His decrees and 
acts, and the consequent impersonal nature of His 
being. If it be true, as Spinoza constantly assumes, 
that God is in every attribute absolutely perfect, does 
this complete perfection involve a greater freedom or 
a greater necessity ? Is a king by virtue of his power 
more free in his acts, or more constrained by the ac- 
companying necessities of his position ? Descartes held 
that God's perfection brought infinite freedom, that He 

1 See Preface, p. 7. 



xlil INTRODUCTION 

was not determined by His infinite understanding or 
by His infinite will. Spinoza, on the other hand, holds 
that if God's understanding is absolute, and His under- 
standing and His decrees are one, this complete knowl- 
edge of every contingency binds Him to one course of 
action. For as there can be but one absolutely per- 
fect Being, so His perfection must be of just one kind. 
It is just as necessary that the attributes of such a 
Being should be just what they are, as that they should 
be contained in His nature. Intelligence does impose 
obligations, and a perfect understanding of every cause, 
and every factor involved, if all nature is one, demands 
that in every case the result shall be just that one 
thing. 

This necessity, however, is not external. The nature 
of God is absolute, and He cannot be changed or even 
influenced except by His own understanding. But be- 
cause He is determined not by an external force, but by 
His own nature, it does not follow that He is less 
determined or that His actions are less necessary. On 
the other hand, there is no compulsion so absolute as 
that coming from within. From the nature of the case 
this is the only compulsion that God can know. Com- 
ing as it does, then, from God's nature, it is so far a 
perfectly harmless tenet, for it only affirms that God 
is God, and that Nature is a faithful, a necessary ex- 
pression of His being. 

It will be worth our while at this point to inquire 
a little further into the nature of the compulsion under 
which God acts as it follows from this early discussion 
of Spinoza. Our conclusions on this subject, it is evi- 
dent, must rest upon the attributes assigned to God, so 
we need but to recall what has been said to make this 
point clear. Good and evil we were told are terms 



INTRODUCTION xliii 

relative to human thought, and God knows them only 
in this connection. 1 The same thought is further em- 
phasized when we hear that God does not regard some, 
acts with favor and others with disfavor. 2 These 
terms arise as we, comparing one object with another, 
find one adapted to our welfare, and another opposed 
to our interests. All things alike, whether we regard 
them as good or evil, express God's infinite understand- 
ing and His will for they could not exist for a single 
moment without His concurrence. It follows, there- 
fore, that God does not know good and evil apart from 
the human mind, that they are not real but rational 
distinctions. These are not terms that are connected 
with the essence of objects, but are merely forms of 
human thought. God, therefore, is not constrained by 
considerations of this kind, and the necessity under 
which he acts is not a moral necessity. God does not 
know the force of moral obligation. While He is de- 
termined by His nature, it is not His nature considered 
as a moral Being. 

Excluded from obedience to supreme moral princi- 
ples as the guiding motive in God's government of the 
world, we turn to intellectual considerations to see if 
there can be such a thing as intellectual or logical com- 
pulsion. A previous knowledge of the Ethics leads 
us to expect that it will be in this attribute of God 
that we shall find the necessity that makes all of His 
acts determined. Not only do we find intellectual ele- 
ments regarded as the highest expression of God's per- 
fection the source of His blessedness, but it was a fa- 
vorite tenet of Descartes accepted by Spinoza that 
whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived must be 

1 Vid. supra, p. xxxv. 

2 Ibid p. xxxvii. 



xliv INTRODUCTION 

true. In some way the connection between clear logi- 
cal thought and Reality is so vital that what is thus 
clearly understood must exist. This, too, not with 
God's thought, but with finite human thought. If 
such a statement can be made of our fallible human 
thought, how much greater the necessity between God's 
infinite understanding and the real sequence of Na- 
ture's changes. We are often told today and with a 
good measure of truth, that it is only because of our 
ignorance of causes that we regard some things as 
necessary and some as contingent. Spinoza antici- 
pated this argument of modern Materialism and car- 
ried this thought years ago to its logical conclusion : 
with God there is perfect, absolute understanding of all 
things, and this understanding determines His decrees, 
which are not less absolute than is His foreknowledge. 
So far as God's knowledge is absolute, it will determine 
what all things shall be, nay, what they must be, if 
God is to retain His absolute character. Any devia- 
tion from this prescribed cause, or any failure in the 
least part of the fore-ordained sequence destroys the 
whole order of Nature. In a universe where there are 
so many factors, where action and reaction assume 
such a multitude of directions and inter-relations, noth- 
ing less than infinite understanding could have planned 
it all, and nothing less than absolute conformity to that 
knowledge could preserve it. Just as it has been 
shown that there can exist but one absolutely perfect 
being, so it might be shown that there is but one abso- 
lutely perfect plan for nature. Perfection of knowl- 
edge is just as singular as perfection of being, and 
there could no more be two perfect plans for nature 
than there could be two absolute divinities. 

Such would be the logical inferences by which Spin- 



INTRODUCTION xlv 

oza might pass from the premises of Descartes to the 
deterministic idea of God found in his own mature 
thought. There are elements in the Cartesian phil- 
osophy, which, harmless though they seem, lead us at 
once and directly to some of the tenets of Pantheism. 
Of this nature are the inferences that follow from this 
identification of the attributes of God. And there can 
be but little doubt that Spinoza when he wrote the 
Cogitata Metaphysica recognized these truths and was 
deeply influenced by them. Though he gives us a very 
faithful presentation of Descartes' thought still he has 
presented the argument whether consciously or not, so 
that it shows us the nature of his own reflection and 
forecasts his later thought. If we allow our minds to 
move at all from the positions as they are given we 
must reject Descartes' assertion that God is absolutely 
free and believe with Spinoza that He is determined 
by the absolute character of His being. 

We need not, however, stand aghast at this proposi- 
tion, for when it is said that God's acts are all deter- 
mined, since they are determined not by an external 
force, but by the necessities of His infinite understand- 
ing, we only in this assert that God is true to His 
nature and that His decrees are the decrees of infinite 
wisdom. Far from being a confession of fatalism, 
therefore, this proposition, strange as it may sound, is 
intellectual opinionism of the strongest type. God's 
acts are necessary, not, however, because of any exter- 
nal compulsion, but because the requirements of His 
intelligence demand an unchanging invariable se- 
quence of events. However, a God who acts, nay, is 
compelled to act in accordance with His infinite under- 
standing, may be a God who can justly claim our 
adoration and love. I say may be, for while this con- 



xlvi INTRODUCTION 

formity to the requirements of an absolute intelligence 
is one of the demands of Godhood, there are others 
which are considered by the human mind to be not less 
but even more important. And if these are not present 
as guiding principles of His decrees there will be 
wanting in His nature that which the human soul re- 
quires in its God. 

§ ii. Having seen the nature of the Determinism 
under which God rests, we are now at the point where 
we may raise the question whether this Determinism 
by destroying the personal nature of God is a direct 
step toward the God of Spinoza's Pantheism. Since 
God is determined not by an external force, but by the 
necessities of such a fundamental mental requirement 
as intelligence, it seems possible to entertain the hope 
that under this kind of necessity we may yet maintain 
the Personality of God. For surely to act always in 
accord with the demands of intelligence is a personal 
trait devoutly to be hoped for. Our hope, however, 
will be short lived, for as we have suggested above 
intelligence though it be absolutely perfect and com- 
plete, is not the sole attribute of God ; and a doctrine 
of the Absolute that is based upon this attribute alone 
cannot satisfy the more exacting requirements of a 
philosophical conception of God. It is a truth estab- 
lished by all historical investigation and by psycholog- 
ical analysis, that a people's conception of God reflect 
their best ideals of culture and of growth. God is, in 
some general way, the sum total of their ideals, of 
mental and moral virtue. To limit the attributes of, 
God to intellectual elements merely, or even to make 
this the matter of prime importance at once circum- 
scribes our ideas of virtue, and limits human endeavor 
and human attainment to this kind of development. 



INTRODUCTION xlvii 

We need no better illustration of this point than that 
furnished by Spinoza's own system. For there the 
fundamental attribute of God, if we may use that term 
where each attribute is infinite and all are one, is His 
infinite understanding. Perfectly logically, therefore, 
he makes the end of human endeavor, the highest eth- 
ical good, the Summum Bonum, to be this intellectual 
comprehension of Nature as of God. Spinoza's sys- 
tem might be judged, therefore, and judged rightly by 
showing how meagerly or how completely it contains 
those elements which are included under the term " per- 
sonality." For we may rest assured that a people will 
not transcend, in their general plane of living, the ideals 
they have included in their best conception of God. 
We do not need, however, to resort to indirect methods 
to get Spinoza's view concerning God's ethical nature. 
For we have already seen that according to the " Cogi- 
tata " good and evil are terms relative to human 
thought, and in no way connected with the essence 
of things. Thus by a word we are prohibited from 
attributing to God any of those qualities which are 
almost universally regarded as the foundation of char- 
acter and of true personality. Good and evil do not 
exist apart from finite thought, and have no foundation 
in Reality or God. The attributes of personality that 
arise from ethical elements must, therefore, be denied. 
God's decrees are not determined or even influenced 
by these considerations. 

Another line of thought will further show us how 
the personal character of God is lost and how Spinoza 
was turned to the impersonal God of Pantheism. We 
have noted above how the different attributes of God 
are identified and become, in Him, indistinguishable. 
As far as its effect upon His personal nature is con- 



xlviii INTRODUCTION 

cerned it is a matter of little importance whether these 
attributes be identified or be denied. In the latter 
case they are destroyed through denial, in the former 
they are swallowed up in God's infinity. In either 
case all similarity to our best conceptions of Personal- 
ity are destroyed. However much we dislike the 
charge of " anthropomorphism " we have no other way 
in which to interpret phenomena philosophically. 
Hence while it may be perfectly true that these attri- 
butes are closer related to one another than in man, 
each one necessarily implying all the others to their 
full perfection, still when it is said that they are all 
identified and indistinguishable, our language is either 
meaningless or it affirms that God has lost all those 
attributes connoted by the term " personal." If God's 
understanding, His essence, His will, His power and 
His decrees are one, what, we may well ask, is the char- 
acter of God. Eliminating as far as possible the non- 
common elements we come finally to the absoluteness of 
each attribute as the one common factor. His under- 
standing is absolute, His power is absolute, his decrees 
are absolute ; the logical result of this absolute charac- 
ter of God's attributes is Absolutism or Determinism 
that includes in an unvarying sequence, every event in 
nature, whether it be physical or whether it be mental 
or moral. So absolute is His nature that God Himself 
is bound by the necessity of His attributes. 

This absoluteness in God's nature, this Determinism 
in the heart of Reality is not the less impersonal be- 
cause it rests upon an infinite intelligence. It is true 
that understanding is an attribute of Personality, but 
all materialistic philosophers will admit that there is 
intelligence in nature's laws. Otherwise the world 
were no cosmos, and all philosophy were futile and 



INTRODUCTION xlix 

vain. The question at issue between Theism and 
Materialism is not whether intelligence is manifested 
in nature, whether nature is not everywhere and al- 
ways conformable to Law. This fact is, especially in 
our day of Science, accepted without one dissenting 
voice. For if there is no reason in the world it is use- 
less to attempt rational explanations of the world's 
phenomena. Mere chance is by hypothesis inexplic- 
able. And to contend that the universe is a mere con- 
course of atoms without Law is an absurdity that no 
one would have the mental bravado to assert. There 
are laws in nature, laws that can be expressed in 
rational terms and understood by rational beings. 
The only question is, how shall we explain the pres- 
ence of mental regulations in matter? How shall 
we interpret this complete obedience of matter to 
laws that can only be expressed or understood in 
the light of intelligence? For so entirely is matter 
amenable to law that not one atom in all nature ever 
mistakes its duty, or ever refuses, however unusual 
the position in which it is placed, to comply instantly 
with the demands of the laws under which it acts. 
That this is true the Materialist will affirm even more 
vehemently than the Theist. For, while the latter may 
believe that miraculous manifestations of God's power 
are not incompatible with the world order, the Mate- 
rialist guards the sanctity of " Natural Law " with the 
jealousy of desperation. In his case, if it is once 
even in the most trivial way inoperative the chain is 
broken and the whole order is destroyed. The differ- 
ence between Theism and Materialism is found in the 
explanation offered for these facts. Theism maintains 
that this Natural Law arises from the Creator of the 
world, a Personal Being. Materialism would show 



1 INTRODUCTION 

and have us believe that this rational element in nature 
does not originate in a personal Agent or God, but is 
somehow included in the very constitution of inani- 
mate matter. Materialism recognizes the element of 
law in nature, the guiding power of certain rational 
principles, and yet does not feel constrained by this fact 
to assert that it comes from a personal Absolute. It is 
not sufficient, therefore, to establish the personal char- 
acter of God, to say that His acts and His decrees are 
an expression of absolute intelligence. If God is a 
personal being, something more than an infinite under- 
standing must be attributed to Him as principles which 
influence Him in His government of the world. 

Should we inquire more specifically what these prin- 
ciples must needs be, we would soon come to the con- 
clusion that what is demanded is that God should be 
an ethical as well as intellectual Being. I can respect 
or stand in awe of a Being whose understanding and 
whose power are infinite, but I cannot love a God who 
is not Love, and I cannot adore a Being insensible to 
considerations of such vital importance to me as good 
and evil. The highest demand of the religious mind is 
that its God should be an ethical Spirit; and the phil- 
osophical conception of Personality requires that this 
concept should include all of those factors which, by 
reflective thought are held to constitute the essential 
nature of the human mind. It is impossible, therefore, 
to have any adequate conception of Personality with- 
out including in it, as one of its most essential factors, 
a supreme regard for ethical elements. Hence the few 
remarks made concerning good and evil in Chapters 
VII. and VIII. of the Cogitata Metaphysica are ex- 
tremely significant. The position there taken helps us 
to understand how Spinoza was led to reject the more 



INTRODUCTION li 

orthodox conception of God and to find the only satis- 
factory Absolute in the God of his Pantheism. By this 
denial of the ethical attributes of God, by making good 
and evil wholly relative to human thought and human 
desire, all moral qualities in God are destroyed, and 
we have then, as the highest determining force in God's 
nature, this intellectual understanding of cause and ef- 
fect which, we have seen, does not in any true sense 
demand that He should be a personal Being. Hence, 
even in this early discussion of God, we find the way 
open for the impersonal Absolute, which is the basis of 
Spinoza's Pantheism. We have given here a thought, 
which alone logically developed and its implied infer- 
ences regarded, precludes Theism, and consequently 
supports the conception of God found in the Ethics. 

The full import of what has just been said concern- 
ing the necessary or determined character of God's de- 
crees, and the consequent impersonal nature of the Ab- 
solute escapes us unless it is taken in connection with 
the deductive character of Spinoza's thought. We 
have already shown that from the earliest period of his 
reflection Spinoza's interest centered in the concept of 
God. Not, however, altogether for the intrinsic inter- 
est of that subject, but partly as the starting point of 
his constructive system. A deductive philosophy re- 
quires as its starting point a concept which includes all 
that is to appear in the system. But why or how ap- 
pear? From logical or intellectual necessity. It de- 
mands first an absolute God. And if the system is log- 
ically carried out no truth will be recognized which 
does not follow in this necessary way from the prem- 
ises previously laid down. If the premises are once 
fixed, determined, the inferences at once follow by in- 
tellectual necessity and are as necessary as the princi- 



Hi INTRODUCTION 

pies from which they are deduced. Thus when Spin- 
oza accepted Deduction as the great Organon of truth 
and the geometrical method as the most consistent 
method of presentation, his philosophy is at once strait- 
ened to the requirements of that method. As the con- 
clusions in geometry follow from a logical or rational 
necessity, so nature is just what it is because of a 
similar intellectual necessity. Spinoza was dominated 
through and through with this deductive nature of 
thought so that he believed it was the image of reality. 
What was necessary logically, was necessary in reality. 
To follow Spinoza in his reasoning this truth must be 
always kept in mind. 

Having shown how the conception of God given in 
the " Cogitata " was such as to turn Spinoza's mind 
toward Pantheism, and how also it prepared the way 
for the impersonal Absolute of that system, we turn 
now to notice some of the more particular factors, that 
had part in this result. A consideration of these will 
further show us how Spinoza, when his ideas of the 
absolute supremacy of God in nature had made im- 
possible his acceptance of any deistic theory of God, 
turned not to Theism but to the more radical, more 
materialistic absolute of Pantheism. 

§ 12. Spinoza seems to have been from the begin- 
ning a rationalist. The universal doubt of Descartes 
had probably some influence in this direction, at least 
so far as to make Spinoza wary of accepting as true 
that which could not be supported by the logic on which 
he relied. Deduction, depending as it does not upon 
empirical verification but upon rational premises and 
logical inference, prepares the way for the rejection of 
everything that does not admit of this kind of proof. 
To establish the truth of any proposition, therefore, his 



INTRODUCTION liii 

sole reliance was upon reason. This early rationalism 
was in all probability the immediate cause of his breach 
with the Jewish synagogue. In the " Theologico-Po- 
litical Treatise " written only a few years after the 
Principles the result of this critical spirit is manifest 
and we see how he was led away from the more ortho- 
dox conception of God. With a spirit akin to the 
ultra critical spirit of our present day, he proceeds 
to sift all the claims of the supernatural in the Scrip- 
tures, and in the end rejects everything that shows the 
touch of a hand other than nature. In the chapter 
on miracles, he thus states his purpose : " I will show," 
he says, 

I. " That nature cannot be contravened, but that 
she preserves a fixed and immutable order, and at the 
same time I will explain what is meant by a miracle. 

II. " That God's nature and existence, and conse- 
quently His providence cannot be known from mira- 
cles, but that they can all be much better perceived 
from the fixed and immutable order of nature. 

III. " That by the decrees and volitions, and conse- 
quently the providence of God, Scripture (as I will 
prove by Scriptural examples) means nothing but na- 
ture's order following necessarily from her eternal 
laws." 1 

These statements, the result of a few added years of 
reflection upon the nature of God, reveal the character 
of Spinoza's early thought. His critical, rationalistic 
mind had not only led him to reject the Jewish and the 
Christian doctrine of Inspiration and of Miracles, but 
had now caused him to give up his belief in a personal 
God. The import of these words is deep and unmis- 
takable. There is a complete surrender of all Liber- 

1 Spinoza's Works, Elwes' Trans., p. 82. 



liv INTRODUCTION 

tarianism and an unqualified acceptance of Determin- 
ism. His early anthropomorphic conception of God 
was now supplanted by the conception that appears 
later in the Ethics. God's providence and care appear 
not in special manifestations of His power, but in the 
presence of universal, invisible laws. The very per- 
sonal fact of a special display of wisdom or of power, is 
made impossible by the sway of principles that know 
no exception to their uniform control. All things are 
determined, following from an absolute necessity. 
And instead of a God whose attitude toward men and 
whose character permits of miraculous expressions of 
His love and His wisdom, God has become a being 
impossible to know except through a study of His 
eternal decrees, the laws of Nature, and impossible to 
love except with a purely intellectual love. When 
Spinoza published this Treatise, therefore, in 1670, 
but seven years after the first appearance of the Prin- 
ciples, his conception of God and of God's relation to 
the world were essentially pantheistic. 

§ 13. Another reason why Spinoza's thought turned 
not to Theism but to Pantheism, is the fact that Theism 
is by nature idealistic, while Pantheism is half, if not 
entirely materialistic. Theism regards God as a spirit- 
ual, personal Being immanent in nature and yet tran- 
scending her every form. While every object and 
every action have their cause in God, His presence is 
not a sensible but a metaphysical fact. This doctrine 
is the doctrine of mind in matter, of the ideal in the 
real, of the spiritual in the corporeal. It is evident that 
we have come face to face with the great problem 
which Descartes so clearly stated for subsequent phil- 
osophy, the relation of the physical and the psychical. 
In order to effect the close relation between God and 



INTRODUCTION lv 

the world, Pantheism is distinctly opposed to the 
idealism of Theism. It is impossible to assert the 
primacy of spirit and remain in Pantheism. On the 
other hand this doctrine so far does away with the dis- 
tinction between body and spirit as to make them co- 
relative attributes of one and the same substance, name- 
ly God. The extended world, Pantheism asserts, is as 
truly and as essentially a part of God as the world of 
thought. But this will be better seen if we turn back 
for a few minutes to see the condition of the problem 
as it was handed down to Spinoza. 

Since the time of Descartes, if never before, one of 
the fundamental problems of philosophy has been to 
explain the relation between mind and matter. Des- 
cartes stated this problem so clearly that those who 
immediately followed him had their whole philosophy 
characterized largely by the position they held upon 
this subject. How are mind and matter related? 
How do they react upon one another when apparently 
there are no grounds of inter-relation? The starting 
point of Descartes' system, his Cogito ergo sum is the 
primal truth of Epistemology because in it all traces of 
this question have been eliminated, and it is an assertion 
that applies wholly to the realm of thought. This 
predication, therefore, was untainted by any of the 
doubts that gather round the still unsolved problem of 
the relation between the psychical and the physical. 
However, the whole problem of philosophy is not episte- 
mological, but there are metaphysical problems as well. 
And the fact that by eliminating all sensuous elements 
Descartes had gained a foothold on Reality, but served 
to emphasize the contrast between the world of mind 
and the world of matter. To put the matter succinctly, 
Descartes found an antithesis between mind and matter 



Ivi INTRODUCTION 

which came to be not only a fundamental problem in 
his philosophy, but a distinction that served as a 
ground of separation for those who immediately fol- 
lowed him. In endeavoring to formulate a rational 
theory concerning the relation of mind and matter Des- 
cartes, Geulincx, Malebranche, and Spinoza, each takes 
a characteristic position which is the key to his system 
of philosophy. So vital did this point continue to be 
after Descartes had once stated it, that these four men 
gave their best efforts to find a satisfactory solution 
for its perplexities. Descartes taught that God is in- 
finite thought, and that the human mind participates in 
His absolute character. He is not, however, infinite 
extension of which finite objects are but modes, but His 
essential nature is mental, not corporeal. Geulincx 
held that thought and extension are both modes of two 
disparate substances. The distinction between his phil- 
osophy and the philosophy of Spinoza, therefore, lies 
in the fact that mind and matter are not modifications 
of the same substance but of two separate substances. 
Malebranche was in accord with Descartes and Geu- 
lincx so far as to affirm that bodies are modes of in- 
finite extension, but minds, on the other hand, instead 
of being modes of infinite thought, have a substantial 
existence. 1 

Spinoza, too, accepted this dualism of Descartes as a 
fundamental philosophical truth and embodied it as one 
of the cardinal principles of his system. One of his 
purposes also was to find a theory of Reality that 
would explain the interaction of such disparate sub- 
stances as mind and matter. He recognized a world 
of mental phenomena and an extended world. His ex- 
planation of their interaction, however, was not that 

1 Cf. Erdmann's History of Phil., Vol. II, p. 31. 



INTRODUCTION Ivu 

of any of the three men whose position we have just 
stated. Neither Descartes, who was in this an idealist, 
nor Geulincx, nor Malebranche, dared to maintain an 
equality of importance between these two aspects of 
substance, but primacy was with them uniformly 
ascribed to mind. Spinoza, of them all, maintained 
that thought and extension are two correlated attri- 
butes of one and the same infinite substance, i. e., 
God. His position upon this point, the solution of 
Cartesian Dualism by thus making mind and matter 
not two substances but two attributes of one substance, 
not only differentiates his philosophy from that of the 
men whose position we have noted, but it states a fun- 
damental truth of Pantheism. While the others, as we 
have already seen, one in one way, one in another, at- 
tributed a certain primacy to mind, Spinoza boldly cor- 
relates these two worlds and makes them equally an 
expression of the power and presence of the one abso- 
lute God. With him the physical world is just as truly 
and just as profoundly a manifestation of God's being 
as the most idealistic principles of the rational world. 
There is but one true Substance, whose attributes as 
modes are thought and extension. The former attri- 
bute is no more essential to God's being than the latter, 
for both are infinite attributes and both express funda- 
mental truth concerning His nature. Spinoza's ex- 
planation of Cartesian Dualism, therefore, was a direct 
step toward Pantheism. He accepts the distinction but 
interprets it so that it harmonizes perfectly with the 
demands of the logic he had already adopted, and with 
his belief concerning the supreme importance of the 
concept of God. Thus Spinoza accepted the only ex- 
planation of the Cartesian Dualism that would make 
his Pantheism possible. The supremacy of mind 



lviii INTRODUCTION 

over matter means some form of Deism or Theism. 
The primacy of matter means Materialism. The cor- 
relation of the two as attributes or modes of one Sub- 
stance is Pantheism. 

Thus while Descartes established the basis for a 
sound Epistemology, his Dualism, the antithesis be- 
tween thought and extension, opened the way for 
Pantheism or even for Materialism. Of course these 
beliefs were never favored in his own mind, but the 
metaphysical principles involved, variously interpreted, 
did lead to these more radical conceptions of Reality. 
Had Spinoza merely reversed the assertion of his pred- 
ecessors and affirmed that not mind but matter is the 
cause of all phenomena, he would have become a 
materialist. But this he could not do ; he was too firm 
a believer in the substantial nature of thought, and in 
the power of logic, to ever make this of secondary im- 
portance. On the other hand this supreme confidence 
in reason, this natural inclination toward rationalism, 
led him to deny all manifestations of supernatural 
power, and to rely exclusively upon the natural 
sequence of events for all knowledge of God's nature 
and of His decrees. Nature, therefore, in all her 
physical forms, and especially in her laws, becomes a 
matter of the highest importance to philosophy. 
Spinoza, therefore, influenced on the one hand by his 
belief in the absolute character of logic, and on the 
other by his belief in the uniformity of natural 
sequence, could affirm the primacy of neither mind nor 
matter, but must make them necessarily correlated 
forms of Reality. The person who refuses, as Spinoza 
did, all miraculous expressions of divine power as 
highly improbable if not actually impossible, must sup- 
port his philosophy by showing some very close con- 



INTRODUCTION Iix 

nection between physical phenomena and God. For 
this, the rather artificial explanation of Deism will not 
suffice. But, on the other hand, the person who 
accepts the invariable sequence of nature without pos- 
sibility of intervention by any cause whatever, as the 
fundamental postulate of philosophy, must deny the 
ideality of God's being as it is represented in Theism. 
For in whatever form antitheistic theories may appear 
in the last analysis they will be found to base their 
argument upon this unyielding sequence in the natural 
world, upon the necessity of all physical acts. So it 
has always been, and so it will doubtless remain. 
Hence, because Spinoza could not accept exclusively 
either the interpretation of Theism or of Materialism, 
he could do nothing else than combine the essential 
features of both in his theory of a pantheistic Ontology. 
§14. We have found in our investigation, therefore, 
three factors which have concurred to turn Spinoza's 
thought from a deistic conception of God to Pantheism. 
,No one of them alone, perhaps, would have been suf- 
ficient to produce his radical departure from the 
philosophy of his time ; but the three taken together 
with cumulative force make any other cosmic theory 
than Pantheism almost impossible. He gave as we 
have seen an unqualified allegiance to the old Aris- 
totelian Logic, as the true Organon of truth. Deduc- 
tion is the only true method of determining truth. 
Some concept must needs be found, therefore, which 
connects all being. Since from it all things are to be 
deduced, in it all things must be contained. Such a 
concept as this Spinoza found in his pantheistic con- 
cept of God. Far from being criticised for his attempt 
to find one idea in which the whole world is contained, 
he deserves praise for the clear insight into the demands 



lx INTRODUCTION 

of this method and for his attempt to satisfy them. 
If criticised at all it should be for the vanity of his 
attempt and for the failure to see the value of the 
Novum Organ um which for forty years had been be- 
fore the world. Deduction demanded this concept of 
God, not as its goal, but as the very starting point of its 
functioning, the postulate of its truth. And in no 
small degree Spinoza by the iron-bound apodeictic char- 
acter of this logic, was led to a belief in a God of sim- 
ilar character. As induction permeates and influences 
all our ideas to-day, so deduction then cast its influence 
over every concept of philosophy. 

The second point we have noted in our discussion 
which gave shape to Spinoza's thought is this concept 
of God. So close is the connection between deduction 
and this idea that it is almost impossible to conceive 
of the former, w r hen it is to be used to establish a 
philosophic system, without the latter. In this con- 
nection they are true complements of one another. We 
have already seen that this idea of God, was historic- 
ally considered a fundamental idea in Spinoza's reflec- 
tion ; we can now see that it was made so necessarily 
by his close allegiance to deduction and by his strict 
conformity to scholastic logic. This concept of God, 
however, was not discovered out of hand, ready- 
made, but was the product of years of careful 
thought, and of definite, though little investigated 
causes. Logically this concept was prior to Pantheism 
as a system, and largely determined just what the 
main tenets of that philosophy must be. To under- 
stand fully just what Pantheism is, therefore, we 
have had recourse to the historical development of 
the idea of God, and sought to show how certain 
ideas in the more orthodox conception, with but a 



INTRODUCTION lxi 

slight modification may become quite pantheistic. 
God's absolute power makes Him the sole cause of all 
being, and the absolute character of His decrees is 
Determinism. So absolute is the character of God, 
and so vital the connection between His being, and 
the existence and essence of all objects that Deism is 
at once declared insufficient. Since in effect the 
world is created anew every moment, God's presence 
and His power in nature must be as real as the objects 
themselves. It is not so, however, according to the 
deistic hypothesis, so that theory of God's being is at 
once rejected, and Theism, Materialism or Panthe- 
ism must be the true conception of His being. 

It was just at this critical point, when Spinoza's 
beliefs were in the plastic state, that the influence of 
Descartes' philosophy came in to give them definite 
character and to throw his mind irrevocably toward 
Pantheism. This effect is, as we have suggested, 
prepared for by his rationalism, and yet this alone 
might as well have led to Materialism as to Theism. 
But as the Dualism of Descartes was interpreted and 
explained by Spinoza, there was no other concept of 
God that could so well satisfy the logical demands of 
this explanation as Pantheism. Spinoza retained the 
dualistic distinction of Descartes and this made 
urgent some theory that would recognize the rights 
of both of these phases of reality. Since from the 
rationalistic character of his early thought Spinoza 
was led to reject all supernatural expressions of God's 
power, he could find the power of God only in the 
laws of nature. God is present in every form of the 
objective world, and not one change can be found in 
nature that is n@t determined by His eternal decrees. 
This is but another way to say that Spinoza was 



lxii INTRODUCTION 

through and through a strict determinist. But the 
root of Determinism is found in the observed sequence 
of physical change and in- the belief in the inviolable 
character of nature's laws. Our knowledge of the 
Absolute, therefore, he would maintain, cannot rest 
upon miraculous manifestations of God's power, but 
must be gained through an investigation of the laws 
that are uniformly governing the natural world. 
God is revealed in every object and in every act of 
nature, not merely in special cases when the laws of 
the physical world seem to be controverted and for 
the time of none effect. If we would know the nature 
of God, therefore, we must turn to the laws of the 
physical and the mental world and find there an ex- 
pression of His wisdom and His power. There is 
more truth, he would say, revealed concerning the 
nature of God in the law of gravitation than in any 
special manifestation of His presence in which men 
have ever believed. And so far as mere intelligence 
is concerned he would unquestionably be correct. If 
we would know of God's wisdom and of His power 
and of His decrees we must study the works of His 
creation ; these are the visible, the tangible expression 
of the wisdom and the power we seek. Such are the 
claims of the natural world; a world where physical 
law stands thus far upon an equality with the laws of 
thought. While they are not strong enough to estab- 
lish a materialistic conception of God, they are far 
too cogent to be ignored or made of little effect. Ma- 
terialism would in many respects fulfill most perfectly 
the demands of these considerations. For not only 
does it recognize these laws of the physical world as 
the direct expression of the Absolute, but it affirms 
that thev are the one source of all. This, however, 



INTRODUCTION Ixiii 

was further than Spinoza could go ; he could not sub- 
scribe to this and retain his belief in the Dualism 
which Descartes had so clearly established. Instead 
of mind being merely an epiphenomenon of matter as 
Materialism affirms, Descartes and Spinoza both held 
that it is one of the attributes of Substance. Material- 
ism expressed but one phase of the truth. Substance 
is not merely Extension, but Thought as well. All 
that was essential in Materialism Spinoza found as 
well provided for in Pantheism. And the idealism of 
Theism, the spiritual nature of God, is also included 
in this pantheistic concept. Thus the Dualism of 
Nature is maintained, although as Deduction demands, 
and as the logical requirements of thought importune, 
the absolute unity of Nature is provided for. Mind 
and matter are two attributes of the same Substance, 
namely God. Pantheism alone of all philosophies can 
maintain this literal unity and still recognize this 
duality. 

§ 15. It is time that we attempt now, in concluding 
our argument, to gather up the threads to see whether 
when woven together they support our contention, and 
help to make clear Spinoza's Pantheism. Was this 
philosophy a true development somewhat sporadic per- 
haps but still a development from definite, definable 
antecedents, or did it Pallas-like spring from the 
troubled brain of Spinoza fully ordered and complete? 
If the latter our work has been useless and we should 
commend students of Spinoza to a study of his Ethics 
alone. But if it is a development, a logical growth 
from premises Spinoza did not formulate and from 
personal factors not wholly under his control then we 
can still affirm however inadequate our analysis has 
been, that some such method as this is essential for a 



lxiv INTRODUCTION 

sympathetic or even for a just appreciation of 
Spinoza's philosophy. 

In the first place we undertook to show that the 
geometrical method, first used in the work that has 
called for this discussion, was not considered an in- 
fallible method of argumentation. It does not follow 
that everything that can be put in mathematical 
form is true. But Spinoza believed, and here we get 
to the root of the matter, that all logical thought and 
all proof is identical in character to the mental 
processes of geometry. It follows, therefore, that the 
most logical presentation of truth will be the accepted 
presentation of geometry. But the truth of geometry 
does not depend upon this form, it is used merely 
because of its logical consistency. So the geometrical 
method as used in the Ethics does not insure certainty 
of argument; it is used simply because of its peda- 
gogical soundness, just as some use the Socratic, some 
the kindergarten method. They seem to be justified 
by the general character of the processes of thought. 

The second point was the extremely broad, the 
extremely important idea of God. Here we have en- 
deavored to show how Spinoza's peculiar ideas de- 
veloped more or less logically from causes easily 
ascertainable but not on that account less potent. His 
first idea of God was the Jewish conception, the ordi- 
nary Deism of Scholasticism. But there was in 
Spinoza beside this deep never dying interest in this 
idea of God, what we have called a rationalistic ele- 
ment, that soon led him to reject not only the Jewish 
conception of Jehovah but also the deistic conception 
of mediaeval philosophy. 

But underneath all this, as the ultimate source of his 
heresy, the real cause of his heterodoxy was his un- 



INTRODUCTION lxv 

shaken faith in Deduction as the true method of proof 
and the right method of thought. His fault, if fault 
it was, was that he accepted completely the logic of 
his times ; his sin if sin it was, was that he carried out 
more logically than had ever been done before the 
principles of this logic, never hesitating to draw his 
conclusions, never blanching at the outcome. Even 
if his system is doomed to philosophical disapproba- 
tion the man himself stands out a hero in intellectual 
prowess and in his devotion to the truth. He was not 
simply a disciple of deductive reasoning but by his 
logical consistency, by carrying out the principles of 
such thought as they had never been carried out before, 
by a devotion to the syllogism that never faltered from 
fear nor weakened in warmth, he deserves the title, 
the saint of Deduction. 

The next problem to which we directed our atten- 
tion was to show that the fundamental tenets of Pan- 
theism are the logical outcome of the principles that 
underlie Spinoza's thought. The two points we 
singled out for special remark were the impersonal 
character of the Absolute and the Determinism which 
stands over all things. So absolute is the conception 
of God which a consistent Deduction demands that 
all His ethical attributes are lost sight of in the su- 
perior importance (superior from the logical stand- 
point) of the more dynamic attributes of cause and 
effect, and logical coherency. The concept of God, 
the ultimate source of the world of experience, does 
not contain in any available form the idea of free 
finite wills, so the essential idea of personality is de- 
stroyed. But on the other hand the demands of strict 
logic such as Spinoza used, necessitate a Determinism 
just as universal, just as invariable as the Determin- 



lxvi INTRODUCTION 

ism of the Ethics. When we sought for the character 
of this Determinism we saw that it could not be an 
external force, or hypostasized necessity, but must, 
therefore, arise from the attribute of God Himself. 
Physical necessity it could not be, and moral necessity 
God does not know, hence it could only be the logical 
necessity of self expression. Thus we have bridged 
over as it seemed to us the gap between Spinoza's 
thought and the current philosophy of his time, at least 
far enough to see that his Pantheism has its roots 
deeply seated in the thought of preceding years, and 
needs this connection clearly pointed out for an ade- 
quate appreciation of the obscure points in this system. 
The definitions are clearer and richer, his ideas more 
easily understood, and their arrangement more logical 
than if we study the system merely content-wise. 
The sources of strength and the causes of error, when 
the system is thus envisaged, both stand out in clearer 
perspective, and with a different emphasis, than if in- 
vestigated in the usual way. In conclusion we shall 
pause to point out some of the points of weakness and 
some of the profound truth to which this historical 
method calls special attention. 

§ 1 6. Turning first to the weaknesses to which this 
genetic study specially directs our thought we find 
them to cluster around the term Deduction. This we 
have seen above is the great underlying principle, the 
true cause of the use of the geometrical method, and 
inferentially implies if it does not absolutely demand 
a determined sequence of events in nature. More 
than any one thing, therefore, this word exposes and 
explains the vulnerable points of Spinoza's Pantheism. 
His purpose, which he in large measure accomplished, 
was to remain always true to the principles of De- 



INTRODUCTION lxvii 

duction. And his close adherence to this kind of logic, 
and to the scholastic idea of truth and valid proof 
led him to embrace in his system much that is artificial 
and unreal. The particular tenets that have excited the 
vituperative and cutting criticism of his opponents 
very largely arose from this cause. The reasons for 
this are not hard to see: in the first place Deduction 
if logically carried out sets before philosophy an ideal 
which is by nature impossible for finite intelligence. 
The human mind cannot formulate a system a priori 
which mast be true. Human reason even in its most 
absolute claims cannot thus set the bounds of Reality. 
However true it may be that there is " logic in nature," 
and that the world is " hung on principles," this does 
not guarantee that what is clearly conceived must be 
true. To assert this is to claim for the human mind 
creative power. The bare logical necessities of 
thought are too abstract, too general to serve as a cer- 
tain basis upon which to construct a theory of Reality. 
Dialectics as a method of system building always leads 
to hopeless confusion and to contradiction of empir- 
ical truth. Of this truth the history of thought fur- 
nishes abundant illustration. On the other hand 
there are certain questions, which, while they are 
known only too well, cannot be explained satisfactorily 
to reason. Such for example are the problems of Evil 
and of Freedom. Before these questions the human 
mind realizes its impotency and stands humbly before 
that which transcends its mightiest endeavors. 

§ 17. Spinoza's position upon these two questions, 
the problem of evil and the problem of human free- 
dom, was profoundly influenced if it was not wholly 
determined by the deductive character of the time in 
which he lived. As we have already shown, Deduc- 



lxviii INTRODUCTION 

tion demands, as its starting point, a concept that 
includes in itself a complete system of thought. 
Nothing can logically be deduced which is not poten- 
tially contained. And truth is established when it is 
shown that the given proposition follows logically 
from the premises previously laid down. Spinoza 
with his idea of one, perfectly absolute God could not 
reconcile with this concept, either the current concep- 
tion of evil, or of human freedom. If God is abso- 
lute,, and if everything is determined by His under- 
standing and His will, then good and evil are alike 
expressions of His wisdom and His power. What 
we know as evil is just as truly an expression of God's 
will as that which we regard as good. Reasoned out 
in this way, beginning not with the facts of experience 
but with the idea of an absolute God, and establishing 
each proposition by deductive proof, there is little 
chance to come to any other conception concerning 
the true character of evil. If evil as well as good 
exists by God's concurrence and by express decrees of 
His will, the ontological basis for a distinction be- 
tween them is destroyed, and their relativity to human 
thought it established. But if it be true that God has 
no regard for ethical distinctions He is not an ethical 
being. In this way we find the significance of Panthe- 
ism as a religion reduced to a minimum, and its logical 
superiority its sole claim to consideration. 

§ 18. Spinoza's Determinism, also, was made neces- 
sary by his strict adherence to the deductive method of 
his time. Induction begins with isolated facts, and 
theoretically, at least, with no preconceived theory to 
account for them. The mind is as open to one conclu- 
sion as to another. It is in this way, as Positivism 
affirms, that we may establish a system of certain 



INTRODUCTION lxix 

truth, and free ourselves from all prejudices and as- 
sumptions. But with Deduction, especially when such 
demands are made upon it as must be made for the 
accomplishment of the purpose to which Spinoza set 
himself, we must postulate that nature and thought 
are in the closest allegiance with one another. It is 
absolutely required before we begin, that we believe 
that " what is clearly and distinctly conceived is true." 
It were folly to construct a system of thought, and 
to assert that this is an explanation of experience 
unless, in some way, we are confident that our system 
constructed upon logic, is a faithful presentation of 
the actual facts in nature. Thus, while from the 
standpoint of Epistemology there is no incompatibility 
between Induction and Determinism, in Deduction 
there is an implicit demand for that fixed sequence 
in nature which is the ground of all deterministic phi- 
losophy. Unless Nature is herself logical it is useless 
to offer a logical explanation of her phenomena. If 
Deduction is to be the measure of truth it is imperative 
that nature should be a closed series with no possible 
intervention from without. This Spinoza provided 
for by the absolute nature which he ascribed to God. 
In every change in the physical world no matter how 
trivial or apparently commonplace, and in every 
thought and deed of men, whatever its ethical nature, 
God's hand is seen supreme ; they are both what they 
are solely by His will and through His power. Thus, 
in nature as Deduction would envisage it, there is no 
place left for human Freedom. To leave anything "to 
the arbitrament of the human will, as irrational and as 
wilful as it often is, is to introduce into the world 
causes whose effects if not counterbalanced might 
wreck the universe. 



lxx INTRODUCTION 

Beside this, Freedom is not primarily a rational in- 
ference, but a datum of experience. We do not reason 
ourselves into a belief in this attribute of the human 
mind, but we experience it in the constant selection of 
elements in our intellectual processes as well as in the 
more debated field of moral choice. The man who 
takes life as it comes with but little reflection upon 
his experience accepts the postulate of moral Freedom 
as he accepts the fact that he can think of this thing 
or of that, or that he can go to his usual work to-day 
or remain at home. The reason that Freedom vs. 
Determinism has been, throughout the history of re- 
flective thought, one of the most debated of questions, 
and the question on which the final word has never 
been said, is not alone because it is of such importance 
for morality, but because it is also a question that im- 
plicates the whole problem of empirical and a priori 
factors in experience. This does not mean, however, 
that there is a necessary opposition or incompatibility 
between them, but it does imply that before the prob- 
lem of Freedom can be solved we must find some 
satisfactory hypothesis concerning the relation of em- 
pirical and a priori elements in experience. Spinoza 
not appreciating the force of empirical facts, but seek- 
ing constantly for the ignis fatuns of deductive proof, 
would not accept this testimony of consciousness, un- 
less it were confirmed in the manner he thought neces- 
sary. But thus envisaged there was but one solution 
of the problem. Beginning as he did with the abso- 
lute character of God as the postulate of further reflec- 
tion, he could not bridge over the chasm to freedom in 
the human mind. Indeed, when the question was con- 
sidered in the light in which he saw it there was little 
desirability and no imperative need that man should 



INTRODUCTION lxxi 

be free. Determinism unifies the world better, it helps 
us to believe in the power of logic more, and it pre- 
pares the way for a deductive philosophy more directly 
than to grant to finite beings this attribute of infinity. 
Hence, we see that the two points most criticised in 
Spinoza's Ethics, his doctrine of evil and the fatalistic 
Determinism that he championed, have their origin in 
the deductive logic which he accepted as the true 
Organon of truth, and which he upheld, be it said to 
his credit, in such a strict consistent way. We have 
already spoken of the geometrical method which 
Spinoza used and shown how it, too, was used in the 
interest of Deduction. We only name it again to call 
attention to the fact that so far as it was the result 
of this way of considering truth its weaknesses, too, 
arose from this same source of error that we have 
found at the root of the two concepts just discussed. 

§ 19. Turning now from the weaknesses to which 
our historical study of Spinoza has called special atten- 
tion, we pass on to consider some of the significant 
truths that are found when his system is thus envis- 
aged. And first, we shall raise the question whether 
Kant himself may not have been influenced by this 
early work of Spinoza. In the first part of the 
Cogitata Metaphysica there are some distinctions 
clearly made of such a character that it leads us to 
ask whether it is not probable that Kant had read 
this essay and received from it suggestions for his 
Transcendental Philosophy. While there is no direct 
or positive evidence that such is the case, some of the 
positions which Spinoza here maintains are so palp- 
ably the logical antecedents of the Kantian Transcen- 
dentalism that they awaken interest in the question, 
and provoke a further inquiry into the justice of the 



lxxii INTRODUCTION 

comparison. It may be worth our while, therefore, 
to point out the main points of similarity between 
these two men, in almost every point so dissimilar to 
one another. 

Spinoza begins this essay, the Cogitata, by a chapter 
in which he seeks to make clear the difference between 
real being (ens re ale), fictitious being (ens fictum), 
and being of the reason (ens rationis). 1 Being is de- 
fined as " all that which, when it is clearly and dis- 
tinctly conceived, we find to exist or at least to be able 
to exist." Under this definition chimera, fictitious 
being, and being of reason are not real. Being of 
reason is " nothing but a mode of thinking which is 
of service in retaining, or explaining, or in imaging 
out ideas." To enable us to retain our ideas we have 
such terms or beings of reason as genus, species, etc. ; 
for explaining our ideas we have time, number, meas- 
ure, and others; those that help us to image out our 
ideas are such terms of negation as blindness, extrem- 
ity, limit, shades, etc. 

But before we affirm a similarity between these 
terms and the transcendental elements of the " Aes- 
thetic " and of the " Analytic," it will be well to see 
just how closely these modes of thinking correspond 
to the a priori elements in the Kantian philosophy. 
The distinction which Kant made in the elements of 
phenomena was between its matter, that part which 
comes through the senses, and its form, that part 
which causes the manifold of empirical elements to 
be perceived in a certain order. The matter of any 
phenomenon is given a posteriori, but its form is 
a priori. Kant recognized these two elements in every 

1 This last is a somewhat awkward phrase, but rational 
being, the only smooth translation, would be ambiguous. 



INTRODUCTION lxxiii 

phenomenon, the empirical factors derived from ex- 
tramental objects through the mind's sensibility, and 
the subjective factors that make experience possible 
by referring this manifold of sense to these forms of 
thought. Spinoza's terminology was widely different; 
that which comes from the external world he calls 
real, that which the mind creates in order to further 
its intellectual demands is called modes of thinking 
{modi cogitandi). Spinoza did not analyse this dis- 
tinction at all, but he did set forth the distinction upon 
which Kant later founded his system of Transcen- 
dentalism. Spinoza did not even use this distinction 
in his later thought, but in the Cogitata it is found, a 
vein just noted and then neglected until it was redis- 
covered by Kant and astonished the whole philosophic 
world by the wealth its working revealed. All that 
we desire to do is to show that Spinoza recognized the 
fact that there are certain fundamental ideas derived 
not from the external world but forms of the mind's 
own making. But even this would not be worth men- 
tion were it not for the further significant fact that 
there is apparently more than an accidental coincidence 
between the particular ideas Spinoza thus enumerates 
and the Kantian categories. 

The first object to which Kant addresses himself in 
the " Critique of Pure Reason " was to prove the sub- 
jectivity of Time and Space. Though Spinoza's argu- 
ment is not similar his conclusion is identical with 
that of Kant. Time is a concept necessary, not for 
every single intuition as Kant would say, but for 
understanding the whole sequence of intuitions. But 
whether for the one reason or the other the result is 
the same ; time is not an " affect " of being but a form 
or mode of thought. Measure another one of Spinoza's 



lxxiv INTRODUCTION 

ideas of reason used to explain experience by a sim- 
ilar argument to that used in connection with time, 
would provide for the subjectivity of time. Thus we 
would have in this essay the " Transcendental Aes- 
thetic " complete. Time and Space by implication are 
not something externally real, but forms of thought 
necessary to explain experience. 

Beside these elements of the " Transcendental Aes- 
thetic " there are several of the categories of Kant 
placed in the list of being of reason. Number, the 
third one of the ideas Spinoza names in his enumera- 
tion, is practically identical with the Kantian categories 
of quantity. The terms " possible " and " contingent " 
though not given with the others are plainhy regarded 
as subjective and suggest the categories of relation. 
Besides all this we find also that Spinoza in this dis- 
cussion makes use of that most distinctly Kantian of all 
Kantian terms u transcendental." 1 In popular usage, 
we are told, unity, the true and the good, the examples 
he gives of transcendental terms, are considered to be 
attributes inherent in the objects themselves. Spinoza's 
purpose is to show that these are not real aflects of be- 
ing but ideas of reason. Taking each one up separate- 
ey he would show that they arise from subjective 
causes. In other words Spinoza would show that 
those attributes usually called transcendental are not 
noumenal or real but of a subjective origin, a use of 
the term that suggests very powerfully the Kantian 
use of the word. So far as the distinction between 
the manifold of sense and the subjective elements of 
experience are concerned, therefore, Spinoza seems in 
these passages to insist upon it in such a way that we 
may well raise the inquiry we have suggested. It is 

1 Vid. Cogitata Metaphysica, Pt. I., Chaps. V. and VI. 



INTRODUCTION Ixxv 

far from an improbability, therefore, that Kant who 
seemed by his keen criticism of Pantheism well ac- 
quainted with Spinoza's system may have received 
some valuable suggestions from this early work. 

In the Ethics Spinoza apparently made little use of 
this distinction between subjective necessities of 
thought and ideas having origin in the attributes of 
external objects. In no part of this work is the dis- 
tinction set forth in such clear-cut terms as in this early 
essay. But on the other hand, the later work con- 
tains as one of its most essential truths this antithesis 
between thought and extension. And more specifically 
one of the prime tenets of Pantheism rests upon this 
distinction between what is externally real and what 
is mentally required. His doctrine of good and evil 
we have seen depends upon this distinction. Good 
and evil have their causa essendi, not in the external 
world but in the way the human mind regards them. 
Apart from this, however, there is little in the Ethics 
to illustrate the importance of the distinction made in 
the Cogitata. 

§ 20. But the most important truth of Spinoza's 
system, the truth which Pantheism emphasized with 
such commendable persistency is not one upon which 
questions and doubts can arise. It is a truth which, 
in the development of philosophical belief, stands out 
in bold relief; it marks a well defined stage in philo- 
sophic thought, and did not merely suggest, but it 
determined the trend of succeeding opinion. The 
thought to which we refer is the closer bond that 
Spinoza established between God and the world. As 
we have already pointed out, even in his early thinking, 
Spinoza assigned such a supreme value to the concept 
of God, and made the world so completely dependent 



lxxvi INTRODUCTION 

upon His power and presence, that Deism was 
doomed. We have seen, too, why it was that Spinoza's 
ideas assumed this particular form. From the earliest 
times he accepted Deduction as the true method of 
determining truth, and looked to the concept of God 
as the source of all being and all truth. Thus this 
vital connection between God and nature becomes a 
dominant thought throughout Spinoza's reflections. 
Since to the end he was the devoted champion of De- 
duction, and since the idea of God increased rather than 
decreased in importance, in the Ethics as well as in the 
Cogitata this thought remains the greatest, grandest 
truth of his philosophy. It only remains to see how it 
has appeared and reappeared in different forms in suc- 
ceeding years. 

In the main current of philosophic thought since 
Spinoza's time the influence of this truth of God's 
immanence in nature has been uninterrupted. Phi- 
losophy soon saw how vital was this truth, and though 
it has been modified in form, it has never been rejected. 
The German Rationalistic School accepted it boldly, 
and the followers of Kant incorporated it in various 
ways in their teachings. Even the recent tendencies 
toward Materialism are manifestations which show 
most forcibly, if illogically, that Nature cannot be 
divorced from God. The place which nature holds in 
human experience is far too important to allow it to be 
treated in the unreflective manner of Deism. However 
radical some of the theories of the Absolute which have 
arisen since Spinoza's chief work was published, they 
have not sinned against the principal truth he wished to 
emphasize and returned to a deistic conception of God. 
And as our knowledge of the world and of its wonder- 
ful laws is increasing through the giant strides of 



INTRODUCTION lxxvii 

science, we can but reaffirm this same truth. God is 
in the world and His presence is just as necessary and 
just as real in the world to-day as when the heavens 
and the earth were first created. Science is not out- 
growing this idea, but growing into it more and more. 
The fact that there is sometimes an atheistic tendency 
in those who devote their lives to this work is not due 
to the nature of that work, but to a failure to compre- 
hend the full significance of the study in which they 
are engaged. So wonderful, so universal, so mighty 
are the truths that thus stand revealed, that they im- 
agine there is no greater grander truth than that which 
they have found. They would feign assert that those 
Laws are the highest work of the Divine, nay, that 
they are themselves the only Absolute. 

This thought that God is in the world, not merely 
over it or above it, therefore, by determining our con- 
ception of God and of Nature, leads us to the very 
heart of Ontology. But more than this, it has opened 
our eyes to see the true significance of the cosmological 
argument for the existence of God. If this thought 
is true, God is not far away but even nigh to every 
one of us ; His spirit is in the world on every hand 
sustaining and directing it, and in the development or 
evolution of material forms and psychical powers we 
have a direct manifestation of His presence, and His 
power. Until this truth was recognized, and Spinoza 
deserves the credit for making it evident, Philosophy 
must needs rely, as we know it actually did, upon some 
form of ontological argument for the being and at- 
tributes of God. The proof for His being and the 
argument for His attributes, until this truth is accepted, 
had to be found in the a priori deductive method of 
which Spinoza was a consummate master. But when 



lxxviii INTRODUCTION 

it is known that God stands as the eminent cause of 
every act, the soul of every form of nature, nature 
acquires a new dignity and a new worth. Under this 
conception the intelligence here shown becomes 
the wisdom of God, the purposes and teleology of the 
external world become the purposes and teleology of 
God, and the evolution of nature in her various stages 
of development becomes the unfolding of the great 
World Plan of God. It is only as we believe this 
truth, only as we rely upon the truth which Spinoza 
presented in his bold formal way that we can put confi- 
dence in this cosmological argument for God's being. 
But when it is known that God stands each moment 
as the cause, the real soul of every form of nature, 
nature is filled with meaning, and becomes the great 
source book for Philosophy as well as the text-book 
for Science. Henceforth, all the truth which the sci- 
ences discover, as well as the no less significant, though 
less demonstrable truths which the poet and the artist 
find, and the reflections of the philosopher, all conspire 
to reveal the real nature of the world and of God. 
Henceforth, Philosophy as well as Science must be 
thus far inductive. We learn of God as we study His 
works. 

§ 21. But there is another field beside that of Phi- 
losophy in which Spinoza's influence has been pro- 
foundly felt. Strange as it may seem at first sight 
there was something in Spinoza's cold, calculating, 
almost fatalistic philosophy that appealed strongly to 
the poetic mind since his time. Goethe and Lessing, in 
Germany, and Coleridge and Wordsworth in England 
are but the most striking examples of an influence in 
this field of art, that has extended even down to the 
present time. In some way they found, in his system, 



INTRODUCTION lxxix 

more than the chaste beauty of a philosophic truth ; un- 
der the forbidding exterior of his method, and the more 
formidable tenets of the fatalism the system suggested, 
they found a truth pulsating with all the warmth and 
color and life of an artistic thought. It is needless to 
say that this truth was the one we have just seen was 
so powerful in shaping later Philosophy. God's actual 
presence in nature, His immanence in the forms of life 
He has created, and is continually preserving, is a 
truth not less important for the Philosophy of the 
Beautiful than for Ontology. 

Spinoza, then, unknowingly emphasized a vital 
aesthetic truth ; or rather, the truth for which he de- 
serves the credit of first making emphatic, is capable 
of an aesthetic envisagement. Pantheism, notwith- 
standing its formality and the radical character of some 
of its tenets, furnishes to Philosophy a conception that 
not only converts the world from Deism to Theism, 
but a conception that also animates nature and gives 
its every form a significance and an ideal beauty that 
could never be found under the older conception of 
God, and of His relation to the world. Without the 
acceptance and appreciation of this truth, viz., the 
presence of the ideal in the real, the universal in the 
particular, the divine in the human, the infinite in the 
finite, the richest and the real significance of nature is 
not seen. But with an appreciation of the truth im- 
plicated in Spinoza's Pantheism, there comes an en- 
largement of the world aesthetically, that has by no 
means been compassed in the last hundred years, either 
poetically or from the standpoint of the artist. Under 
this conception of nature the world around us on every 
side and in every form is filled with possibilities for 
artistic charm and beauty as various and as deep as 



lxxx INTRODUCTION 

the emotions of the soul itself. Indeed, nature thus 
becomes a direct expression of the mind and soul of 
God Himself. Beauty no longer consists, as the Greeks 
believed, in a harmonious relation of parts, mere form, 
nor must we rely entirely upon the human form as 
the mediaeval painters thought, for an expression of 
emotional elements. But now, when we believe as 
Spinoza taught, that God is in these forms of nature, 
landscape, some little scene of water or of wood, may 
represent some truth of life, and picture some deep 
emotion of the heart of man. With our feet planted 
upon this truth as a ground rock of our philosophy 
we have an outlook upon beauties never before pic- 
tured so vividly nor so truly. The world which was 
before conceived as a mechanism — not without beauty 
it is true but still a mechanism — now throbs with the 
life and the emotions of the mind it represents. Man 
does not descend, to become a brother to the insensible 
clod, but the world in its organic and in its inorganic 
forms is raised up to man. Nature is no longer merely 
what we see and hear and touch, the mere sequence 
of cause and effect, but under this new conception it 
is all we feci and love and enjoy. Nature becomes a 
mine of sesthetic truth as inexhaustible as infinity; the 
world becomes a grand picture that reflects in a divine 
way the deepest emotions and aspirations of the soul 
itself. It was for this reason that Spinoza's system, 
though set forth in the most abstract formal way, ap- 
pealed to the poetic mind. It was not because Panthe- 
ism was wholly satisfactory, because none of its tenets 
do violence to truth, that it was so heartily accepted 
by the men whose names we have mentioned above. 
They probably did not appreciate or even care for his 
logic, but they did perceive or feel that down beneath 



INTRODUCTION lxxxi 

this forbidding exterior there was the warm glow of a 
vital aesthetic truth. It was only as Wordsworth ap- 
preciated this truth, only as he realized the indwelling 
in nature of the divine spirit, that he could write : 

" To me the meanest flower that blows can give 
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears." 

In Literature we have examples of immortal pictures 
taken from regions supernal. Virgil and Dante and 
Milton have each found in that realm and painted with 
their poetic art, pictures that bid fair to defy oblivion. 
Spinoza sketched with a few bold strokes a picture 
even more impressively sublime in the immensity of its 
conception. Pantheism or God become visible is per- 
haps the most stupendous, the most daring picture that 
man has yet conceived. Its depth has by no means 
yet been fathomed or its possibilities appreciated by the 
Art of the past. But the truth of God's presence in the 
world, the lasting fruit of Spinoza's reflection, in a 
more refined, conservative form remains to-day a 
thought necessary for the highest interpretation of Art 
as well as essential truth of Ontology. It was this 
idea of God's immanence in nature and its rich accom- 
paniment of aesthetic suggestion that explains Spinoza's 
influence over much of the world's poetry since his 
time. Lessing and Goethe, and Coleridge and Words- 
worth, and poets and artists even to the present have 
appreciated this aesthetic truth and incorporated much 
of it in their more refined expressions. But they are 
only producing in the concrete that which Spinoza 
conceived abstractly, or toning down to milder shades 
that which he had sketched in boldest form. 



LUDWIG MEYER 

TO 

THE WORTHY READER. 

S. P. D. 

It is admitted by all who have any claims to superior 
intelligence that the method of mathematics, viz., the 
method by which conclusions are demonstrated from 
definitions, postulates, and axioms is the best method 
of obtaining and imparting truth. And rightly so ; for 
as certain knowledge of an unknown object can only 
be obtained through facts previously known, there 
must of necessity be certain premises on which the 
whole superstructure of human knowledge rests, pro- 
vided it does not fall of its own weight, or succumb 
to some slight attack from without. No one who has 
paid any attention to the noble study of mathematics 
can doubt its definitions or postulates or axioms. For 
definitions are but a very open explanation of the terms 
and names under which the subject is discussed, and 
the postulates and axioms of mathematics, or the gen- 
eral ideas of the mind, cannot be denied by any one 
who understands the use of his vocabulary. 

Nevertheless mathematicians are almost the only 

ones committed to such a method. Others employ a 

method radically different from this, namely, a method 

where the end is attained through definitions and 

i 



2 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

logical division interspersed with numerous questions 
and explanations. For almost all believe, and many 
well informed persons have asserted that this method 
is peculiar to mathematics and should be abjured in 
all other branches of study. Therefore they, in their 
discussions, are unable to offer apodeictic proof, but 
are compelled to reason by analogy and from probable 
evidence. They produce a whole medley of ponderous 
volumes in which nothing is established with certainty, 
but which are full of contending views ; what is in one 
place asserted is presently, and for a similar reason, 
denied. So much so that the mind eager for eternal 
truth, when it had hoped to find the tranquil expanse 
of its own desire, and crossing this with propitious 
speed to gain the haven of true cognition, finds itself 
on a tempestuous sea of thought tossed about and 
overcome, surrounded by storms of contending belief, 
and lost amid waves of uncertainty, without hope of 
rescue. 

There are some, however, who, regretting this 
wretched plight of Philosophy, in order that they may 
leave to posterity some studies beside mathematics 
established with absolute certainty, have departed from 
the ancient method to this new path, arduous though 
it be. Some of these have put into literary form the 
philosophy now accepted and accustomed to be taught 
in the schools; others have set in order new systems 
elaborated through their own reflection. Although for 
years the task was undertaken in vain, at length that 
splendid star of our century Rene Descartes arose, 
who, after he had made clear the mathematical truth 
that was inaccessible to the ancients, and everything 
desired by his contemporaries, also discovered this fun- 
damental principle of all knowledge. By means of 



PREFACE 3 

this truth he was able to elaborate and establish many 
things with mathematical certainty. To any one who 
attends to his writings, which cannot be too highly 
praised, this will be as evident as the midday sun. 

Although the philosophical writings of this incom- 
parable man contain a method of demonstrating mathe- 
matics, it is not the method found in Euclid and in 
other geometries. Descartes' method, which he called 
Analysis and maintained was the best way to discover 
truth, was widely different from this. In the end of 
his " Response to the Second Objection," he recog- 
nizes two kinds of apodeictic demonstration. The one, 
Analysis, which he showed to be the true method, by 
which truth is discovered methodically and as it were 
a 'priori; the other by Synthesis, the method in which 
a long series of definitions, and premises and axioms, 
and theorems, and problems is used so that if anything 
is denied in the conclusion, it is immediately shown to 
have been contained in the premises. By this means 
assent is extorted from the reader however unwilling 
or unyielding he may be. 

Granted, however, that truth may be established 
beyond all chance of doubt by these two methods, still 
they do not have an equal value. For many plainly 
unlearned in mathematical knowledge and so wholly 
ignorant of the method by which such truth is discov- 
ered (analysis), and by which it is set in order (syn- 
thesis), are not only unable to teach this truth to others 
but are unable to follow it for themselves. Whence it 
happens that many who have made his opinions and 
dogmas only a matter of memory, carried away by 
some thoughtless attack or influenced by the authority 
of others, have defamed the name of Descartes, and, 
when a discussion of these things arises, since they 



4 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

cannot demonstrate anything, garrulously repeat what 
has always been ascribed to the Peripatetic Philosophy. 
Wherefore, in order that this state of affairs might be 
improved, I have often desired that some one, alike 
skilful in Analysis and Synthesis, well versed in the 
writings of Descartes, and thoroughly master of his 
philosophy, might give his attention to this work and 
what he has put in analytic form remold in synthetic 
order and demonstrate in the more familiar forms of 
geometry. I myself, although fully conscious of my 
unfitness for that task, have often been inclined to 
undertake it. Other occupations, however, have filled 
my time and prevented me from acting on my desire. 

I was very glad to know, therefore, that our author 
had put into geometrical form, for a pupil whom he 
was teaching Descartes' philosophy, the entire second 
Part of the Principles and a part of the third, together 
with some important questions and difficulties usually 
discussed in Metaphysics, and not yet discussed by 
Descartes; and that he had consented, at the urgent 
request of his friends, that these, corrected and revised 
by himself, should be published. I, therefore, approv- 
ing this purpose, offered my services, if he had any 
need of them, in helping to publish the work. I asked 
and even urged him that he should put the first Part 
into similar form and let it precede the two already 
done, in order that the work might be complete and 
therefore more intelligible. Although for good reasons 
he did not wish to do this, he was unwilling to refuse 
his friends or to neglect anything which might be done 
for the benefit of the reader. He entrusted to my care 
the entire management of the publication since he had 
departed from the city into the country and was unable 
to be present. 



PREFACE 5 

This is what we offer you, therefore, dear reader, in 
this little volume : viz., the first and second Parts of 
Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, together with a 
fragment of the third, to which we have added under 
the name of an appendix the Cogitata Metaphysica of 
our author. But when we speak of the first Part of 
the Principles, and the title of the book suggests the 
same thought, we do not wish it understood that all 
that Descartes has said in this is here presented demon- 
strated in geometrical order, but only that preferable 
terms have been selected and those principles which 
Descartes treated in his Meditations, which relate more 
particularly to Metaphysics. Those matters which are 
only of logical interest, however, or which Descartes 
expressed for their historical value, he has omitted. 
That he might the more easily effect this end our 
author, so far as the order is concerned, has trans- 
posed almost all that Descartes had put into geometrical 
form in the end of his " Response to the Second 
Objection." This he did by placing all of Descartes* 
definitions first and by inserting propositions of his 
own ; by placing the axioms not together with his 
definitions, but a part of them after the fourth propo- 
sition ; finally by omitting those not needed and by 
changing the order so that they might more easily be 
understood. It did not escape the notice of our author 
that these axioms might be demonstrated in the manner 
of theorems (as Descartes also held, Postulate 7.) and 
might even properly be classed as propositions. We, 
indeed, urged him to do this, but the amount of work 
with which he was employed only left him two short 
weeks in which to complete the work. For this reason 
he was unable to satisfy his own and our desire, but 
merely adding a brief explanation in place of the 



6 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

demonstration, he postponed until another time the 
complete and perfected volume, if perchance after this 
imperfect edition a new one should be demanded. To 
this end we shall urge him to complete the third Part 
concerning the visible world. (Of this we have added 
the fragment our author had completed, for we were 
unwilling that the reader should be deprived of any 
part of his work, however small.) To better accom- 
plish his purpose, certain propositions concerning the 
nature of fluid bodies had to be inserted in Part II. 
For my part, I shall urge him to speedily complete 
the work. 

Not only in regard to the axioms, but also in 
demonstrating the propositions and in other conclu- 
sions our author often differs from Descartes ; for 
example, the term apodeictic is used in a widely dif- 
ferent sense. However, let no one think that he 
wished to correct that most illustrious man in these 
things, but only that he did this in order to retain the 
current order and not increase the number of axioms 
unduly. For this and for many reasons he was com- 
pelled to demonstrate many things which Descartes 
had stated without demonstration and to add much 
that he had omitted. 

Nevertheless, I wish it to be noted first of all that 
in all of these Parts, viz., in the first and second 
Parts of the Principles and in the fragment of the 
third, as well as in the Cogitata Metaphysica, our 
author is merely expressing the opinions of Descartes 
with their demonstrations so far as they are found in 
his writings or as they logically follow from his 
premises. For when he promised to teach a pupil 
the philosophy of Descartes it was a matter of prin- 
ciple with him not to depart in the least from his 



PREFACE 7 

opinions or to teach anything that did not follow from 
his dogmas, or was contrary to them. Wherefore, 
let no one think that he is teaching here his own 
opinions or only what he approves. Although he ad- 
judges certain things to be true, he affirms that others 
are opposed to his belief. Many things he rejects as 
false, from which he holds a far different opinion. 
Of this nature, to mention only one from many, are 
those conclusions concerning the Will, Schol. Prop. 
15, Part I., and Chapter 12, Part II. of the Appendix, 
although they seem to be proved with painstaking 
care. For he did not think that the Will was some- 
thing distinct from Intellect, much less endowed with 
such freedom. For in these assertions, as is evident 
from his dissertation concerning method Part 4, 
Meditation 2, and in other places, Descartes merely 
affirms and does not prove that the human mind is 
an absolute thinking substance. Although our author 
indeed admits that there is a thinking substance in 
Nature, he denies that this constitutes the essence of 
the human mind. He believed that in the same way 
that there are no limits to Extension, so Thought is 
in no way determined. And as the human body is 
not absolute, but its extension is determined accord- 
ing to natural laws of motion and of rest, so also the 
mind or human spirit is not absolute but is determined 
through ideas by natural laws of thought. These, we 
ought to conclude are given when the body begins to 
exist. From this definition it is easy to show that 
the Will and the Intellect cannot be distinguished, 
much less, as Descartes affirmed, can we say that the 
Will is endowed with liberty. To say that it is the 
faculty of affirming or of denying is wrong, for to 
affirm or to deny is only a form of idea. Indeed, those 



8 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

faculties, as Intellect, Desire, etc., ought to be placed 
in the list of fictitious thoughts, or at least of those 
ideas which men have because of their powers of ab- 
straction, as for example, with humanity, lapidity, etc. 

Reference must also be made to another point which 
was prominent in the mind of Descartes, namely, 
that this or that surpasses human knowledge. For it 
must not be thought that our author states this as his 
own opinion. He believed that all these things, and 
even many things more subtle and more sublime, could 
not only be clearly and distinctly conceived by us, but 
even readily explained if only the human mind were 
led in the way which Descartes opened up and made 
possible for investigating truth and for acquiring 
knowledge. Therefore the principles of knowledge 
which Descartes set forth and the philosophy based 
upon these do not suffice for solving all those extreme- 
ly difficult problems which relate to metaphysics, but 
others are required if we desire the intellect to sound 
the depths of cognition. 

And finally, to bring our preface to an end, we wish 
the reader to know that these papers are published for 
no other purpose than to discover and to impart truth, 
and to incite in men a desire for a, true and a sincere 
philosophy. So let every one, having been diligently 
warned, before he undertakes to read this work, deter- 
mine to correct as far as possible certain typographical 
errors which have crept in, and to insert the omissions 
in order that he may receive the full benefit which we 
earnestly desire for every reader. For these obstacles, 
as any one can readily see, may easily prevent the force 
of the demonstration and the thought of the author 
from being easily seen. 



AD LIBRUM. 

Ingenio seu te natum meliore vocemus, 

Seu de Cartesii fonte renatus eas, 
Parve Liber, quidquid pandas, id solus habere 
Dignus, ab exemplo laus tibi nulla venit. 
Sive tuum spectem genium, seu dogmata, cogor 

Laudibus Auctorem tollere ad astra tuum. 
Hactenus exemplo caruit, quod praestitit ; at tu 

Exemplo haud careas, obsecro, parve Liber; 

Spinozae at quantum debet Cartesius uni, 

Spinoza ut tantum debeat ipse sibi. 

—J. B,, M. D. 1 

1 Probably by J. Bresser, M. D. 



The Principles of Philosophy Demonstrated 
by the Method of Geometry. 

Part I. 

PROLEGOMENON. 

Before giving these propositions and their demon- 
stration it seems best to recall briefly why Descartes 
came to doubt all things, how he discovered the 
fundamental principle of all knowledge, and finally how 
he liberated himself from this universal doubt. All of 
this we would have put in mathematical order if we 
had not thought that such prolixity would have im- 
peded our understanding of these things which 
should be seen as clearly as though presented in a 
picture. 

In order to proceed with his investigation with the 
utmost caution Descartes was compelled : 

1. To lay aside all prejudices. 

2. To find the fundamental truth on which all 
knowledge rests. 

3. To discover the cause of error. 

4. To understand everything clearly and distinctly. 

In order to accomplish the first three points he 
doubted all things, not, however, as a sceptic who 
doubts merely for the sake of doubting, but in order 
to free his mind of all prejudices, so that he might 
find at length the firm and certain truth on - which 
all knowledge rests. By using this method, such a 
■* 11 



12 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

truth, if any such existed, could not escape him. For 
this principle must be so clear that it needs no proof, 
and cannot under any circumstances be doubted ; every 
demonstration must presuppose it. Such a truth he 
found after a long period of doubt. And after he 
had once gained this truth it was not difficult to dis- 
tinguish the true from the false, or to detect the cause 
of error. And thus he could be on his guard lest he 
accept anything doubtful and false for what is certain 
and true. 

To accomplish the last point, viz., to understand 
everything clearly and distinctly, his principal rule was 
to examine separately all the simple ideas from which 
all others are composed. For when he clearly and dis- 
tinctly understood these simple ideas, he was enabled 
to understand m the same thorough way, all others into 
which they entered as component parts. Having 
prefaced our remarks with these few words we shall 
proceed with our purpose as stated above, namely, to 
explain why he doubted everything, how he found 
the fundamental truth of all knowledge, and how he 
extricated himself from the difficulties of these doubts. 

Concerning his uni- In the firSt P laCe he Calls attention tO 

versai doubt. a u f those things perceived through 
the senses, the heavens, the earth and all external ob- 
jects. So also, even concerning those things which 
he thought to be most certain he doubted, because he 
knew that his senses had sometimes deceived him, 
and in sleep he had often persuaded himself that many 
things existed in which he later found he had been 
deceived. And finally because he had heard com- 
petent witnesses affirm that they sometimes felt pain in 
limbs recently lost. It was not without reason, there- 
fore, that he doubted everything even the existence of 



PART I 13 

his own body. Hence from all these reasons he was 
able to conclude that sense perception is not a certain 
foundation for knowledge (all that the senses give may 
well be called in doubt), but certainty rests upon some 
more indubitable principle than this. To investigate 
further he next notices the universal attributes of cor- 
poreal matter, as extension, form, quantity, etc., as well 
as all mathematical truth. Although these seem more 
certain than the objects of sense perception, neverthe- 
less, he finds a cause for doubting them as well. Some 
err* even in these, and beside there is an old idea that 
God, who is omnipotent, and has created us with our 
present faculties, has perhaps so made us that we are 
deceived even in those things which seem most certain. 
These are the causes that led him to doubt all things. 
In order to find the fundamental 
The discovery of truth in knowledge, he afterward in- 

the fundamental , n 1 • 1 • 1 

principle of all quired whether all things which are 
subjects of cognition could be doubted, 
if perchance there was anything which he had not yet 
called in question. Doubting in this way he believed 
that if anything was found, which, for none of the 
reasons given above, should be doubted, this might 
be considered the foundation on which all knowledge 
rests. And although, as it now seemed he had doubted 
everything (for he had called in question all that the 
senses give, and all that comes from the understand- 
ing), there was something left the certainty of which 
had not been doubted, namely, he himself who was 
doubting. Not, however, so far as he consisted of 
head or hands or other bodily members, for he had 
doubted the existence of these, but even while he was 
doubting he was thinking, etc. Carefully examining 
this fact he found that for no reason whatever could it 



i 4 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

be doubted, for, whether waking or sleeping, if think- 
ing at all he must therefore exist. And even though he 
and others might fall into error, since they were in 
error they must exist. Nor could he conceive of a 
creator so skilful in deceit that he could deceive him 
about this truth. For if it is supposed that he is de- 
ceived, it must also be supposed that he exists. Fin- 
ally, whatever reason for doubt may be conceived, there 
is none which does not at the same time make one more 
certain of his own existence. Indeed the more argu- 
ments that can be assigned as cause for doubt the more 
there are which convince him of his own existence. 
So true is this that whoever begins to doubt will never- 
theless exclaim, "I doubt, I think, therefore I am!' 

In this truth he finds the ground of all knowledge 
as well as the measure of all other truth, viz., What- 
ever is as clearly and distinctly perceived as this is true. 

That nothing but this Cogito ergo sum can be the 
fundamental truth in all knowledge is evident from 
what has already been said. Concerning this it should 
be noted in the first place, that it is not a syllogism 
in which the major premise is omitted. If it were, 
the premise cogito ought to be better known than the 
conclusion, ergo sum. And if this were so the ergo 
sum would not be the foundation of all knowledge. 
Beside it would not be a certain conclusion, for its 
truth depends upon universal premises which the 
author had called in question. Therefore Cogito ergo 
sum is one proposition equivalent to the statement 
ego sum cogitans. 

To avoid confusion hereafter (for the matter ought 
to be thoroughly understood), we must know what 
we are. For if I clearly understand this our essence 



PART I 15 

will not be confused with other things. To deduce 
this from what precedes our author thus proceeds : 

He now recalled all those opinions formerly held, 
as for example, that his mind was something very 
fine in texture, like the wind, or fire, or air, interplaced 
with the coarser particles of the body ; and that his 
body was better known than his mind and could be 
more clearly perceived. These opinions he now saw 
were at variance with what he had discovered. For 
he could doubt the existence of his body, but not his 
reality so far as he was a thinking being. Beside 
this, the body could not be clearly and distinctly known 
and therefore, according to his own dictum, should 
be rejected as non-existent. Therefore, since the body 
cannot be accepted as pertaining to his essence, so 
far as it is known, he further inquires what there is 
about his being which compels him to believe in his 
own existence. Such things were these : that he had 
determined to be on his guard lest he be deceived; 
that he had desired to understand so many things; 
that he had doubted everything he was not able to 
know; that he had affirmed only one thing at a time; 
that he had denied all else, and even rejected it as false ; 
that he had conceived many things though reluctantly ; 
and finally that he had considered many things as 
though derived from the senses. Since his existence 
was so evidently bound up with each one of these 
actions, and since none of them belonged to the things 
which he had doubted, and finally since they all may 
be considered as forms of thought, it follows that these 
are all true and pertain to his nature. So when he 
said cogito these modes of thought were all implied, 
viz., to doubt, to understand, to affirm, to deny, to wish, 
to be unwilling, to imagine, and to feel. 



16 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

Some distinctions must here be noted that will have 
importance when we come to discuss the distinction 
between mind and body, (i) That modes of clear 
and distinct thought may be known even when some 
things are still in doubt. (2) That we render a clear 
and a distinct concept obscure and confused when we 
ascribe to it something concerning which we are still 
in doubt. 

Finally, in order that he might be 

Hi doubl mti ° n fr ° m certain and remove all doubt from 
those things he had called in question, 
he further proceeds to inquire into the nature of a 
perfect Being and whether such a Being exists. For 
when he has discovered that this Being, by whose 
power all things are created and preserved and to 
whose nature it would be repugnant to be a deceiver, 
exists, then he has removed that reason for doubt 
which is found in the fact that he was ignorant of 
the cause of his existence. For he knew that the 
power of discerning the true from the false would 
not have been given to him by a God of perfect good- 
ness and truth in order that he might be deceived. 
Mathematical truth, therefore, and all other of like 
certainty cannot be doubted. To remove other causes 
for doubt he inquires next why it is we sometimes 
fall into error. For when he discovered how error 
arose, and that we use our free will to assert what we 
perceive only confusedly, he concluded straightway 
that we could avoid error by withholding assent from 
that which is seen only indistinctly. 

As every one has the power of inhibiting the will 
he can easily restrain it to the limits of the understand- 
ing. And since in youth we form many prejudices 
from which we free ourselves only with difficulty, he 



PART I 17 

enumerates and examines separately all of our simple 
ideas to assist us in casting these prejudices aside. 
His object was to determine what was clear and what 
was obscure in each. Thus he was able to distinguish 
the clear from the obscure and to form clear and dis- 
tinct ideas. By this means he easily found the real 
distinction between mind and body; what was clear 
and what obscure in those ideas derived from the 
senses ; and finally how sleep differs from waking. 
When this was done he could doubt no longer concern- 
ing the waking life, nor could he be deceived by his 
senses. In this way he was able to free himself from 
all his recent doubt. 

Before I close this part of the discussion it seems 
that some satisfaction should be given to those who 
argue, that since it is not known that God exists per se 
it is impossible for us ever to know that God does exist. 
For from uncertain premises (and we have said that 
all things are uncertain so long as we are ignorant of 
our origin), nothing can be concluded with certainty. 

In order to remove this difficulty Descartes re- 
sponded in this fashion ; although we do not know 
whether the creator of our nature has created us so 
that we are deceived in those things which seem most 
certain, nevertheless, we cannot doubt those things 
we understand clearly and distinctly, so long as we 
attend merely to them. But we only doubt those 
things previously demonstrated, and now recalled to 
memory, when we no longer attend closely to the 
reasons from which they were deduced, v/hich per- 
chance are even forgotten. Therefore, though we 
cannot know directly that God exists, but must learn 
this by deduction, still, we are able to know this cer- 
tainly, provided we attend very accurately to the prem- 



18 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

ises from which the conclusion is deduced. Vid. Prin. 
Pt. I. Art. 13, and Response to Second, Obj. No. 3, 
and end of Med. 5. 

But since this reply is not sufficient we will offer 
another. We saw above, when speaking of the evi- 
dence and certainty of our existence, that this was 
found in the fact that, consider what we will, we 
meet no argument for doubt which does not at the 
same time convince us of the certainty of our exist- 
ence. This is true whether we consider our own 
nature, or conceive of God as a skilful deceiver, or 
adduce some extraneous reason for doubt. For ex- 
ample, considering the nature of a triangle, though 
we are now compelled to believe that its three angles 
are equal to two right angles we are not forced to 
the conclusion that this is really true if perchance we 
are deceived by our Creator. In the same way we 
deduce the certainty of our existence. We are not 
compelled to believe that under any conditions the 
three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. 
On the contrary we find reason for doubt, for we have 
no idea of God which compels us to believe that it is 
impossible for God to deceive us. It is equally easy 
for one who has no true conception of God to think 
that he is a deceiver or that he is not. So for those 
who have no right conception of a triangle it is equally 
easy for them to think that the sum of the angles is 
equal to two right angles, or that it is not. There- 
fore, we grant that we cannot be absolutely certain 
of anything except of our own existence, however 
closely we attend to the proof, until we have a clear 
concept of God which compels us to affirm (in the same 
way that the concept of a triangle compels us to affirm 
that the sum of its angles is equal to two right 



PART I 19 

angles) that he is perfectly true in His being. But 
we deny that we are unable to come to any certain 
knowledge of. the external world. For, as now ap- 
pears, the whole matter hinges upon this, viz., whether 
we can form such a concept of God that it is not as 
easy for us to think of Him as a deceiver as to believe 
that He is perfectly true in His being. When we 
obtain such a concept as this, all cause for doubting 
mathematical truth is removed. For, when we con- 
sider how the doubt of this affects our own existence, 
if we doubt this still we ought not to even affirm our 
own existence. If now having obtained this concept 
of God we consider the nature of a triangle we are 
compelled to affirm that the sum of its three angles is 
equal to two right angles ; or if we consider the nature 
of God, and this also compels us to affirm that He is 
perfectly true and the author and continual preserver 
of our being, we are not deceived. Nor is it less im- 
possible for us to think wiien we once have obtained 
this idea of God (which we suppose to be already 
found), that He is a deceiver, then when we consider 
the nature of a triangle to think that the sum of its 
angles is not equal to two right angles. As we can 
form such an idea of a triangle although we are not 
certain that God is not deceiving us, so we can form 
this idea of God, although we do not know whether 
or not He is deceiving us. And, provided only that 
we have such an idea of God, however it may have 
been obtained, it is sufficient to remove all doubt. 

This point having been made clear I shall remark 
upon this difficult proposition: we can be certain of 
nothing not merely as long as we are ignorant of God's 
existence (for I have not yet spoken of this), but as 
long as we do not have a clear and a distinct idea of 



20 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

His being. Hence if any one should desire to oppose 
our conclusions, his argument should be as follows: 
We cannot be certain of anything so long as we have 
no clear and distinct idea of God. But we cannot 
have a clear and a distinct idea of God as long as we 
do not know whether or not he is deceiving us. 
Therefore we cannot be certain of anything as long 
as we do not know whether or not our Creator is 
deceiving us. etc. To this I reply by conceding the 
major premise but, denying the minor. For we have 
a clear and a distinct idea of a triangle although we 
do not know whether or not God is deceiving us. 
And in the same way we have a clear and a distinct 
idea of God as I have already shown, and, therefore, 
cannot doubt His existence, nor any mathematical 
truth. 

Our prefatory remarks being thus completed we 
proceed now to the main problem. 

DEFINITIONS. 

I. Under the term thought (cogitatio) I compre- 
hend all mental phenomena of which we are imme- 
diately conscious. 

Thus volition, understanding, imagination and sense 
perception are all forms of thought. I have added 
the term immediately to exclude phenomena which 
directly depend upon and follow from these mental 
states. Thus voluntary motion arises as the direct 
result of some form of thought but is not itself a 
mental state. 

II. By the term idea (idea) I understand any 
form of thought of which we are conscious through 
immediate perception. 

I cannot express anything in words, therefore, with- 



PART I 21 

out thus making it certain that I have some idea which 
these words are meant to signify. Therefore I would 
even call the images depfcted in phantasy, ideas, not, 
however, so far as they are corporeal, i. e. ? as they 
affect some portion of the brain, but only so far as 
.they affect the mind in that portion of the brain. 

III. By the objective reality of an idea, / under- 
stand the object represented by the idea. 

In the same manner I may speak of objective per- 
fection, or of an objective art, etc. For whatever we 
perceive in the objects of our ideas are objective in 
the ideas themselves. 

IV. These characteristics are said to be formally 
(formaliter) contained in the objects of our ideas 
when they really are just as we perceive them. They 
are said to be eminently (eminenter) contained when 
they are not just as we perceive them but so great that 
they can easily supply what we perceive. 

Note that when I say a cause eminently contains the 
perfection of its own effect, I mean that the cause 
contains the perfection of the effect more completely 
than the effect itself. Vid. Ax. 8. 

V. Every object to which belongs as to a subject, 
some property, or quality, or attribute, or through 
which some things which we perceive exist, or of which 
we have some real idea is called substance. 

Properly speaking, indeed we have no other idea 
of substance than that it is an object in which either 
formally or eminently something else exists which we 
perceive, or that it is objective in something apart 
from our ideas. 

VI. Substance in which thoughts are immediately 
present, is called mind. 

I use the term mind (mens), rather than spirit 



22 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

(animus), for the latter term is equivocal, often being 
used to mean a corporeal object. 

VII. Substance, which is the immediate subject of 
extension, and of accidents, which presupposes forms of 
extension as figure, position, and motion, etc., is called 
body (corpus). 

Whether mind and body are one and the same sub- 
stance will be inquired into later. 

VIII. Substance which we know to be perfect in 
the highest degree, and in which nothing can be con- 
ceived implying a defect or limitation, is called God. 

IX. When we say that something is contained in 
the nature of the thing itself or in its concept, it is the 
same as to affirm that this is true. 

X. Substances are said to be distinct when the one 
can exist alone and apart from others. 

We have here omitted the Postulates of Descartes be- 
cause we were unable to deduce any conclusions from 
them in what is to follow. Nevertheless, we earnestly 
ask the reader that he does not fail to carefully read 
them over and give them his earnest attention. 

AXIOMS. 

I. The knowledge and certainty of an unknown 
object depends upon the cognition of objects pre- 
viously known. 

II. There are reasons for doubting the existence 
of our own bodies. 

(This was shown in the Prolegomenon, so may be 
placed here as an axiom.) 

III. If our being comprises anything beside mind 
and- body it is not so well known as these. 

(These axioms, it should be noted, do not affirm 



PARTI 23 

objective existence, but only deal with objects as a part 
of our mental life.) 

Proposition I. 
We cannot be absolutely certain of anything until 
we knozv that we really exist. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

This proposition is self-evident. For he who does 
not know that he exists, cannot know that he is affirm- 
ing or denying*. It should be noted, too, that although 
we affirm and deny many things that have no refer- 
ence to our existence, nevertheless unless this fact is 
accepted as indubitable all things are in doubt. — Q. 
E. D. 

Proposition II. 
The proposition ego sum is self-evident. 

demonstration. 
If you deny that it is self-evident, it can be known 
only through some truth, prior to the proposition ego 
sum (per. Ax. 1), which is absurd (per Ibid.). 
Therefore it is self-evident. — 0. E. D. 

Proposition III. 
The primary truth is not that I am a corporeal being, 
neither is this fact self-evident. 

demonstration. 
There are some reasons for doubting the existence 
of our bodies (Vid. Ax. 2). Hence (per Ax. 1) 



24 PRINCIPLES OP DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

we must derive this truth through something pre- 
viously and more indubitably known. Therefore, the 
primary truth is not that I am a corporeal being nor 
is this fact self-evident. — Q. E. D. 

Proposition IV. 
Ego sum is the primary fact in cognition only so 
far as I am a thinking being. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

The assertion that I am a corporeal being is not the 
primary fact in cognition (per Prop. III.) ; neither am 
I certain of my existence except as I am mind and 
body. For if I comprise in my being any thing beside 
mind and body, it is not so well known to me as body 
(per Ax. 3). Therefore ego sum is the primary fact 
of cognition only so far as I am a thinking being. 
-Q. E. D. 

COROLLARY. 

From the last proposition it is evident that the mind 
is better known than the body. (For a fuller explana- 
tion, see Art. 11 and 12, Part I. of the Principles.) 

SCHOLIUM. 

Every one is certain that he affirms, he denies, he 
doubts, he understands, he imagines, etc., or that he is 
a doubting, an understanding, an affirming — in a 
word — a thinking being. This truth no one can 
doubt. Therefore the proposition cogito, or sum 
cogitans, is the fundamental truth of all Philosophy. 
And, since for certain knowledge nothing more can be 
demanded or desired than that we deduce all things 



PART I 25 

from certain premises so that all our conclusions are 
as certain as our premises, it follows that all that we 
deduce from our principle so that if we doubt the 
conclusion we must also doubt the premises, must be 
held to be perfectly true. In order to proceed as 
cautiously as possible, in the beginning I shall admit 
to be of equal certainty only those things which we 
perceive in ourselves so far as we are thinking beings. 
As, for example, that one desires this or that, that one 
has certain ideas, and that one thing contains more per- 
fection than another ; namely, that which contains ob- 
jective perfection of substance is far more perfect 
than that which contains only objective perfection of 
some accident. Finally, that that is the most perfect 
substance which contains the highest degree of perfect 
being. These things, I say, are not only all as clear 
as our first principle but, perhaps, are even more cer- 
tain. For they not only affirm that we think but that 
we think in this particular way. And we shall find, 
when we come to test them, that they are not only 
indubitable, but that we cannot doubt their verity 
without doubting the fundamental truth of all knowl- 
edge. For example, if some one should say he is in 
doubt whether something can arise from nothing, he 
might also doubt his own existence even when he is 
thinking. For if I can affirm that something can exist 
without a cause I can, by the same right, affirm that 
thought may exist without a cause and that I think 
although I am nothing. Since this is impossible I 
cannot believe that something can arise from nothing. 
Leaving these matters for the present, it seems neces- 
sary, in order to proceed, to add to the number of 
Axioms we have already given. In the end of his 
" Response to the Second Objection," Descartes has 



26 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

given certain truths as axioms, and I could not wish 
to be more accurate than he. Nevertheless, in order 
to preserve the order now begun, and to render them 
a little clearer, I shall attempt to show how they de- 
pend one upon the other and all upon the principle 
Ego sum cogitans, or that they are all as certain as 
this truth. 



AXIOMS 

Taken from Descartes. 

IV. There are different degrees of reality or being. 
For substance has more reality than accidents or mode ; 
and infinite substance than finite. So, too, there is 
more objective reality in the idea of substance than in 
the idea of accident ; and in the idea of infinite sub- 
stance than in the idea of finite substance. 

This axiom is known as true from a consideration 
of those ideas of which we are certain because they 
are modes of thought. For we know how much 
reality or perfection the idea of substance affirms of 
substance and how much the idea of mode affirms of 
mode. And since this is true we know that the idea 
of substance contains more objective reality than the 
idea of its accidents, etc. (Vid. Schol. Prop. 4). 

V. A thinking being, if it were possible, would 
immediately add to itself any attribute of perfection in 
which it was lacking. 

Every one observes this in himself so far as he is 
a thinking being; therefore (per Schol. Prop. 4) we 
kndw that this is true. And for the same reason we 
arc equally certain of the inference. 

VI. In the idea or concept of everything, existence 



PART I 27 

either as possible or necessary is contained (Vid. 
Axioms of Descartes, No. 10). 

In the concept of God or an absolutely perfect being, 
existence is necessary. For otherwise it would be im- 
perfect which is contrary to the hypothesis. 

VII. No object or quality of an object already 
existing can exist without some existing object as the 
cause of its existence. 

In the Scholium to Prop. 4 I have shown that this 
axiom is equal in truth to the proposition Ego sum 
cogitans. 

VIII. Whatever reality or perfection an object con- 
tains, this exists either formally (formaliter) or emi- 
nently (eminenter) in its primary or adequate cause. 1 

By the term eminently I mean that the cause con- 
tains the perfection of the effect more fully than the 
effect itself. By the term formally I mean that the 
cause and the effect contain the perfection to a like 
degree. 

This axiom depends upon the previous ones. For 
if it is supposed that there is less perfection in the 
cause than in the effect zve have a result without a 
cause, and this is absurd (per Ax. 7). 

Therefore nothing can be the cause of a given effect 
except that in which is contained eminently or at least 
formally, all the perfection found in the effect. 

IX. The objective reality of our ideas requires a 
cause in which this same reality is not only objectively 
contained, but one in which it is found formally, or 
eminently. 

Although this axiom is evident to all, many misuse 
it. For when some one forms some new idea every- 
one wishes to know why he did so. When they can 

1 Cf. Veitch's Descartes, p. 268, and Note p. 281. 



28 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

assign some cause that contains formally or eminently 
all the perfection found in the concept they are content. 
Descartes has sufficiently explained this in his example 
of a machine (Vid. Prin. of Phil., Pt. /., Art. iy). So 
also if one inquires from whence man derives the ideas 
of his own thought and body, he finds that they are de- 
rived from himself. He discovers that he formally or 
at least constantly contains all that these ideas objec- 
tively contain. Therefore if one has some idea which 
contains more objective reality than he himself contains, 
impelled by reason he would seek some other cause 
outside of himself which formally or eminently con- 
tains all the perfection he is seeking to understand. 
Nor would any one ever assign any other reason for 
doing this than that he had conceived this with equal 
clearness and distinctness and that he had compre- 
hended the truth of this axiom as it depends directly 
upon those preceding it. Namely (per Ax. 4), dif- 
ferent degrees of reality or being are given in our 
ideas; and (per Ax. 8) for these degrees of perfec- 
tion, some cause with equal perfection is required. 
But since these degrees of reality in our ideas are not 
merely in thought, but represent something in sub- 
stance and its modes, in a word, so far as they are 
considered as images of things, it clearly follows that 
no other cause for this can be assigned than that all 
the reality they objectively contain is contained either 
formally or eminently in reason. This we have shown 
above and it is evident to all. 

In order to make this perfectly clear I will illustrate 
with one or two examples. If one should see two 
books (for example, one written by a great philosopher 
and another by an uncultured man) written in the 
same hand, and should consider not the meaning of the 



PART I 29 

words, i. e.j the mental images they represent, but only 
the delineation of the characters in which the thoughts 
are expressed, he would discover no dissimilarity. So 
he would not be led to look for different authors for 
the books but would believe they were written by 
the same person and with a common end in view. 
But attending not to this but to the meaning of the 
words and of the discussions he would find great dif- 
ferences, and would conclude that they certainly had 
a different origin. He would find that the sense of 
the words being considered, that is, the concepts they 
represent, the one is far more perfect than the other. 
I speak here of the first cause of the books. Although 
as is evident the one might even have been derived 
from the other. 

We may illustrate further by the statue of some 
leader. Here, if we attend only to the material used 
we will find no cause for seeking a different sculptor for 
this, and for some copy. Indeed, nothing hinders us 
from thinking that the first is a copy of the second, 
this again of a third and so on ad infinitum. // the 
material alone is considered we do not need a separ- 
ate cause for each. But if we consider the statue as 
a statue we ar<e immediately compelled to seek a first 
cause which contained either formally or eminently 
all that is presented to us. I do not see that this 
axiom requires any further elucidation or confirma- 
tion. 

X. No lesser cause is required for the conservation 
of an object than for its first creation. 

Because at the present time we are thinking it does 
not at all follow that we must continue to think. Our 
concept of thought does not contain nor involve neces- 
sary existence. For I can clearly conceive of thought 



30 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

although I suppose that it does not exist. (This every 
one knows from his own experience so far as he is 
a thinking being). But since the nature of any cause 
ought to contain and involve in itself the perfection 
of its effect (per Ax. 8), it follows that there is some- 
thing in ourselves or without us (as yet we do not 
know which) whose nature involves necessary exist- 
ence. And this something is the primary cause of 
our thought both of its beginning and its continuance. 
For, although our thought began to exist, its nature 
and essence does not imply a necessary existence any 
more than it did before it began to be. It is there- 
fore preserved in its existence by the same force that 
determined that it should exist. What we here affirm 
of thought is true also for every thing whose essence 
does not involve a necessary existence. 

XL Nothing exists of which we may not ask, what 
is the cause (or reason) of its existence. (Vid. Ax. I. 
of Descartes). 

If anything positive exists we cannot say that it 
exists without a cause (per Ax. /). Therefore we 
must assign some positive cause for its existence. This 
may be external, i. e., some cause outside of the object 
itself, or internal, i. c., something comprehended in 
the nature and definition of the object. 

Four Propositions Taken From Descartes. 

Proposition V. 
God's existence is known merely from the consid- 
eration of his nature. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

It is equivalent to saying that a thing is true to say 
that it is contained in its nature or in its concept. 



PART I 31 

(per Def. 9). The concept of God includes necessary 
existence. Therefore it is true to say that he has a 
necessary existence in Himself, or that He exists. 
-Q. E. D. 

SCHOLIUM. 

Many important truths follow from this proposition. 
Indeed upon this truth alone, namely, that existence 
belongs to the nature of God, or that the concept of 
God involves a necessary existence as that of a triangle 
that the sum of its angles is equal to two right 
angles, or again that His existence and His essence 
are eternal truth, depends almost all our knowledge 
of God's attributes by which we are led to a love of 
God (or to the highest blessedness). Therefore it is 
extremely desirable that the human race should some- 
time consider this. I confess that there are certain 
prejudices which make this truth hard to see. But if 
any one with earnest purpose, impelled by the love of 
truth and its utility, wishes to examine into this, we 
recommend that he consider what is given in Medita- 
tion V. and in the end of his " Response to the Sec. 
Ob'j.," and also, what we have said of Eternity in 
Ch. I. Pt. II. of our Appendix. He would then under- 
stand very clearly, nor could he doubt that we do 
have an idea of God which is indeed the foundation 
of human blessedness ; he would see clearly that the 
idea of God differs greatly from that of other objects; 
He would see, when he understands the essence and 
existence of God, that he differs toto genere from all 
other things. But there is no need to detain the reader 
longer. 



32 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

Proposition VI. 

The existence of God may be demonstrated a pos- 
teriori from this, viz., that we possess this idea of 
such a Being. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

The objective reality of anything requires a cause 
apart from our ideas, in which cause this reality is 
not only objective, but in which it is contained either 
formally, or eminently (per. Ax. 8). We have the 
idea of God, and the objective reality of this idea 
as it is not in our minds either formally or eminently 
cannot be anywhere but in God himself. Therefore 
this idea of God as we have it requires God for its 
cause and He, therefore, exists. 

SCHOLIUM. 

There are certain ones who say they have no idea 
of God, although, as they affirm, they love and worship 
him. And although you place before their eyes the 
definition and attributes of God, you have accom- 
plished nothing. No more, by Hercules, than if you 
should attempt to teach a man blind from birth the 
different colors as we see them. Indeed, we ought 
to give their words very little attention unless we wish 
to consider them as a new species of animal half way 
between man and the lower beasts. In what way 
do I attempt to set forth the idea of anything except 
by giving a definition and explaining its attributes? 
Indeed when we are discussing the idea of God, it is 
not so much that men deny the words as that they 
are unable to form some image corresponding to these 
words. 



PART I 33 

Then it should be noted that Descartes when he 
cites Axiom 4 to show that the objective reality of 
the idea of God is not in us either formally or emi- 
nently, supposes that every one knows that he is not 
infinite substance nor perfect in knowledge or power, 
etc. This he was justified in doing, for whoever 
thinks at all knows that there are many things he does 
not understand clearly and distinctly, and that he is 
even in doubt in regard to much that he sees. 

Finally it should be noted that there are not many 
gods, as clearly follows from Axiom 8, but only one 
as we have shown in Proposition II. of this part and 
in Pt. II., Chapter II., of our Appendix. 

Proposition VII. 
The existence of God is demonstrated in the fact 
that we, having the idea of existence, also exist. 

SCHOLIUM. 

To prove this proposition Descartes laid . down two 
axioms, viz., (1) "Whatever is able to do that which 
is more difficult is able to do that which is less so. 
(2) It is greater to create or (per Ax. 10) conserve 
substance than attributes or properties of substance." 
What he meant by these I do not know. For these 
terms are not used absolutely but only in respect to a 
definite cause. 1 

So one and the same thing at the same time, in 
respect to different causes may be easy or difficult. 
If you call that difficult which requires more exertion, 



1 If yon wish an example, consider the spider which easily 
spins its web, but for man this would be almost impossible. 
On the other hand, men easily do many things which perhaps 
are impossible for angels. 



34 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

and that easy which requires less in the same case, as 
for example, the force which sustains fifty pounds 
could sustain twenty-five with double ease, clearly the 
axiom would not be true ; neither does it demonstrate 
what he intended it should. For when he said, " If 
I have the power of preserving myself I have the 
power also of giving to myself all the works of per- 
fection which I lack " (for that would require only as 
great power) ; I would concede that this energy used 
for self-preservation might be able to do many other 
things far more easily if I did not need it for conserv- 
ing myself. But so long as I use this energy for 
self-preservation, I deny that it is possible to use it 
for accomplishing other things, though they be never 
so easy. This is clearly evident from our example. 
Nor does he take away the difficulty by saying, that 
as I am a thinking being I shall know this necessarily, 
for I employ all my strength in preserving myself 
which is the reason I do not give myself the attributes 
of perfection which I lack. For (although we are 
not now discussing this, but only how the necessity 
of this proposition follows from this axiom) if I know 
this I would be greater and perhaps would require, for 
preserving myself in such perfection, greater power 
than I now possess. And then I do not know that 
it is any greater task to create (or to conserve) sub- 
stance than attributes, i. e., to speak clearly and more 
philosophically, I do not know but that substance re- 
quires all the virtue and essence by which it conserves 
itself, to conserve its attributes. But we leave this and 
will inquire, as this worthy author intended we should, 
into what is meant by the terms " easy " and " diffi- 
cult." I do not think that by any means I could per- 
suade myself that he understood by the term " diffi- 



PART I 35 

cult " that which is impossible (and so could not be 
conceived as existing), and by the term "easy" that 
which implies no contradiction (and so is easily con- 
ceivable). Although in the Third Meditation and in 
the observation he seems to mean that when he says: 
" Nor ought I to think that those things which are 
wanting in my nature are more difficult to acquire than 
the powers which I now possess. For, on the con- 
trary, it is manifestly far more difficult for me as a 
being or a thinking substance to arise from nothing 
than, etc." For this is not in keeping with the words 
of the author nor consonant with his ability. And, 
indeed, though for the present I shall overlook it, 
between the possible and the impossible, or between 
that which is conceivable and inconceivable there is no 
relation, just as there is none between something and 
nothing. Power does not quadrate better with that 
which is impossible than creation and generation with 
non-being; such terms are not capable of relationship. 
Beside this it should be remembered that I can compare 
and understand only those things of which I have a 
clear and a distinct concept. I cannot conclude, there- 
fore, that one who is able to do impossible things is 
able also to do that which is possible. I ask what 
conclusion is this? If any one can square a circle he 
can also make a circle whose radii are not equal; or 
if one can endue nothing with the qualities of matter 
he can also produce something from nothing. As I 
have said there is no analogy, or relation, or means 
of comparison between such terms. , Any one who 
reflects upon this even a little can clearly see that this 
is true. Therefore I believe that something else was 
meant by the ingenious Descartes. Considering the 
second axiom given above, Descartes seemed to mean 



36 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

by the terms greater and more difficult that which was 
more perfect, and by the opposite terms that which 
was less perfect. This also certainly seems obscure. 
It is the same difficulty found above, and I deny here, 
as there, that he who has. power to do the greater 
thing has power also at the same time to do the lesser. 
According to the above proposition this must be 
granted. Then when he says " it is greater to create 
or conserve substance than its attributes," we cannot 
understand by attributes that which is formally con- 
tained in substance and only distinguished from it by 
reason. For then it would be the same thing to create 
substance as to create attributes. For the same reason 
we cannot think that he meant the properties of sub- 
stance. This follows necessarily from its essence and 
definition, much less can we understand by this, how- 
ever, as he seemed to wish, the properties and at- 
tributes of some other substance ; as for example, if I 
say that because I have the power of conserving my- 
self, a thinking, finite substance, so I have the power 
of giving to myself all the perfection of infinite sub- 
stance which differs by its whole essence from me. 
For the power or essence by which I conserve my 
being differs toto genere from the power and essence 
by which absolute or infinite substance conserves 
itself. The power and properties of infinite substance 
are not differentiated per se but only by reason ; 2 so 
(while I may concede that I conserve myself), if I 
wish to think that I have the power to give to myself 
all the perfection of infinite substance I suppose noth- 
ing else than that I have the power to annihilate my 

2 It may be noted here that the power by which substance 
conserves itself is nothing but its essence and only differs 
from that in name. Which we, will clearly show when in the 
Appendix we discuss the nature of God. 



PART I 37 

being and to create infinite substance anew. Which 
clearly presupposes more than that I am able to con- 
serve the finite substance of my being. If then none 
of these interpretations can be given to the terms 
attributes or properties, nothing remains but the qual- 
ities which are eminently contained in the substance 
(as this or that thought which I clearly see are want- 
ing in me). Not, however, what some other substance 
eminently contains ; for these attributes even though 
wanting in me are not imperfections so far as I am con- 
sidered to be a thinking being. This, then, which 
Descartes wished to infer from his axioms does not 
logically follow ; namely, that if I have the power to 
conserve myself, I have the power also of giving to 
myself all the marks of perfection of the Absolute 
Being. This is evident from what has been said. But 
to avoid confusion, and to make the matter more cer- 
tain, it seems best to demonstrate the following Lem- 
mata first and give the demonstration of the seventh 
proposition afterward. 

Lemma I. 

An object of a higher degree of perfection, by virtue 
of this fact involves a fuller existence and a greater 
necessity of existence. Conversely, that which by 
nature involves a greater necessity of existence, is 
more perfect. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Existence is contained in the idea or concept of 
every object (per Ax. 6). Let us suppose A to be 
an object with ten degrees of perfection. I say that 
this object involves more existence than if it is sup- 



38 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

posed to contain but five. For, as we cannot affirm 
existence of nothing (Vid. Schol. Prop. 4), as we 
detract from the perfection of a concept and conceive 
its content to approach zero as its limit, so much* do 
we detract from its possible existence. If we conceive, 
this degree of perfection to be infinitely diminished, 
even to zero, it will contain no existence, or but an 
absolutely impossible one. On the other hand if we 
increase this degree of perfection to infinity we con- 
ceive that it has the highest possible existence and so 
to be absolutely necessary. This was the first point 
to be proven. Then, as I am by no means able to 
separate these two (as appears from Ax. 6 and the 
whole of Pt. I.) it clearly follows that the other is 
likewise true. 

Note I. Although many things are said to exist 
necessarily simply because the cause producing them 
is given we do not now speak of such objects; but 
only of that necessity and possibility which follows 
from the mere consideration of the nature and essence 
of the thing itself, no reason being held as to its cause. 

Note II. We do not here speak of beauty and other 
marks of perfection which men from ignorance and 
tradition are accustomed to esteem as such. But by 
perfection I understand only so much reality or being. 
As for example, I perceive that there is more reality 
in substance than in modes or qualities. And so far, 
I know clearly that there is necessity, and a more per- 
fect existence in the first than in the latter two, as is 
evident from Axioms 4 and 6. 

COROLLARY. 

Hence it follows that that which absolutely involves 
a necessary existence Is perfect Being, or God. 



PART I 39 

Lemma II. 

He ivho has the power of conserving himself, in- 
volves, by his nature, a necessary existence. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Whoever has the power of conserving himself, has 
also the power of self-creation (per Ax. 10), that is, 
(as all will readily concede), he needs no external 
cause of his existence, but his own nature is sufficient 
cause that he should exist, either problematically or 
necessarily. But not problematically; for (according 
to what I have shown in Ax. 10) from the mere fact 
of existence it does not follow that an object will con- 
tinue to exist ; this being contrary to the hypothesis. 
Therefore necessarily : that is, his nature involves 
existence. Q. E. D. 

DEMONSTRATION 

Of Proposition VII. 

If I had in myself the power of self-conservation 
I would by nature have a necessary existence (per 
Lemma II.), and (per Coroll. Lemm. I.) ; my nature 
would contain all the attributes of perfection. But as 
a thinking being I am certain that there are many im- 
perfections in me (per Schol. Prop. 4) as that I doubt, 
I desire, etc. Therefore I do not have the power of 
self-conservation, nor can I say that I choose thus 
to limit my being for this is clearly opposed to Lemma 
I. and to what I actually experience in myself. (Per 
Ax._ 5 ). 

Since then it is impossible for me to exist ex- 
cept as I am conserved, as long as I exist, I must 
exist either by my own power (provided I possess such 



4 o PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

power), or by the power of another. But I exist (per 
Schol. Prop. 4) and yet have not the power of self- 
conservation as is now positively proven. Therefore 
I am conserved by another; but not by a being who 
does not possess the power of self-conservation (for 
the same reason that I myself do not possess this 
power) ; therefore by some being who has this power, 
i. e. (per Coroll. Lemm. I.) by one whose nature 
involves a necessary existence, and contains all per- 
fection which I recognize as belonging to an absolutely 
perfect being. Therefore this perfect being, i. e., God, 
exists. Q. E. D. 

COROLLARY. 

God is able to do all that we clearly understand, 
just as we so understand it. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

This all follows from the preceding Proposition. 
For it was proven that God does exist from this, viz., 
that it is necessary for some being to exist in whom 
is found all the perfection we can clearly conceive. 
Moreover, there is in us the idea of some power so 
great that by it alone all things exist which are under- 
stood by me as possible, the heavens, the earth and 
all other things. Therefore with God's existence all 
of these statements are likewise proven. 

Proposition VIII. 
Mind and body are essentially different. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Whatever we clearly conceive, can be realized by 
God just as we so conceive it (per Coroll. of the pre- 



PART I 4i 

ceding). But we clearly conceive of mind, a thinking- 
substance (per Def. 6) apart from body, i. e. (per 
Def. 7), apart from extended substance (per Props. 
3 and 4) ; and vice versa body apart from mind (as 
all will concede). Therefore, through divine power 
mind can exist apart from body and body apart from 
mind. 

Substances which can exist the one apart from the 
other are essentially different (per Def. 10) ; body 
and mind are substances (per Defs. 5, 6, 7) which 
can so exist ; therefore they are essentially different. 

See Prop. 4 of Descartes in the end of his Response 
to the Second Objection; and also what is found in 
Pt. I. of the Principles, Arts. 22-29. F° r I consider 
that these things here do not give the value of the 
work. 

Proposition IX. 
God is omniscient. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

If you deny it, then God either knows nothing or 
only a certain limited amount. But to understand 
some things and be ignorant of others implies a lim- 
itation to God's perfection, which is absurd (per Def. 
8). If God understands nothing, it either indicates 
in God a want of intelligence and involves in Him, as 
in men who understand nothing, an imperfection, 
which is impossible with God (Ibid.), or it indicates, 
which is also repugnant to the idea of His being, that 
He understands only some things. But if intelligence 
is so denied to Him it is impossible for Him to create 
intellect (per Ax. 8). Since intellect is clearly and 
distinctlv conceived bv us, God is able to be its cause 



42 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

(per Coroll. Prop. 7). Therefore, it is far from 
being the case that He understands only some things, 
this being opposed to God's perfection. Therefore, 
God is omniscient. Q. E. D. 

SCHOLIUM. 

Although it must be conceded that God is incor- 
poreal, as will be proven in Proposition 16, this does 
not mean only that all perfection of extension is want- 
ing in Him, but only that the imperfections of exten- 
sion must not be attributed to Him. The same is true 
of God's intelligence, as all, who wish to be above the 
rank and file of philosophers, will readily admit. This 
will be further explained in our Appendix, Pt. II., 
ch. 7. 

Proposition X. 

Whatever perfection is found in God arises from 
His own being. 

If you deny it, let it be supposed that there is some 
perfection in God which does not have its source in 
Himself. Either it would be in God by virtue of itself 
or by virtue of something apart from God. But if its 
cause was in itself it would have a necessary, or at 
least a problematical existence (per Lemma II. Prop. 
7), and so far (per Coroll. Lemma I. Ibid.), have some 
absolute perfection and (per Def. 8) thus be God. 
If, therefore, we say that there is some perfection in 
God whose cause is itself, we affirm that it arises from 
God Q. E. D. But if it has arisen from some other 
source than God, then He is not an absolutely perfect 
being, which is contrary to Def. 8. Therefore what- 



PART I 43 

ever perfection is found in God arises from His own 
being. O. E. D. 

Proposition XL 
There arc not many gods. 



DEMONSTRATION. 

If you deny this, conceive, if possible, that there are 
many gods, for example A and B. Then necessarily 
(per Prop. 9) A as well as B will be omniscient; that 
is, A will understand all things himself and B, and 
likewise B will understand himself and A. But since 
A and B exist necessarily (per Prop. 5), the cause of 
the truth and the necessity of the idea of B which A 
has is B himself ; and likewise the cause of the truth 
and the necessity of the idea of A in B is in A him- 
self. Therefore there will be some perfection in A 
that is not self-caused, and likewise with B. And so 
far A and B would not be gods. Therefore there is 
only one God. Q. E. D. 

It should be noted here' that because there is some- 
thing which in itself involves a necessary existence as 
does God's being, He is the only being of whom this 
is true, as any one who reflects carefully will clearly 
see. I might also demonstrate this, but it is evident 
in all that I have shown in this Proposition. 

Proposition XII. 

All existing things arc conserved by God's power 
alone. 

demonstration. 

If you deny this, let it be supposed that something 
conserves itself. Then (per Lemma II. Prop. 7) its 



44 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

nature involves necessary existence. And so (per 
Coroll. Lemma I. Prop. 7), it would be God, and there 
would be more than one God, which is absurd (per 
Prop, supra). Therefore, nothing exists which is not 
conserved by God's power alone. Q. E. D. 

COROLLARY I. 

God is the Creator of all things. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

God (per the preceding) conserves all things, i. e. 
(per Axiom 10), he has created all things and is 
continually creating them. 

COROLLARY II. 

Objects have in themselves no essence which is the 
cause of God's knowledge of them. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Since God's perfection is self-derived (per Prop. 
10), objects can have no self-caused essence which 
could be the cause of God's knowledge of them. On 
the other hand, since God has created all things, not 
from other objects, but by the mere fiat of His will, 
(per Prop. 12 with Coroll.), and since He knows no 
other power beside His own (for so I define creation), 
it follows that before creation nothing existed, and that 
God is the cause of the essence of all things. Q. E. D. 

It may be noted, also, that this corollary is evident 
from the fact that God is the cause or creator of all 
things (per Coroll. I.), and that the cause must con- 
tain in itself all the perfection of the effect (per Ax- 
iom 8). 



PART I 45 



COROLLARY III. 



It clearly follows, therefore, that God does not, prop- 
erly speaking, perceive or form precepts, for His un- 
derstanding is not determined by any external object, 
but all things arise from Himself. 

COROLLARY IV. 

God's causality is prior to the essence and existence 
of things. This clearly follows from Corollaries I. 
and II. above. 

Proposition XIII. 

God is never a deceiver, but in all things is perfectly 
true. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

We can attribute nothing to God in which we find 
any imperfection (per Ax. 8). 1 All deception (as is 
evident) or desire of deceiving, arises either from 
malice or fear. Fear, moreover, presupposes a limited 
power ; malice a privation of some good. No decep- 
tion, therefore, can be ascribed to God, a being omnipo- 
tent and of perfect goodness, but on the contrary, it 
must be agreed that He is in no way a deceiver. Q. 
E. D. See " Response to Second Objection," num- 
ber 4. 

1 1 have not put this down as an Axiom with the others, as 
I could not see the need of so doing. I do not use it except 
in demonstrating this proposition, and also, while we have not 
yet proved God's existence I did not wish to assume anything 
as true which I could not deduce from the primary truth Ego 
sum as I said in Scholium Prop. 4. Further, I have not 
given among the others the definitions of malice and fear for 
no one is ignorant of them, and I do not use them except in 
this place. 



46 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

Proposition XIV. 
Whatever we clearly and distinctly conceive, is true. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

The faculty we possess of discerning the true from 
the false (as every one finds in himself and is evident 
from all that has been said) has been created by God 
and is continually conserved by Him (per Prop. 12 
and Coroll.), that is (per the above), by a Being of 
absolute truth and not a deceiver. Neither has He 
given to us (as every one knows) any power of with- 
holding assent to what we thus clearly conceive. 
Wherefore if we are deceived in this, we are deceived 
in everything by God, and He is a deceiver, which, by 
the above, is absurd. Therefore, whatever we clearly 
and distinctly conceive is true. Q. E. D. 

SCHOLIUM. 

Since those things to which we are constrained to 
assent when we clearly and distinctly conceive them 
are necessarily true ; and since we have the power of 
withholding assent from those things which are ob- 
scure and doubtful, and not derived from certain prem- 
ises (as every one understands from his own experi- 
ence), it clearly follows that we are able to be on our 
guard lest we fall into error and are deceived (which 
will be made clearer as we proceed). We may, in 
this manner, determine in ourselves to affirm nothing 
which we do not clearly and distinctly conceive, or 
which is not deduced from certain premises. 



PART I 47 



Proposition XV. 
Error is nothing positive. 



DEMONSTRATION. 

If error were something positive, God would be its 
cause, and by Him it would continually be procreated 
(per Prop. 12). But this is absurd (per Prop. 13). 
Therefore error is nothing positive. Q. E. D. 

SCHOLIUM. 

Since error is nothing positive in man, its cause will 
be merely the lack of a correct use of our freedom 
(per Schol. Prop. 14). We cannot say, therefore, 
that God is the cause of error in any sense, except as 
we say the absence of the sun is the cause of dark- 
ness, or as we say that God is the cause of blindness 
in a child having all his faculties except sight. For 
He has given to us understanding for a few things 
only. In order that it may be clearly understood how 
error depends entirely upon the misuse of the will, 
and how we may be able to avoid all error, we will 
call to mind the different modes of thought which we 
have, viz. : All modes of conception (as sensation, 
imagination, and pure cognition) and of volition (as 
desire, aversion, affirming, denying, and doubt) ; for 
all forms of thought may be referred to these two 
classes. 

Concerning these things it may be noted: 1. That 
so far as mind knows objects clearly and distinctly 
and assents to them, it cannot be deceived (per Prop. 
14) ; and also so far as it knows things and does not 
assent to them. For, although I can conceive of a 



48 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

winged horse, it is certain that I do not fall into error 
as long as I do not assent to the proposition that such 
a creature exists, or even while I am in doubt about 
it. And since to assent is nothing else than to deter- 
mine the will, it follows that error depends entirely 
upon the use of the will. 

As now more evidently appears, it should be noted : 
2. That we not only have the power of assenting to 
those things which we clearly and distinctly conceive, 
but also of assenting to things conceived in some other 
way. For our will is determined by no limits. If 
one but consider for a moment it will be evident that 
if God should choose to give us infinite knowledge 
there would be no necessity for bestowing upon us a 
more ample power of volition in order that we might 
approve all that would be known under such condi- 
tions. But the power we now possess would be suffi- 
cient for assenting to infinite things. From this we 
learn that we give our assent to many things not de- 
duced from certain principles. And further, it is evi- 
dent that if knowledge extended as far as the power of 
volition, or if we could not exercise our power of vo- 
lition beyond the limits of understanding, or finally, 
if we could but keep volition within the bounds of 
knowledge, we should never fall into error (per Prop. 

14). 

We do not have the power of attaining the first two 
conditions, however, for that would imply that the 
will was not created infinite in its nature and the under- 
standing finite. The third condition alone remains, 
viz., whether we have the power of limiting the action 
of volition to the limits of the understanding. Since 
the will is free to determine itself, it follows that we 
have the power of restricting this faculty of assent 



PART I 49 

within the limits of understanding. So, also, we can 
prevent ourselves from falling into error. Whence 
it is perfectly evident that whether or not we fall into 
error depends entirely upon the use we make of our 
free will. That our will is free is demonstrated in 
Art. 39, Pt. I. of the Principles, and in Meditation 4, 
and in our Appendix, the last chapter, it is also clearly 
shown. Although it is true that when we clearly and 
distinctly conceive something we cannot withhold as- 
sent, this necessity of assent does not depend upon 
some defect in the will, but upon its freedom and per- 
fection. For to assent to the truth is a mark of per- 
fection in us, as is sufficiently evident in itself ; neither 
is the will ever more perfect or more free than when 
it directly determines itself. If it were possible for 
the mind so to do, it would give to itself this same 
perfection, viz., to assent necessarily to what is clearly 
and distinctly conceived. Wherefore it is far from 
being the case, that because we are not indifferent in 
comprehending truth, we know we are less free. On 
the other hand, we know that the more indifferent we 
are under such conditions the less freedom we possess. 
It only remains to show how, in regard to man, 
error is privation, and in regard to God mere nega- 
tion. This we will easily see if we consider first, that 
seeing many things beside those which we understand 
clearly, we are more perfect than if we did not perceive 
them. This is evident because, if it be supposed that 
we are able to conceive nothing clearly and distinctly, 
but only confusedly, we would have nothing more 
perfect than these confused concepts, neither would 
anything further be desired. Under such conditions, 
to assent to what we perceive only in a confused way, 
so far as the act is concerned, would be the perfect 



50 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

thing to do. This will be evident to any one, if, as 
above, he supposes that it is repugnant to human na- 
ture to know anything clearly or distinctly. For 
though he does not attain to clearness in his knowl- 
edge, it is far better to assent to what is perceived 
only confusedly, and thus to exercise his freedom, 
than to remain indifferent, that is, as will be shown, 
to remain in a lower degree of freedom. If we wish 
to appeal to experience and utility, we will find that 
daily experience teaches this same truth. 

Since, therefore, all our modes of thought, consid- 
ered in themselves, are perfect, the source of error is 
not in the understanding. But if we consider the 
different forms of volition as they differ from one 
another, some are found to be more perfect than 
others, for there are some that show less indifference 
of will, that is, are more free. We know, also, that 
as long as we give our assent to what is not clearly 
and distinctly known, we are rendering ourselves the 
more unfit to discern the true from the false. And 
thus we do not possess the highest liberty. There- 
fore, to assent to what is only obscurely perceived, so 
far as it is anything positive, is not in itself an imper- 
fection or error. But it deprives us of the highest 
freedom for which we are fitted. All imperfection of 
error, therefore, consists in the privation of the high- 
est form of liberty and is called error. It is called 
privation because it deprives us of some perfection 
which is consonant with our nature. It is called error 
because, from our own fault, we are without that per- 
fection which we might possess, did we but keep, as 
far as possible, volition within the bounds of knowl- 
edge. Since error in men, therefore, is nothing else 
than a privation of the perfect use of freedom, it fol- 



PART I Si 

lows that this freedom is not connected with any fac- 
ulty which man has obtained from God, nor even in 
the operation of a faculty so far as it depends upon 
God. Nor can we say that He has deprived us of a 
more perfect knowledge with which, in order that we 
should not fall into error, He might have endowed 
us. For no one has a right to demand anything of 
God, nor has an object any properties except those 
which God of His own free will has given it. Noth- 
ing existed before the will of God, nor, as we will 
clearly show in chaps. 7 and 8 of our Appendix, can 
anything be conceived to have existed. God, there- 
fore, has no more deprived us of a fuller understand- 
ing, or of the faculty of a more perfect knowledge, 
than He has deprived the circle of the properties of 
the globe or its periphery of the properties of the 
sphere. 

Since, then, nothing in our powers, however con- 
sidered, reveals any imperfection in God, it clearly 
follows that error in man is nothing but privation; 
but relative to God as its cause, it is not privation, 
but negation. 

Proposition XVI. 
God is incorporeal. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Matter is the immediate subject of motion (per 
Def. 7) ; therefore, if God is corporeal, He may be 
divided into parts. This, however, since it involves 
an imperfection, it is absurd to affirm. 



52 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 



ANOTHER PROOF. 

If God were corporeal, He might be divided into 
parts (per Def. 7). Now, either each part would be 
able to subsist per se or it would not. If the former, 
each part would be similar to other things erected by 
God and constantly conserved by His power (per 
Prop. 10 and Ax. n). These parts would then per- 
tain no more to the nature of God than do other 
created objects, as is evident from Prop. 5. But if 
each part exists by its own power, they would each 
involve a necessary existence (per Lemma II. Prop. 
7), and consequently would be a perfect being (per 
Coroll. Lemma II. Prop. 7). But this also is absurd 
(per Prop. II.). Therefore God is incorporeal. Q. 
E. D. 

Proposition XVII. 
God is simple being (ens simplissimum). 

DEMONSTRATION. 

If God were composite in His nature, these parts, 
as all will readily concede, should be prior, even down 
to the most insignificant one, to the nature of God, 
which is absurd (per Coroll. 4, Prop. 12). There- 
fore God is simple being. Q. E. D. 

COROLLARY. 

Hence it follows that God's understanding, His vo- 
lition, His decrees and His power are only distinctions 
of reason. 



PART I 53 

Proposition XVIII. 
God is unchangeable. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

If God were changeable, He would not change in 
part, but His whole essence would change (per Prop. 
7). But God's essence is necessarily what it is (per 
Props. 5, 6 and 7) ; therefore God is unchangeable. 
Q. E. D. 

Proposition XIX. 
Go d is eternal. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

God is a perfect being (Def. 8), and therefore nec- 
essarily exists. If we attribute only a limited exist- 
ence to Him these limits must be known, if not by us, 
by God Himself (per Prop. 9), who is omniscient. 
But then God who is omniscient (per Def. 8), would 
know no existence beyond these limits, which is ab- 
surd (per Prop. 5). Therefore God does not have a 
limited but an infinite existence, which we call eter- 
nity. (Vid. Chap. I., Part II., of our Appendix.) 
God, therefore, is eternal. O. E. D. 

Proposition XX. 
God has preordained everything from eternity. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Since God is eternal (per Prop. 19), His under- 
standing is eternal because it pertains to His eternal 



54 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES PHILOSOPHY 

essence (per Coroll. Prop. 7). Hence His under- 
standing, and His will, and His decrees are one (Ibid.) 
Therefore when we say God knows all things from 
eternity, we say also that He has willed, and decreed 
them from eternity. Q. E. D. 

COROLLARY. 

From this proposition it follows that God is un- 
changeable in all His works. 

Proposition XXL 

Extended substance has three dimensions, length, 
breadth and depth. We are united with each of these 
three. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Extended substance, so far as we clearly understand 
it, does not pertain to the nature of God (per Prop. 
10). It can, however, be created by God (per Coroll. 
Prop. 7, and per Prop. 8). Then we clearly and dis- 
tinctly perceive (as every thinking person knows) that 
extended substance produces in us titulations or pain 
and other similar sensations or ideas, at times even 
contrary to our desires. If we attempt to find some 
other cause of our sensations, as for example God or 
an angel, we immediately destroy the clear concept 
which we had before. Therefore (Vid. demonstration 
Prop. 14 and Schorl. Prop. 15), as long as we properly 
attend to our perceptions and do not admit what is not 
clearly and distinctly known, we lose our indifference 
and are led to admit that extended substance alone is 
the cause of our sensations. So, also, we will see and 
admit that extended things were created and exist by 



PART I 55 

God's power. In this we are clearly not deceived 
(per Prop. 14 with SchoL). Therefore it is truly 
affirmed that extended substance has length, and 
breadth, and depth, which was the first point. 

And further, as I have already proven, we observe 
great differences between our various sensations, as 
for example, when I say I perceive or see a tree; or 
when I say I am thirsty, or suffer, etc. It is evident 
that I cannot see or understand the reasons for these 
differences, unless I know that as a being, I am united 
to certain portions of matter and not to others. When 
I understand this clearly, and there is no other way 
to know it, it is evident that I am united to a certain 
part of matter. This was the second point, and it is 
now proven. Q. E. D. 

Note. — Unless the reader considers himself merely 
as a thinking being and free from his body, and lays 
aside as 'prejudices all the reasons he has heretofore 
held as proving the existence of the body, he will q/- 
tempt in vain to understand this demonstration. 



The Principles of Philosophy Demonstrated 
by the Method of Geometry. 

Part II. 

A Postulate. 

It is only asked here that each one attend as accu- 
rately as possible to his concepts in order to be able 
to distinguish the clear from the obscure. 

DEFINITIONS. 

I. Extension is that which consists of three dimen- 
sions. We do not understand by the term the act of 
extending or anything else distinct from quantity. 

II. By substance we understand that which de- 
pends only upon the concurrence of God for its exist- 
ence. 

III. An Atom as a part of matter, by nature is in- 
divisible. 

IV. That is indefinite, the limits of which, if it 
has any, cannot be investigated by the human mind. 

V. A vacuum is extension without corporeal sub- 
stance. 

VI. Space is distinguished from extension only 
by the reason ; in reality they are one and the same 
thing. See Art. 10, Pt. II. of the Principles. 

VII. That which we understand to be divisible, is 
divisible, at least potentially. 

57 



58 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

VIII. Local motion is the transference of a particle 
of matter or of a body from the vicinity of other con- 
tiguous bodies considered as in a state of rest, to the 
vicinity of others. 

This definition Descartes used to explain local mo- 
tion. In order to understand this rightly it should be 
noted : 

i. That by a particle of matter he understood all 
that which is transferred at the same time, although 
it may itself be composed of many parts. 

2. That to avoid confusion in this definition he 
spoke only of that which is always in moving bodies, 
viz., transference, lest, as has often happened, this be 
confused with the force or action which transfers 
them. This force or action, it is generally believed, 
is required only for motion and not for rest, which 
belief is plainly wrong. For, as is self-evident, the 
same force is required to give to a body at rest a cer- 
tain velocity as is required to bring the same body 
with that given velocity to rest. This is proved also 
by experience. Almost the same force is used in 
starting a ship at rest in quiet water as in suddenly 
stopping it when in motion. Plainly this force would 
be the same except that we are assisted in retarding 
the motion of the ship by the weight and viscosity of 
the retarding water. 

3. That, he says, the transference is made from 
the vicinity of contiguous bodies to the vicinity of 
others and not from one place to another. For place 
(as he himself explained Art. 13, Pt. 2) is not some- 
thing in the object, but it depends upon our thought, 
so much so that the same body may be said at the same 
time to change its place and not to change it; but not 
at the same time to be transferred from the vicinity of 




PART II 59 

contiguous bodies and not to be transferred. For 
only one body at the same moment of time can be 
contiguous to the same moving body. 

4. That he did not say absolutely that a transfer- 
ence was made from the vicinity of contiguous bodies, 
but only so far as they were considered to be at rest. 

For in order that the body A be 

7//A transferred from the body B at rest, 

f the same force is required whether 

in this direction or in that. This is 
evident from the example of a boat aground or on 
the sand in shallow water. For in order that the 
boat may be moved an equal force must be exerted 
against the boat and against the ground. Therefore 
the force by which bodies are moved is expended 
equally on the moving body and on the one at rest. 
The action and the reaction are equal. If the boat is 
moved from the sand, the sand is likewise moved from 
the boat. If, of bodies which are mutually separated, 
the one to this place, the other to that, we attribute 
equal motion, then regard one of them as at rest, it is 
because the same action is in one as in the other. 
Then also even to bodies which are regarded by all 
as at rest, e. g., the sand from which the boat is sep- 
arated, we are compelled to attribute to this a motion 
equal to the motion of the boat ; for, as we have shown, 
the same action is required in the one part as in the 
other, and the transposition is reciprocal. But this 
is too much at variance with the common way of 
speaking. In truth, although, those bodies from 
which others are separated are regarded as at rest 
and are also said to be so, nevertheless we affirm that 
everything in the moving body on account of which 
it is said to be moving is also in the body at rest. 




Go PRINCIPLES OP DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

5. Finally, from the definition it is evident that 
every body has for itself its own one proper motion, 
since only in regard to contiguous quiet bodies is it 
said to recede. Nevertheless, if a moving body is a 
part of other bodies having other motions, we clearly 
see that it is also able to participate in these as well. 
But because so many things can not easily be under- 
stood, nor will all recognize this, it will suffice to con- 
sider that alone which is peculiar to each body. See 
Art. 31, Pt. 2, Principles. 

IX. By a circle of moving bodies we understand 
such an arrangement that when one is impelled by the 
impulse of another the last imme- 
-S^ diately touches the first one of the 
series; although the line described 
by the motion of these bodies may 
plainly be contorted. 

AXIOMS. 

_. To non-being there are no properties. 

II. Whatever can be detracted from an object, 
without destroying the completeness of that object, 
does not constitute its essence; that which, when 
taken away, destroys the object does constitute its es- 
sence. 

III. As to hardness sense indicates nothing else, 
nor do we clearly and distinctly know more than that 
the parts of hard bodies resist the motion of our 
hands. 

IV. Whether two bodies are mutually approaching 
one another, or whether receding, they occupy the 
same amount of space. 

V. A particle of matter, whether it gives way to 
or resists another, does not lose its character. 



PART II 61 

VI. Motion, rest, form, and similar ideas cannot 
be conceived without the concept of extension. 

VII. Beside the sensible qualities of bodies, noth- 
ing remains except extension and its affects as given 
in Part I. of the Principles. 

VIII. One space or portion of extension is no 
greater than another. 

IX. All extension can be divided, at least, in 
thought. Concerning the truth of this axiom no one 
can doubt who has learned even the elements of math- 
ematics. For the space between a given circle and 
its tangent can always be divided by an infinite num- 
ber of greater circles. Which is also true as regards 
the asymptote of the hyperbole. 

X. No ends of extension or space can be con- 
ceived except as another space is conceived to imme- 
diately follow such limits. 

XL If matter were manifold and one part did not 
immediately touch the other, each part would neces- 
sarily be comprehended under limits beyond which no 
matter is given. 

XII. A very minute body easily recedes before the 
motion of our hands. 

XIII. One space does not penetrate another, nor is 
the one greater than the other. 

XIV. If the tube A is of equal length with C, but 
^4 €335352) C is twice as large as A, then if 

^^gg^ssggsN some liquid flows through A with 
CQsHHBS^ double the velocity ofijjjg^which 
passes through C, in the same time "an equal amount 
will have passed through each. And if, in an equal 
time, an equal quantity has passed through each, the 
velocity through A will be double that of C. 

XV. Things which agree in a third part agree in 



62 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPEIY 

the whole. And things which are each double a third 
part are equal to one another. 

XVI. Matter which is moved in different ways 
has at least as many divided parts as there were degrees 
of swiftness observed at any given time. 

XVTI. A straight line is the shortest distance be- 
tween two points. 

XVIII. A body A moving from C toward B, if re- 
q g pelled by a contrary impulse, will 

w move along the same line toward C. 

XIX. Bodies having motions in opposite direc- 
tions, when they come in contact, undergo some 
change. 

XX. Variation in any object proceeds from a 
stronger force. 

XXI. If when body I is moved toward body 2 and 
impels it, and body 8 from this im- 

2\ pulse is moved toward I, bodies i, 
2, 3, etc., cannot be in a straight 
line. But all of them from I to 8 
compose a complete circle (Vid. Def. 9). 

lemma 1. 

Where there is extension or space, there from neces- 
sity substance also exists. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Extension or space (per Ax. 1) cannot be pure 
nothing; therefore it is an attribute which must be 
attributed to something. But not to God (per Prop. 
16, Part I.) ; therefore to some object which needs 
only God's concurrence for its existence (per Prop. 12, 
Part I.), that is (per Def. 2), to substance. Q. E. D. 




PART II 6.) 



LEMMA II. 

We clearly and distinctly conceive of rarefaction 
and condensation. We would not concede, however, 
that a body occupies more space wider rarefaction 
than tinder condensation. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

We can have a clear and a distinct concept of these 
because we can conceive that the parts of a body mu- 
tually recede, or mutually approach one anothei. 
Therefore (per Ax. 4), they will not occupy more or 
less space. If the parts of some body, for example 
a sponge, are compressed the'bodies between the parts 
will be occupied. What we can thus clearly perceive 
occupy less, space than before (per Ax. 4). And if, 
again, the body expands and the pores are filled by 
some body, there is a rarefaction, but no more space 
will be occupied. What we can thus clearly perceive 
by the senses in the case of the sponge, we can con- 
ceive by the understanding to be true with all bodies, 
although the pores of these cannot be perceived by our 
senses. Therefore, rarefaction and condensation are 
clearly conceived, etc. Q. E. D. 

It seemed best to give this at this place in order to 
overcome these prejudices concerning space, rarefac* 
Hon, etc., and in order that the mind may be ready to 
understand what follows. 

Proposition I. 

Although hardness, zveight, and the other sensible 
qualities of a body be removed, the whole nature of 
that body will nevertheless remain. 



64 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 



DEMONSTRATION. 

In the hardness of this stone, for example, sense 
indicates nothing to us, nor can we clearly and dis- 
tinctly conceive anything, except that its parts resist 
the movements of our hands (per Ax. 3). There- 
fore (per Prop. 14, Part L), hardness is nothing but 
this. If that body were pulverized into very small 
particles, these parts would easily give way (per Ax. 
12) ; nevertheless, they do not lose the nature of the 
body (per Ax. 5). Q. E. D. 

In regard to weight and to other sensible qualities, 
the same demonstration is valid. 

Proposition II. 

The nature of body or matter (corporis sive mate- 
rise) consists in extension alone. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

The nature of body is not destroyed by the loss of 
sensible qualities (per Prop. 1 above) ; therefore 
these do not constitute its essence (per Ax. 2). Noth- 
ing remains except extension and its affects (per Ax. 
7). Therefore, if extension is destroyed, nothing will 
remain which pertains to the nature of body, but it 
is destroyed; therefore (per Ax. 2), the nature of 
body consists in extension alone. Q. E. D. 

COROLLARY. 

Space and Body are the same. 



PART II 65 



DEMONSTRATION. 



Body and extension are the same (per the preced- 
ing) ; space and extension are the same thing (per 
Def. 6) ; therefore (per Ax. 15), space and body are 
the same. Q. E. D. 

SCHOLIUM. 

Although we have said x that God is omnipresent 
we do not believe that God is extension, that is, (per 
the preceding) body. His omnipotence pertains 
only to his power and his concurrence by which all 
things are conserved. So far, therefore, His om- 
nipresence refers no more to extension or body than 
to angels or to the human mind. It should be noted, 
too, that when we say His power is everywhere we 
do not exclude His essence : for where His power is, 
there His essence is also (Coroll. Prop. 17, Part I.). 
We would exclude corporeality, that is, God is not 
everywhere in some corporeal power, but in divine 
essence, which is common in the preservation of ex- 
tension and in thinking being (Prop. 17, Part I.). 
These He would not be able to perfectly conserve if 
His power or essence were corporeal. 

Proposition III. 
It is a contradiction to say that a vacuum exists. 

demonstration. 

By a vacuum is meant extension without corporeal 
substance (per Def. 5), that is (per Prop. 2), body 
without body, which is absurd. 

x Vid. Appendix, Pt. II., Chaps. III. and IX. 



66 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

For a fuller explanation of this proposition, and to 
correct the prejudices men have concerning a 
vacuum, Articles 17 and 18, Part II. of the " Princi- 
ples," should be read. In these it is noted more espe- 
cially that bodies between which nothing intervenes 
necessarily touch one another, and, also, that there are 
no properties to non-being. 

Proposition IV. 

One particle of a body occupies at one time no more 
space than another; conversely, the same space at a 
given time will contain no more of one body than of 
another. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Space and body are the same thing (per Coroll. 
Prop. 2) : therefore when we say that one portion of 
space is no larger than another (per Ax. 13) we 
affirm that a body cannot occupy more space in one 
place than in another, which was the first point to 
be proved. 

Further, from the fact that space does not differ 
from body, it follows, that when we say that a body 
cannot occupy more space in one place than in another, 
we likewise affirm that the same space cannot contain 
more of one body than another. Q. E. D. 

COROLLARY. 

Bodies which occupy an equal amount of space, as 
for example some gold and some brass, have an equal 
amount of matter or of corporeal substance. 



PART II 67 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Corporeal substance does not consist in hardness, 
e. g. of gold, nor in softness, e. g. of brass, nor in 
any sensible quality (per Prop. 1, above), but in ex- 
tension alone (per Prop. 2 above). Moreover, since 
by hypothesis there is an equal amount of space or 
(per Def. 6) of extension in the one as in the other, 
there is a like amount of corporeal substance. 
Q. E. D. 

Proposition V 

There are no Atoms. 

demonstration. 

By their nature atoms are indivisible parts of mat- 
ter (per Def. 3). But since the nature of matter 
consists in extension (per Prop. 2 above), which by 
nature is divisible, however small the part (per Ax. 
9 and Def. 7), it follows that any part of matter, 
however small, is divisible. That is, there are no 
atoms or indivisible parts of matter. Q. E. D. 

SCHOLIUM. 

The question of atoms has always been a great and 
an intricate one. Some affirm that atoms must exist 
because one infinity cannot be greater than another ; 
and if two bodies, A and one double the size of A, 
are divisible to infinity by the power of God, who 
understands their infinite parts in one intuition, they 
can actually be so divided. Therefore, as it is said, 
since one infinity is no greater than another, one part 
of A will be equal to one double its size, which is 



68 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

absurd. Then they ask also, whether a part divided 
half way to infinity would still be infinite, and 
whether it would be equal or unequal, and other 
things of this kind. To this question Descartes re- 
plied that we ought not to reject what we properly 
understand on account of other things which surpass 
our understanding, and which consequently cannot 
adequately be conceived. Infinity and its properties 
are beyond the power of the human intellect, which 
is by nature finite. It would, then, be improper to 
reject as false what we clearly and distinctly con- 
ceive, or to doubt this because we do not understand 
the infinite. Hence, Descartes held that those things 
which have no limits, such as the extension of the 
world or the divisibility of a part of matter, should 
be called indefinite. See Art. 26, Part I. Principles. 

Proposition VI. 

Matter is indefinitely extended, and is the same 
throughout the heavens and the earth. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Point I. No limit to extension or matter can be 
conceived (per Prop. 2 above) except as we conceive 
of another space, that is (per Def. 6), extension or 
matter immediately following this (per Ax. 10), and 
so on indefinitely ; which was the first point to be 
proved. 

Point II. The essence of matter consists in ex- 
tension (per Prop. 2 above), and this is indefinite 
(per Point I.). That is (per Def. 4), it cannot be 
conceived to be bounded by any limits ; therefore 
(per Ax. 1 1), it is not manifold in its nature but every- 



PART II 69 

where one and the same ; which was the second point 
to be proved. 

SCHOLIUM. 

We have already discussed the nature and essence 
of matter. In the last Proposition to Part I. we 
showed that matter created by God's power exists, as 
it is conceived by us, and from Proposition 12 of the 
same part it follows that it is conserved by the same 
power that created it. Also, in the last Proposition to 
Part I. we showed that so far as we are thinking 
beings, we are united to some part of matter. Hence, 
we are certain that all the changes in matter are real, 
which we, by the contemplation of matter, perceive 
as possible. As, for example, that matter is divisible 
or capable of motion, that there may be a transfer- 
ence of some parts of matter from one place to an- 
other, which, indeed, we clearly and distinctly know, 
provided we understand that other parts take the place 
of those which are moved. This division and motion 
is conceived by us in infinite modes, hence an infinite 
variation of matter is conceived as possible. I say that 
these things are clearly and distinctly conceived by us 
(as was clearly explained in Part I. of the Principles) 
so long as they are regarded as modes of extension, and 
not as objects apart from extension. And although 
some philosophers conceive of many forms of motion, 
we only admit that there is local motion. For it is evi- 
dent to us, who admit only what is clearly and distinctly 
perceived, that extension is capable only of local mo- 
tion, neither can any other form be imagined. 

Zeno, indeed, it is said, for various reasons denied 
that there was motion in space (inotuin localum), 
which assertion the cynic Diogenes refuted in a char- 



70 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

acteristic way, namely, by walking about in the school 
where Zeno was teaching, and thus disturbing his 
pupils. When he was asked by a certain listener 
to stop his walking he began to find fault with him 
by saying : " Why do you thus dare to refute the 
teaching of your master?" But lest any one, per- 
chance, deceived by this argument of Zeno, should 
think that the senses show anything to us, as for ex- 
ample motion, which is at variance with the under- 
standing, so that the mind is deceived about those 
things, which, by the help of the intellect are perceived 
clearly and distinctly, I shall give his principal rea- 
sons, and show that these are only supported by false 
prejudices; namely, because he had no true concept of 
matter. 

In the first place it is said that he argued that if 
there is motion in space, the motion of a body moving 
in a circle with the greatest possible speed does not 
differ from a body at rest ; and this is absurd, there- 
fore, that also. Consequently, he affirmed this. 
That body is at rest, all of whose parts constantly re- 
main in the same place ; but all the parts of a body 
moving in a circle with the greatest possible velocity 
constantly remain in the same place. Therefore, etc., 
This, it is said, he explained by the 
example of a wheel, for example 
A, B, C. Which, if it moves with 
a certain velocity about its center, 
the point A will move more rapidly 
through the points B and C than 
if it rotated more slowly. Let it be 
supposed for example, that when moving slowly for an 
hour, the point A occupies the same point as when it 
began. If it moves with double this velocity, in a half- 




PART II 71 

hour it will occupy the same point, and if with a ve- 
locity four times as great, then in a quarter of an hour. 
If, now, we conceive that the velocity is increased to in- 
finity, and the time to be diminished even to a mo- 
ment, then the point A, moving with this infinite 
velocity every moment, or continually, will be in the 
place from which it began to move. So far it will 
always remain in the same place. And this, which is 
true of the point A, is also true of every other point 
of the wheel. Therefore, all points of a body moving 
with the highest velocity remain in the same place. 

Indeed, as I would reply, it should be noted that this 
is more an argument against infinite motion than 
against motion itself. We shall not, however, inquire 
whether Zeno argued rightly, but rather would detect 
those prejudices on which the whole argument rests 
so far as he thought this to annul the idea of motion. 
In the first place it is supposed that a body may be 
conceived to be moving so fast that a greater velocity 
is impossible. Then, again, it is supposed that time 
is composed of moments, as some think that quantity 
is made up ©f indivisible points. Both suppositions 
are false. For we are not able to conceive of a motion 
than which there can be no greater. It is contrary to 
reason to think there is a motion, however small the 
line it describes, so rapid that no more rapid one can 
be given. The same thing holds true in regard to 
slowness. For it implies that we can conceive of a 
motion so slow that a slower one can not be given. 
Concerning time also, which is a measure of motion, 
we • affirm that the same thing is true, and that it is 
contrary to reason to think of a time so short that no 
shorter can be given. All of which, as we will prove, 
follows from the words of Zeno. Let it be supposed, 



therefore, as he said, that the wheel A, B, C, rotates 
with such speed that the point A at all moments is 
in the point A from which it moves. I say that I can 
clearly conceive that this swiftness is indefinitely in- 
creased and these moments of time to be diminished 
in inverse ratio. For let it be supposed that while 
the wheel A, B, C, is rotating, another wheel, D, E, 
F, (which I suppose half as large as the other), is 
made to rotate by the chord H. Since the wheel D, 
E, F is only half the size of A, B, C, it is evident 
that the first one will rotate twice as fast as the latter. 
Then if the wheel A, B, C is supposed to have the 
motion of D, E, F, the movement of D, E, F will be 




F 

four times the original motion of A, B, C. And if 
we suppose this motion of D, E, F to be given to A, 
B, C, the motion of D, E, F will be eight times the 
motion of our original wheel. And so on to infinity. 
This is perfectly evident from the very concept of 
matter. For as we have proven the essence of mat- 
ter consists in extension or in space always divisible. 
There is no motion except in space. We showed also 
that the same part of matter cannot occupy two points 
of space at the same time. This would be equal to 
saying that one part of matter is equal to another part 
twice its size. Therefore, if a particle of matter is 
moved it is moved through some space. This space, 
and the time that serves to measure this as well, how- 



PART II 73 

ever small they be conceived to be, will always be 
divisible. Q. E. D. 

We turn now to another argument of the same 
nature. If a body is moved, does it move in the place 
in which it is, or in some other? It does not move 
in the place where it is, for if it is any where it is 
necessarily at rest. Neither can it move in a place 
where it is not. Therefore, a body does not move. 
This argument is plainly similar to the first, for it 
also supposes that there is a time given than which 
there can be no smaller. For if you reply that a body 
does not move in the place it is, but from that place to 
another, he will ask whether it does not also move 
through the intervening places. We reply by mak- 
ing a distinction — if through the term was we un- 
derstand to be at rest then we deny that the body was 
at any of the places through which it moved : but if by 
was existence is meant, then we say that it necessarily 
existed in that point although it was moving. But he 
would also ask whether it existed any where while 
it was moving. We reply, if he meant to ask whether 
the body remained in any one place, that it did not ; 
but if he wished to ask whether it changed its position, 
we reply that it has, through all the points in the given 
distance. Then he would inquire whether it could 
occupy, and move from a point at the same moment 
of time. To this we reply by making another dis- 
tinction. If by a moment of time he understands a 
duration so short that no shorter is conceivable, as 
was shown above, he asks a question that is not in- 
telligible, and hence unworthy of reply. 

But if he take time in the true sense explained 
above, however small the duration assigned, it will 
never be so small that a body may not both occupy it 



74 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

and be moving at the same time. This is evident to 
any one who considers the matter. For it is evident, 
as we said above, that he supposes a time given than 
which no smaller is possible. Hence, he proves 
nothing. 

Beside these two there is another argument of Zeno 
which, together with its refutation, is given in 
Descartes (Vol. I. " Epis.," last letter but one). 

I wish here to remind the reader that my argument 
is opposed to the reasonings of Zeno ; and that as far 
as he argued from reason not from sense, he followed 
the argument of Diogenes. Nor does sense ever give 
any truth to the inquirer, except the mere phenomena 
of Nature, whose causes he is impelled to investigate ; 
never does it show anything to be false which the 
understanding clearly comprehends as true. So we 
believe, and so far this is our Method : — to demon- 
strate the things we set forth, by reasons clearly and 
distinctly perceived by the understanding; holding 
to these, whatever the senses may give that seems 
contrary to this ; which, as we have said, can only de- 
termine the understanding as it inquires about this or 
that, but cannot prove the falsity of anything which 
is clearly and distinctly perceived. 

Proposition VII. 

No body moves to the place of another, except as 
that other moves into the position of sonic other. 

DEMONSTRATION. 1 

If you deny this, let it be supposed, if possible, that 
a body A take the position of a body B, and is equal 

1 Vid. Fig. Prop. seq. 



PART II 75 

to it, and also that B does not recede from its place. 
Then the space which before only contained B (by 
hypothesis) will contain A and B, and so twice as 
much corporeal substance as it before contained. 
Which (per Prop. 4 of this Part) is absurd. There- 
fore, no body can take the place of another, etc. 
Q. E. D. 

Proposition VIII. 

When some body takes the place of another, at the 
same moment the place left by the one is occupied by 
another which is immediately contiguous to it. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

If the body B moves toward D, either the bodies 
A and C mutually approach and touch one another, 
or they do not. If they mutually approach and are 
contiguous the question is conceded. If they do not 
approach one another, but the space left by B lies 
between them, then (per Coroll. 
Prop. 2 supra, and Coroll. Prop. 
4) some body equal to B lies be- 
tween. But (per hypothesis) not 
B : therefore, some other body, 
j) which at the same moment takes 

its place. But since it is at the 
same moment it is no other than the one immediately 
contiguous (per Schol., Prop. 6). There it was 
shown that there >can not be motion from one place 
to another which does not require a duration than 
which a shorter may always be conceived. Hence, 
it follows that the space of the body B cannot be 
occupied at the same moment by a body which must 



m 


sfe 


m 




B 





76 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

be moved from some other position. Therefore, only 
the body immediately contiguous to B can occupy this 
space at the given moment. O. E. D 

SCHOLIUM. 

Since the parts of matter are really distinct from' 
one another (per Art. 61, Part I. Principles) , one 
part can exist apart from the other (per Coroll. 
Prop. 7, Part I.) and they are not dependent upon one 
another. Therefore, all the fancies about sympathy 
and antipathy should be rejected as false. And 
further, since the cause of an effect must be positive 
(per Ax. 8, Part I.) we can not say that the cause 
of motion is a vacuum, but that it is due to the im- 
pulse of some other body. 

COROLLARY. 

In all motion the whole circle of bodies is moved. 

DEMONSTRATION 

At the moment when body i takes the place of body 
2, this one must move into place of body 3, etc. (per 
Prop. 7). Then at the moment when 1 is occupying 
the place of 2, the place it formerly 
held must (per Prop. 8) be filled 
by some other body, for example 
by 8, or some other body contigu- 
ous to 1. But since this can only come from the im- 
pulse of another body (per Schol. sup.) which is here 
supposed to be 1, the series cannot lie in a straight 
line (per Ax. 21) but (per Def. 9) describes a com- 
plete circle. Q. E. D. 




PART II 



77 



Proposition IX. 

// a circular canal, A, B, C, is Med with water or 
with some other fluid, and at A the canal is four times 
as broad as at B, when the water (or liquid) at A 
begins to move tozvard B, the zvater at B will move 
four times as fast as the water at A. 



DEMONSTRATION. 

When the water at A moves 
toward B, the water at C, which 
is contiguous to A, takes its 
place (per Prop. 8) ; then from 
B an equal quantity must replace 
that at C. (per eandem). There- 
fore (per Ax. 14), it will move 
four times as fast. Q. E. D. 
What we have just said concerning circular chan- 
nels is also true of all unequal spaces through which 
water is forced. For the proof would be the same in 
all such cases. 




Lemma. 

If two semicircles are described from the same cen- 
ter, as for example A and B, the distance between 
them is equal at all points. But if they are described 




from different centers as are C and D. the distance 
between them is unequal at all points. This is evident 
from the definition of the circle. 



78 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

Proposition X. 

A fluid body moving through the channel A, B, C, 
changes its velocity by indefinite degrees. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

(Vid. Figure to Prop. IX). The space between A 
and B is unequal at all points (per Lemm. sup.) ; 
therefore (per Prop. 9) the velocity with which a fluid 
moves through this channel is everywhere unequal. 
And since we can conceive that the space between A 
and B to be indefinitely divided (per Prop. 5), the 
inequalities also will be indefinitely changing and also 
(per Prop. 9) the motion by indefinite degrees. Q. 
E. D. 

Proposition XI. 

In the matter which passes through the channel A, 
B, C, there is a division into indefinitely small parts. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

(Vid. Fig. Prop. 9). The matter flowing through 
A, B, C, has a motion changing by indefinite degrees 
(per Prop. 10) ; therefore (per Ax. 16) its parts must 
be indefinitely divided Q. E. D. See also Articles 34 
and 35, Part II. " Principles." 

SCHOLIUM. 

We have already spoken of the nature of motion. 
It behooves us here to inquire into its cause, which 
is twofold : the primary or general cause, which is the 
cause of all the motion in the world, and then more 
specifically, how does it happen that particular objects 



PART II 79 

which have no motion, acquire it. Regarding the gen- 
eral cause of motion it is clear, since we ought not to 
admit anything except what is clearly and distinctly 
perceived (per Prop. 14, Pt. I. and Schol. Prop. 17, 
Pt. II. ), and since we understand no other cause except 
God (the creator of matter), that no other general 
cause of motion can be admitted except God. And 
What we have said of motion is also true of rest. 

Proposition XII. 

God is the 'principal cause of motion. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

See the Scholium just given. 

Proposition XIII. 

God by his power conserves the same quantity of 
motion and rest which he once gave to matter. 

demonstration. 

Since God is the cause of motion and of rest (per 
Prop. 12), he conserves these by the same power by 
which he also created them (per Ax. 10 Pt. I.), and 
indeed with the same amount of power (per Coroll. 
Prop. 20, Pt. I.) O. E. D. 

SCHOLIUM. 

I. Although, in Theology, it is said that God does 
many things because He is pleased to do so, and to 
show His power to man, since these acts are known 
only through divine revelation, they should not be 
admitted into the body of philosophical truth where 



80 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

reason is the criterion of truth, lest Theology and 
Philosophy become confused. 

II. Although motion is nothing but a mode of a 
moving body, nevertheless, it has a certain definite 
quantity. How this is possible will appear below. 
See Art. 36, Pt. II. of the " Principles." 

Proposition XIV. 

Every object, so far as it is simple and individual 
considered in itself alone, has a certain unchanging 
quantity. 

To many this proposition is, as it were, an axiom ; 
nevertheless we will give a demonstration of its truth. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Since an object can exist in a certain state only by 
the concurrence of God (per Prop. 12, Pt. I.), and 
since God is unchanging in all His works (per Coroll. 
Prop. 20, Pt. I.), if we consider no external causes 
(i. e., particular ones) but consider the object in itself, 
it must be admitted that its quantity always remains 
the same. Q. E. D. 

COROLLARY. 

A body when once in motion will continue to move 
unless hindered by some external forces. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

This is evident from the preceding Proposition. 
Nevertheless for correcting certain prejudices concern- 
ing motion read Articles 37 and 38, Part II. " Prin- 
ciples. " 



PART II 81 

Proposition XV. 

Every moving body, in itself, tends to move in a 
straight line not in a curved one. This proposition 
might be given as an axiom but I will demonstrate it 
from the preceding ones. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Motion since it has God alone as its cause (per Prop. 
12, Pt. II.) has in itself no power of existence (per 
Ax. 10, Pt. I.), but is, as it were, procreated every 
single moment by God (per that which was demon- 
strated with the axiom just cited). Therefore, as long 
as we consider the mere nature of motion we cannot 
attribute to it, as pertaining to its nature, a duration 
so great that a greater may not be conceived. But 
if it is said that it pertains to the nature of a mov- 
ing body to move in a curved line, a longer duration is 
attributed to the nature of motion than if it is sup- 
posed to be the nature of motion to move in a straight 
line (per Ax. 8). Since (as we have already demon- 
strated) we cannot assign such a duration to the 
nature of motion, we cannot suppose that it is in the 
nature of a moving body to move in a curved line 
but it must tend to move in a straight line. Q. E. D. 

SCHOLIUM. 

To many, perhaps, this demonstration will not seem 
to prove that a moving body tends to describe a straight 
line rather than a curved one, for no straight line can 
be assigned so small that there may not be a smaller 
either curved or straight, neither is there any curved 
line so small that there may not also be another curved 



82 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

one still smaller. Although I have considered these 
objections I do not consider them to be valid. For 
we have based our conclusion upon the universal 
essence of these lines, not upon the quantity of each 
or accidental differences. But that I may not in this 
demonstration render obscure what is clear, I refer the 
reader to the definition of motion, which affirms nothing 
of motion except a transference of one part of matter 
from one vicinity to the position of others, etc. This 
is true so far as we conceive of a simple trans- 
ference, that is, that this is made in a straight line. 
So far as we go beyond this we assign something to 
motion which is not in the definition and so far does 
not pertain to its nature. 

Corollary. 

From this it follows that every body moving in a 
curved line is continually deflected from the line which 
it tends to follow. This is done by some external 
force (per Prop. 14, Pt. II.) . 

Proposition XVI. 

Every body moving in a circular orbit, as for ex- 
ample a stone in a sling, tends constantly to move off 
at a tangent. 

demonstration. 

A body moving in a circumference is continuously 
restrained by some external force from moving in a 
straight line (per Coroll., Prop. XV. Pt. II.) . When 
this ceases to act the body at once moves off in a 
straight line (per Prop. 15). I say also, that a body 
describing a circle continually tends to move off at a 



PART II 



83 






II 



For, if you deny it let it be supposed that 
the stone, for example, in 
the sling at B, does not 
tend to follow the line 
BD, but some other line, 
either within or without 
the circle, for example, 
BF. Or the line BG 
(which I understand inter- 
sects the . line Bp, drawn 
from the center of the circle at B and makes 
with it an angle equal to the angle FBH), if it is 
supposed that the sling is moving from C toward B. 
But if the stone moving from L to B at B, tends to 
move in the line BF, then (per Axiom 18) when the 
sling moves from C toward B, it should tend to move 
toward K, not toward G, which is contrary to the 
hypothesis. And since there is no line that can be 
drawn through the point B except the tangent AD, 
which keeps the angles DBH, and ABH equal, there 
is no line except this tangent able to fulfil the hypo- 
thesis, when the sling is moving either from L to B 
or from C to B. Therefore no other line except the 
tangent can be drawn on which the body tends to move. 
Q. E. D. 

ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION. 1 

In place of a circle let the hexagon A, B, H, be 
inscribed in a circle and a body C be at rest on one 
side AB. Then let the ruler DBE (one end fixed at 
D and the other end. free) be moved about the center 
D, continually intersecting the line AB. It is evident 
that if the ruler DBE, while it is thus conceived 

1 The letter A at the intersection of the circle and the hexa- 
gon between B and G is omitted in the Latin text. 



84 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 




to move meet some body at C, when the ruler inter- 
sects the line AB at a right angle it will tend to 
move C in the line FBAG 
toward G, that is, along the 
line AB produced indefinite- 
ly. Indeed, since we can con- 
sider the number of sides of 
the polygon to be increased ad 
libitum, it can be affirmed of 
any figure whatever that can 
be inscribed in a circle that 
when a body C at rest on one 
of its sides, is impelled by a ruler fixed at the center, 
when the angle found by the side of the polygon and 
the ruler is a right angle, the body will tend to move 
in the line of that side indefinitely produced. 

Let us conceive instead of the hexagon a polygon 
of an infinite number of sides (that is, the circle ac- 
cording to the definition of Archimedes) ; then it is 
clear that wherever the ruler shall come in contact 
with the body C, it would always meet it at a right 
angle. Hence it would never come in contact with C, 
without C at the same time tending to move in the 
line of that side produced. Any side whatever when 
produced will lie wholly outside the figure, and this 
side indefinitely produced is the tangent of one side 
of the figure of an infinite number of sides, that is, of 
a circle. Therefore if we think of sling moving in a 
circle in place of the ruler the stone will constantly 
tend to move in a tangent to that circle. Q. E. D. 

It should be noted that this demonstration can be ap- 
plied to any curved figure. 



PART II 



85 



Proposition XVII. 

Every body moving in a circle tends to move from 
the center of the circle it describes. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

As long as a body is moving in a circular path, so 
long is it held in its course by some external force ; 
this force being removed it at once begins to move 
off at a tangent (per the 
above) all of whose points 
except that which touches the 
circle fall outside of the circle 
(per Prop. 16, Lib. 3, Ele- 
ments), and so are further 
removed from the center of 
its path. Therefore, when 
the stone in the sling EA, is at the point A it will 
tend to move along a straight line whose points are 
all further from the center E than those of the circum- 
ference LAB. This is to do nothing else than to 
recede from the circle which it is describing. O. 
E. D. 




Proposition XVIII. 

7/ some body A is moved against another body B at 
rest, and B acquires no motion from the impact, then 
A has lost none of its motion but retains all it had 
before. 

demonstration. 

If you deny it, let it be supposed 
that A has lost some of its motion 
but has not transferred it to another 
body as, for example, B. If this happens there will be 
less motion in Nature than before which is absurd (per 




86 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

Prop. 13). The demonstration in respect to the rest in 
B is the same. 1 Therefore if no motion is transferred 
B will be in the same state of rest and A will retain 
the same amount of motion. O. E. D. 

Proposition XIX. 

Motion, considered in itself, by its own determina- 
tion moves in a given direction; nor is there any need 
for a moment of rest before it can change its direction 
or be repelled. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Let it be supposed as in the preceding proposition 
that a body A is moved directly against B and im- 
peded by B but that B is not moved. Therefore (by 
the above) A will retain all of its motion, nor does it 
remain at rest even for a moment. Nevertheless when 
it moves it does not move in the same direction as 
before, for it is supposed to be impeded by the body 
B. Therefore its motion remaining entire and its 
prior determination being lost it will move in some 
other direction (per what was said in Chap. 2, 
Diopt.) ; and so far (per Ax. 2) determination does 
not pertain to the essence of motion, nor is a moving 
body when repelled at rest at any time. Q. E. D 

COROLLARY. 

Hence it follows that motion is not the opposite of 
motion. 

1 Spinoza throughout this work attributes quantity to rest 
or quietude just as he does to motion: a body may have a 
certain amount of rest as well as a certain amount of motion. 




PART II 87 

Proposition XX. 

// a body A meet a body B and they move on to- 
gether the gain of motion in B and the toss of motion 
in A are equal. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

If you deny it, let it be supposed 
that B acquires less motion from A 
than A loses. Then that quantity of 
motion must be added or substracted from the total 
motion in Nature, which is absurd (per Prop. 13 
above). Since therefore, B can acquire neither more 
nor less motion than A loses it must receive just what 
is lost by A. Q. E. D. 

Proposition XXI. 

// a body A is twice as great as B and moves with 
an equal velocity, it zvill have twice the motion of B 
or a force for retaining a motion equal to that of B. 

demonstration. 

Let it be supposed, for example, that in place of A 
there are two Bs that is (by hypothesis) A is divided 
into two equal parts. Each one then has the same 
inertia and (by hypothesis) the force in each is equal. 
If now these two parts are joined together their 
velocity remaining the same there will be a body A 
whose force and quantity will be equal to two Bs or 
double that of one B. Q. E. D. 

This follozvs also from the definition of motion, for 
zvhen a larger body is moved there is more matter 
separated from the surrounding matter. There is, 



88 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

therefore, more of a separation, that is (per Def. 8) 
more motion. See also Def. VIII. 

Proposition XXII. 

If a body A is equal to another body B and moves 
with twice the velocity of B, the force or motion in A 
is also double that of B. (Vid. Fig. Prop. 20). 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Let it be supposed that B, when it first received a 
certain force acquired a velocity of four degrees. If 
it is not acted upon by some external force it will con- 
tinue to move with the same velocity (per Prop. 14). 
Suppose now, that by a new impulse it receives a new 
force equal to that which it first received. It will 
thus acquire four other degrees of velocity beside 
those that it had before, which (per the same Prop.) 
it will retain. Thus it will be moving with twice 
its former velocity, or with the velocity of A, and 
have double its former force or a force equal to that 
of A. Therefore the motion in A is double that in B. 
Q. E. D. 

It should be noted here, that by force (vis) we 
understand the quantity of motion. This, in bodies of 
equal size, will vary according to the velocity, for in a 
given time the distance by which equal bodies arc 
separated from those tangent to them varies with the 
velocity. Therefore those moving more swiftly have 
more motion (per Def. 8). In bodies at rest by the 
force of resistance we understand the quantity of rest. 
From which follow: 



PART II 89 



Corollary I. 



The more slowly bodies move, the more they par- 
take of rest, for bodies having a greater velocity 
meeting those which have less force, resist more and 
are not separated so far from bodies immediately con- 
tiguous to them. 

Corollary II. 

If a body A moves with double the velocity of a 
body B which is twice as large as A, they contain an 
equal amount of motion and force. 

demonstration. 

If B is twice as large as A, but A moves with twice 
the velocity of B, and C is only half as large as B and 
move's only half as fast as A (per Prop. 21), B will 
have twice the force of C and A will have twice the 
motion of C (per Prop. 22). Therefore (per Ax. 15) 
B and A have an equal motion, for the motion of each 
is double that of the third body C. Q. E. D. 

Corollary III. 

From these corollaries it follows that motion must 
be distinguished from velocity. For we can conceive 
of bodies which have an equal velocity, but one of 
them having more motion than the other (per Prop. 
21). And on the other hand, bodies with an unequal 
velocity may have an equal motion (per Coroll. 
II. above). This, also, is evident from the definition 
of motion which is nothing but the transference of 
one body from the vicinity, etc. 

It should be noted that this corollary is not at van- 



9 o PRINCIPLES OP DESCARTES' PH1L0S0PPIY 

ance with the first. For velocity is conceived in tzuo 
ways: Either so far as a body in a given time is 
further or nearer removed from those bodies imme- 
diately contiguous to it, and so far partakes more or 
less of rest, or so far as in a given time it describes 
a longer or a shorter line and so far is distinguished 
from motion. 

I might add other propositions to explain more fidly 
Proposition 14, in regard to other points, as we have 
done in regard to motion. But it is sufficient to read 
Art. 43, Part II. of the Principles, and to add one 
Proposition only in order to understand what follows. 

Proposition XXIII. 

When the modes of a body are forced to suffer 
change, this change is alzvays, under the circumstances, 
a minimum one. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

This proposition follows sufficiently clearly from 
Prop. 14. 

Proposition XXIV — Rule 1. 

If two bodies, for example A and B (vid. Fig. Prop. 
20) are equal, and are moving toward one another 
with equal velocity, when they meet each will be re- 
flected in an opposite direction without any loss of 
velocity. 

In this hypothesis it is evident that in order that 
this opposition may be removed, either they must both 
be reflected in opposite directions or one must take the 
other on with it. For they are opposed only in regard 
to their determination, not as to their motion. 



PART II 91 



DEMONSTRATION. 

Since A and B are mutually approaching one an- 
other they must suffer some change (per Ax. 19). 
But since the motion of the one is not opposed to the 
motion of the other (per Coroll. Prop. 19) they do 
not necessarily lose any of their motion (per Ax. 19). 
Therefore, the change is in their determination alone. 
But we can not say that the determination of only 
one, e. g. B, is changed unless A, by which it was 
changed, is supposed to be stronger (per Ax. 20). 
This, however, is contrary to the hypothesis. There- 
fore, since a change in the determination of only one 
is impossible, it will be in both, A and B being de- 
flected in opposition directions (per what was said in 
ch. 2, Dioptric), each retaining its original motion. 
Q. E. D. 

Proposition XXV — Rule 2. 

// they are unequal in mass, namely, B being greater 
than A (vid. Fig. Prop. 20) other things being as 
before, then A alone zvill be deflected and each will 
move with its former velocity. 

demonstration. 

Since it is supposed that A is less than B, it will 
have less force than B. And, since in this hypothesis 
as in the last, the opposition is only in their deter- 
mination, as we showed above, the variation therefore 
will be in their determination alone. It will be merely 
in A and not in B (per Ax. 20). Therefore, A alone 
will be reflected in an opposite direction by the greater 
body B, its former velocity being returned. Q. E. D. 



92 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

Proposition XXVI. 

If the mass and velocity are unequal, for example 
B twice as large as A (vid. Fig. Prop. 20), but A 
moving with double the velocity of B, other things 
being as before, both will be reflected in opposite di- 
rections, and each will retain its former velocity. 

DEMONSTRATION- 

Since A and B are moving toward one another, and 
according- to hypothesis the motion in one is equal to 
that in the other (per Coroll. 2, Prop. 22) ; therefore, 
the motion of the one is not opposed to the motion of 
the other (per Coroll., Prop. 19). This hypothesis, 
therefore, is so far similar to the hypothesis of Propo- 
sition 24, and by the same demonstration A and B will 
be reflected in opposite directions by retaining each its 
former motion. 0. E. D. 

COROLLARY. 

From the three preceding Propositions it is evident 
that in order that a body be moved the determination 
of that body requires a force equal to its motion. 
Whence, it follows that a body which has lost more 
than half of its determination and more than half of 
its motion suffers more change than one which has 
lost all of its determination. 

Proposition XXVII — Rule 3. 

7/ A and B are equal in mass, but B moves a little 
more rapidly than A, not only is A reflected back in 
an opposite direction, but B gives to it one-half of its 



PART II 93 

excess of motion, and both move in the same direction 
with an equal velocity. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

A (by hypothesis) is opposed to B not only by its 
determination, but also by its slowness, so far as it 
partakes of the nature of rest (per Coroll., Prop. 22). 
Whence, although it is reflected in an opposite direc- 
tion and its determination is changed, all of its oppo- 
sitiori (contrarietas) is not destroyed. Therefore (per 
Ax. 19), there ought to be a variation both in its de- 
termination and in its motion. But since by hypo- 
thesis, B moves faster than A, B will have a greater 
force than A (per Prop. 22). Therefore, the change 
proceeds from B to A, which will be reflected in an 
opposite direction, which was the first point to be 
proved. 

Then, so long as A moves more slowly than B, it 
will be opposed to B (per Coroll. 1, Prop. 22). Conse- 
quently there ought to be a variation in A until it 
moves with a velocity equal to B's (per Ax. 19). But 
in this hypothesis it is not impelled by some stronger 
force so that it should move more rapidly than B. 
Since it is impelled by B, it can not move slower than 
that body, nor can it move faster : therefore, it must 
move with a velocity equal to B's. 

Further, if B gave less than one-half of its excess 
of velocity to A, A would move slower than B ; if 
more than one-half, then faster, which as we have 
shown, is absurd. Therefore, the variation will con- 
tinue until B has given one half of its excess of 
velocity to A, which B would therefore lose. So, also, 
they will both move without any opposition with an 
equal velocity in the same direction. Q. E. D. 



94 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 
COROLLARY. 

It follows, that a body moving with a greater 
velocity has the more determination, so that it tends 
the more to move in a straight line ; and, on the 
other hand, a body moving more slowly has less de- 
termination. 

SCHOLIUM. 

Lest the reader confuse the force of determination 
(vim determinationis) w T ith the force of motion 
(vi motus), it seems best to explain these terms. If 
now the bodies A and C are equal, and are moving 
toward one another with an equal velocity, they will 

be deflected back (per 
—jO\ P ro P- 2 4)> eacn retaining 
/ its former velocity. If 
there is a body C at B and 
it moves obliquely toward 
A its determination is less 
than its motion equaling 
l"^ the line B D or the line C 

__[„_ A. Therefore, although 

\A \ the motion in the two cases 

is the same, the force of 
determination of C moving directly toward A is 
greater than the force of determination of C mov- 
ing obliquely from B toward A in the ratio of AB to 
CA. Since it is here supposed that A and B move 
with an equal velocity, the time B consumes in moving 
from B to A or A C, which measures its opposition to 
A, will be to A's time as B A to A C. When the body 
C, moving from B along the line B A, strikes A, it will 
be deflected along the line of A B/ B' being on B C 



PART II 95 

produced so that B' C is equal to B C. And since the 
motion of the two bodies is equal the time B consumes 
in traversing the perpendicular distance A C is greater 
than the time of A in moving an equal distance or, to 
such a degree it is opposed to the determination of A, 
which is the stronger. In order that the determination 
of C moving from B toward A, may be equal to the de- 
termination of C (or from the hypothesis, to A), it is 
necessary that the motion from B be to the motion 
from C as B A is to C A. Then when it strikes the 
body A obliquely, A will be reflected back to A' and 
B toward B', each retaining its former velocity. But 
if B is as much greater than A as the line B A than 
C A, then B will repel A toward A' and give of its 
motion until the motion of B is to the motion of A as 
the line B A is to C A, and by losing the motion which 
it has transferred to A it will proceed in the direction 
it was first moving. For example, if the line A C is 
to the line A B as I to 2, and the motion of A to the 
motion of B as 1 to 5, then B will give to A one de- 
gree of motion, and will repell it in an opposite direc- 
tion, while B, having lost one-fifth of its motion, will 
move on in the same direction as before. 

Proposition XXVIII— Rule 4. 

If a body A (vid. Fig., Prop. 27), a little larger 
than B, is at rest, it will not be moved hozvever great 
the velocity of B, but B will be deflected at an angle 
retaining its former motion. 

Note. — Of these bodies there is opposition of three 
kinds : One when the one meets the other and they 
both move on with an equal velocity ; the second when 
one is reflected in an opposite direction the other re- 



96 PRINCIPLES OP D ESCARP PS' PHILOSOPHY 

maining at rest ; the third when one is deflected from 
its course and gives some part of its motion to the 
body at rest. There is no fourth kind as is seen from 
Prop. 13. Therefore it will be evident (per Prop. 
23) that conformable to our hypothesis the least pos- 
sible change occurs in these bodies. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

If B moves A, until both move with the same 
velocity, it must give from its own motion (per Prop. 
20) all that A acquires and consequently would lose 
more than half of its motion (per Prop. 21) as well 
as more than half of its determination (per Coroll., 
Prop. 27). So far (per Coroll., Prop. 26) it under- 
goes more change than if it lost all of its determina- 
tion. And if A loses a part of its rest, but not so 
much that it moves with a velocity equal to B's, then 
the opposition of the two bodies is not destroyed. For 
A, so far as it partakes of rest, will be opposed to the 
motion of B, and so far B will be deflected from its 
course and will lose all of its determination and that 
part of its motion which it has given to A. And this 
also is a greater change than if it had lost its deter- 
mination alone. The change, therefore, under our 
hypothesis, since it is in the determination alone, is 
the least possible that can come in these bodies, and 
therefore (per Prop. 23) the only possible one. Q. 
E. D. 

It should be noted that in the demonstration of this 
Proposition, and it holds true likewise in other places, 
that we have not cited Prop. 19, where it was dem- 
onstrated, that the entire determination of a body may 
change, the motion remaining the same. Neverthe- 
less this should be remembered in order that the force 



PART II 97 

of this argument may be seen. For in Prop. 23 we 
do not say that the variation is the least absolutely, 
but the least possible under the given conditions. 
That such a change as this is possible, that is, a change 
in the determination alone, is evident from Props. 18 
and 19 with the Corollary. 

Proposition XXIX— Rule 5. 

// there is a body A, less than B, at rest (vid. Fig. 
Prop. 30.), then, however slowly B moves toward A, 
B will give such a portion of its motion to A that they 
will move on together (Read Art. 50, Part II. 
Principles) . 

In this rule, as in the preceding, there are three 
possible cases by which their opposition may be 
destroyed. We will show that under this hypothesis 
there is the least possible change in these bodies, and 
so (per Prop. 23) this is the only variation. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

By hypothesis, B transfers to A (per Prop. 21) less 
than half of its motion, and (per Coroll., Prop. 17) 
less than half of its determination. But if B did not 
carry A on with it, but should be reflected in an oppo- 
site direction, it would lose all of its determination 
and there would be a greater variation (per Coroll., 
Prop. 26). And much greater even, if it should lose 
all of its determination, and at the same time a part 
of its motion, as is supposed in the third case. 
Therefore, the change under our hypothesis is the 
least possible. O. E. D. 



g8 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

Proposition XXX — Rule 6. 

If a body A, at rest, is exactly equal to B, a body 
moving ton'ard it, when B strikes A, A will be im- 
pelled and B repelled. 

Here, as in the preceding, there are three possible 
cases, and we will show that the resulting change is 
the least possible. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

If the body B should take A with it until both move 
with an equal velocity, then the motion in each would 
be the same (per Prop. 22) and (per Coroll., Prop. 
27) B would lose half of its de- 
termination and half of its motion 
(per Prop. 20). If B is repelled in 
an opposite direction it will lose all 
of its determination but retain all its motion (per 
Prop. 18). In the latter case the change is 
equal to that • of the former (per Coroll., Prop. 
26). But neither of these is possible, for if 
A remains at " rest and still changes the determina- 
tion of B, it must needs (per Ax. 20) be greater 
than B, which is contrary to the hypothesis. And if 
B act on A until both move together with an equal 
velocity, B is greater than A, which is also contrary 
to the hypothesis. Since neither of these results is 
possible, the third case must be the result, namely, that 
B impels A a little, and is repelled by A. O. E. D. 
Read Art. 51, Part II. of the Principles. 




PART II 99 

Proposition XXXI — Rule 7. 

// B and A (vid. Fig. above) are moving in the 
same direction, A a little more slowly than B, which 
is following, so thai it will impinge on A, and if A 
is greater than B, but the excess in magnitude is not 
equal to B's excess of velocity, then B will give a 
part of its velocity to A, so that they will move on 
together. But if the excess of motion in B docs not 
equal the excess of magnitude in A, then B will be 
reflected back, each retaining its former velocity. 

See Art. 52, Part of II. of the Principles. Here, as 
above, there are three possible cases. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

Point one: B, which is supposed to be stronger 
than A, cannot be reflected in an opposite direction 
(per Props. 21 and 22, and Ax. 20). Therefore, since 
B is stronger than A it will move A on with it so that 
the two advance together, for as appears from the pre- 
vious proposition, there is less change in this way than 
in any other. 

Point two : Since here B is not so strong as A it 
can not move A (per Props. 21 and 22), neither (per 
Ax. 20) can it give it any of its motion. Therefore 
(per Coroll., Prop. 14), it will retain its former mo- 
tion. Not, however, in the same direction, for it is 
supposed to be impeded by A. Therefore (per what 
was said in Chap 2, Diopt.), it will be reflected in 
an opposite direction, each body retaining its former 
motion (per Prop. 18). O. E. D. 

It should be noted that here, as in the preceding 
propositions, Ave have assumed as proven that every 



ioo PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

body meeting another by which it is absolutely im- 
peded, advances no further in its former direction, 
but on the contrary, is reflected in an opposite direc- 
tion. To understand this read Chapter 2 of the Diopts. 

SCHOLIUM. 

For explaining the changes of bodies which are 
mutually impelled we have so far considered two 
bodies as though separated from all others, no account 
being taken of other impinging bodies. For we will 
consider the state and changes of those in place of the 
bodies by which they are impinged on all sides. 

Proposition XXXII. 

// a body B is impinged on all sides by moving 
particles which tend to move it in all directions, as 
long as there is no other cause it will remain -un- 
moved. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

This proposition is self-evident : for if a body is 
moving from the impulse of corpuscles coming from 
a certain direction, the corpuscles which move it im- 
pel it with greater force than others coming from 
other parts, and striking it are unable to produce a 
sensible effect (per Ax. 20). But this is contrary to 
the hypothesis. 

Proposition XXXIII. 

Conditions being as in the last Proposition, a body 
B can be moved in a certain direction by a force how- 
ever small. 



PART II 



DEMONSTRATION. 



Since, by hypothesis, B is at rest, and the particles 
contiguous to it are in motion, these particles . (per 
Prop. 28) in touching B are repelled, each one re- 
taining its former velocity. B, therefore, is being 
continually left by those particles contiguous to it, and 
no action is required for separating it from those 
particles which come in contact with it (according to 
what was remarked concerning Def. 8). Therefore, 
however small the external force impinging on B, it 
is still greater than that required to retain B in its 
position (for we have shown that there is no force 
in the bodies immediately tangent to B), and which, 
added to the impact of the particles moving in the same 
direction, is not greater than the impact of particles 
moving in an opposite direction (for we suppose that 
these particles are acting equally on all sides.) 
Therefore (per Ax. 20), any external force, however 
small, will move B in a certain direction. O. E. D. 

Proposition XXXIV. 

A body B, the conditions being as above, can not 
be moved with a velocity greater than the velocity of 
the body impelling it, although the particles of that 
body may be moving much more rapidly. 

demonstration. 

The corpuscles which, together with the external 
force, impel B in a certain direction, although they 
move much more rapidly than the external force is 
able to move, nevertheless, since (by hypothesis) they 
have no g r eater force than those particles which tend 



102 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

to drive B in another direction, all strength of their 
determination is used in resisting these, and hence 
(per Prop. 32) they give no acceleration to the body. 
Therefore, since there are, according to supposition, 
no other elements or causes except this external force, 
nor does it receive acceleration from any other bodies 
except this external force, it can not be moved with 
a greater velocity than the impulse of this body. 
Q. E. D. 

Proposition XXXV. 

When a body B is so moved by an external force, 
it receives the greater part of its motion from those 
bodies which immediately surround it, and not from 
an external force. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

The body B, however large it is supposed to be, 
will be moved by the continued impulse of a body 
however small (per Prop. 33). Let us suppose that 
B is four times as large as an external body by which 
it is moved. Since (by the preceding Proposition) 
both will move with an equal velocity there will be 
four times as much motion in B as in the body by 
which it is impelled (per Prop. 21). Therefore (per 
Ax. 8, Part I.), it does not receive the principal part 
of its motion from this external force. And since 
no other factors are present except those bodies by 
which it is continually being impelled (for B is sup- 
posed to be at rest), it receives the greater part of its 
motion from these bodies continually acting upon it 
and not from some external force, O. E. D. 

Let it be noted here that we cannot say, as above. 



PART II 103 

that the motion of particles coming from one direc- 
tion is needed to counterbalance the motion of parts 
coming from an opposite direction. For bodies mov- 
ing toward one another (as is here supposed) with 
an equal motion are opposed to one another in their 
determination alone and not in their motion 1 (per 
Coroll. Prop. 19) ; hence when resisting one another 
they are opposed only in their determination and not 
in their motion. Beside B cannot receive from 
circumjacent bodies any determination and consequent- 
ly no increase of velocity so far as it is distinguished 
from motion. It does, however, receive motion ; there- 
fore, some adventitious force being present, it must 
needs be moved by these particles as we have shown 
in this Proposition, and this is clear also from the 
method by which we demonstrate Proposition 33. 

Proposition XXXVI. 

If some body, for example my hand, moves with a 
uniform- motion in any direction so that it in no way 
resists any bodies, nor do any bodies in any way resist 
it, in the space through which it moves the bodies must 
necessarily be moving in all directions and with a 
velocity equal to that of my hand. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

A body can move through no space that is not a 
plenum (per Prop. 3). That is, the space through 
which my hand is moving is filled with bodies which 
move under the condition given above. If you deny 

1 See Proposition 24 of this book, where it was demonstrated 
that bodies resisting one another are opposed only in their 
determination and not in their motion. 



104 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

it let it be supposed that they are at rest or are mov- 
ing in some other way. If they were at rest they 
necessarily resist the motion of the hand (per Prop. 
14) until its motion is communicated to them so that 
they move in the same direction and with a velocity 
equal to that of my hand (per Prop. 20). But it is 
supposed in the hypothesis that they do not resist. 
Therefore, they are moving, which is the first point 
to be proved. These bodies must be moving in all 
directions. If you deny it let it be supposed that 
they do not move in one direction, say from A to B. 
If, therefore, the hand is moving from A to B it 
will necessarily meet with moving particles (according 
to what has just been said and according to hypo- 
thesis) with a different determination from the deter- 
mination of the hand. Therefore, they would resist 
it (per Prop. 14) until they are moved in the same 
direction as the hand itself (per Prop. 24 and Schol. 
Prop. 27). And since (by hypothesis) they do not 
resist the hand, they will be moving in the same direc- 
tion, which was the second point. 

Again, these bodies in whatever direction they move, 
will all have an equal velocity. For if it be supposed 
that they do not move with an equal velocity, let it 
be supposed that those which move from A toward B, 
do not have as great a velocity as those which move 
from A toward C. 
C Therefore, if the hand moves from 

A to B with the same velocity as the 
bodies moving from A to C (for it 
-B is supposed to be able to move with an 
equal velocity in any direction without resistance), the 
bodies moving from A toward B will resist the hand 
until they move with the hand with an equal velocity 



PART II 105 

(per Props. 14 and 31). But this is contrary to 
hypothesis. Therefore they will move in all directions 
with an equal velocity, which was the third point. 

Finally, if these bodies do not move with an equal 
velocity to the hand, the hand moves either slower or 
faster than they. If the former the hand would resist 
the bodies which are following it in the same direc- 
tion (per Prop. 31); if these particles move slower 
than the hand, then they will resist the hand, both 
cases being contrary to our hypothesis. Therefore, 
since the hand does not move slower or faster than 
the particles it must move with a velocity equal to 
that of the particles amid which it moves. Q. E. D. 

// you inquire why with an equal degree of velocity, 
I would reply that it is not with a velocity absolutely 
equal. See Schol. Coroll. Prop. 27. If then you 
woidd ask whether the hand while, for example, it 
was moving from A to B would not resist those par- 
ticles at that time moving from B to A, read Prop. 33, 
in which you will see that the force of these bodies is 
equalised by the force of bodies moving from A to B 
(for by the third part of this demonstration this force 
is equal to that). 

Proposition XXXVII. 

If some body, A for example, can be moved in a 
certain direction by a force however small, it is neces- 
sarily surrounded by bodies which are all moving with 
equal velocity in all directions. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

This body A is surrounded on all sides by bodies 
(per Prop. 6), which are moving in all directions with 
an equal velocity. For if they were at rest the body A 



io6 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

(as is supposed), could not be moved in a given direc- 
tion by a force however small, but only by a minimum 
force which was able to move A together with the 
bodies which immediately surround it (per Ax. 20). 
Then if the bodies by which A is surrounded are 
moved in one direction with a greater force than in 
another, for example, from B to C than from C to B, 

since as we have already shown it is 
Q)^- — surrounded on all sides by moving 

bodies, it will necessarily be moved 
along the line from B to C (per Prop. 30). Hence 
a force however small would not suffice to move A 
from C to B, but one sufficient to overcome this excess 
of motion toward B would be required (Ax. 20). 
Therefore these bodies must be moving in all direc- 
tions with an equal force. 

SCHOLIUM. 

Since these things are true of fluid bodies, it follows 
that fluid bodies are those which are divided into 
minute parts, which are moving in all directions with 
equal velocity. And, although these particles cannot 
be seen even by the eye of a lynx, still the truth of 
what we have thus demonstrated cannot be denied. 
For, in Propositions 10 and 11 it was shown that the 
subtlety of nature is so great that it cannot be known 
(I shall not say by the senses). Beside, as was also 
shown above, since bodies only by their rest resist 
other bodies, and as the senses tell us hardness is 
nothing else than the resistance the parts of a body 
offer to our hands, we conclude that those bodies are 
hard whose particles are. with regard to another at 
rest, and near together. 

Read Articles 54, 55, and 56, Part II. Prin. 



The Principles of Philosophy Demonstrated 
by the Method of Geometry. 

Part III. 

The universal principles of nature having been pre- 
sented, we must proceed now to explain those things 
which follow from them. But since the things which 
follow from these principles are more than can ever be 
known, and since we are not determined by them to 
one thing rather than another, first of all a brief history 
should be given of the principal phenomena whose 
causes we are to investigate. This you have in 
Articles 5 to 15, Part III. of the Principles. And from 
Articles 20 to 40 the hypothesis is expressed which 
Descartes deemed best fitted not only to explain the 
phenomena of the world, but also for investigating 
their natural causes. 

The best way to understand the nature of plants or 
of men is to see how they arise and develop from 
their germ cells. Principles perfectly simple and easily 
known should be found from which we can demon- 
strate that the heavens, the earth, and all the visible 
world could have arisen as from cells, although we 
know full well that they have not actually done so. 
For in this way we will explain their nature much 
better than if we only describe them. 

I say that we are seeking for principles which are 
simple and easily known. Unless such are found we 
do not desire any at all. For we are only adding 

107 



io8 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

the first principles to what has been given in order 
that the nature of these things may more easily be 
known, and that we may, according to the method 
of mathematics, advance from what is perfectly clear 
to that which is more obscure, and from the simple 
to what is more complex. 

Therefore, we said that we are seeking the prin- 
ciples from which we might demonstrate that the 
heavens, the earth, etc., could have arisen. We are 
not seeking merely the causes which are sufficient, for 
explaining the phenomena of the heavens as is now 
and then done by astronomers. But we are seeking 
for those principles which will lead us to a knowledge 
of all those things in the earth (for we believe that 
all those things which we observe in the earth should 
be included in the phenomena of nature). In order 
that these may be found, the following points should 
be observed in a valid hypothesis : 

I. That (considered in itself alone), it implies no 
contradiction. 

II. That it should be as simple as possible. 

III. That what follows from it may be easily 
known. 

IV. That all things observed in all nature can be 
deduced from it. 

Finally, we said, that we might assume an hypo- 
thesis from which, as from a cause we are able to 
deduce the phenomena of nature although we know 
that these phenomena have not thus arisen. In order 
that this may be understood I will give an example. 
If a person should find on a paper the curved line 
which we call a parabola and wished to investigate 
its nature it would make no difference whether he 
regarded it as first cut from some cone and then placed 



PART III leg 

upon the paper, or whether he regarded it as generated 
from the movement of two straight lines, or as derived 
in some other way. In whatever way he conceives 
it to have been generated, he wishes to demonstrate 
all the properties of the parabola from it. Indeed, 
although he knows that it was made from the cone, 
he will be free to assign some other cause which seems 
to him better adapted to explain all its properties. 
So also in order to explain the forms of nature we 
may assume any hypothesis at will, provided we de- 
duce from it, through mathematical inference, all the 
phenomena of nature. And, what is even more 
worthy of note, we can scarcely assume anything, from 
which we may not, perhaps with more labor, through 
the laws of nature given above, deduce the same 
results. For since in accordance with these laws, 
matter assumes successively all the forms of which 
it is capable, if we consider these forms in order we 
will come finally to the form in which the world 
exists. We need not fear, therefore, the error of a 
false hypothesis. 

A POSTULATE. 

We ask that it be conceded that, in the beginning, 
all matter of which the visible world is composed 
was divided by God into particles as nearly as possible 
equal to one another. These particles, however, from 
which now the heavens and the stars are composed 
were not spherical, for a number of spheres joined 
together do not fill up the space they occupy ; but they, 
small in size, were fashioned in some other way. 
These particles had in them just as much motion as 
there is in the world to-day and they were all moving 
with an equal velocity. Not only did single particles 



no PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

mutually separate from one another move about their 
own center as if they composed a fluid body, such as 
we think the heavens to be, but there are many mov- 
ing together around certain other points, equally re- 
mote and like disposed and now the centers of fixed 
bodies ; then also, there were some around other points 
which equal the number of the planets. And so they 
compose as many vortices as there are stars in the 
world. Vid. Fig. Art. 47, Part III. of the Principles. 

This hypothesis considered in itself implies no con- 
tradiction ; for it attributes nothing to matter except 
divisibility and motion, which we have already dem- 
onstrated to really exist in matter. And since we 
have shown that matter is indefinite, and the earth and 
the heavens are one and the same, we can suppose 
without a trace of contradiction, that these modifica- 
tions are in all matter. 

Then this hypothesis is a very simple one, because 
there is no irregularity or dissimilarity in the particles 
into which matter was divided at the beginning, nor 
in their motion. For these reasons this hypothesis is 
also very easy to understand. This is evident also 
from the fact that in this hypothesis nothing is assigned 
to matter except that which is known to any one from 
the concept of matter alone, namely, divisibility and 
motion in space. 

We shall attempt to show, as far as it may be done 
and in the following order, that all that we observe in 
nature can be deduced from this alone. In the first 
place we will deduce the fluidity of the heavens from 
this postulate and explain how this is the cause of 
light. Then we shall proceed to consider the nature 
of the sun and those things which are observed in 



PART III in 

the fixed stars. Afterward we shall speak of comets 
and of the planets and their phenomena. 

DEFINITIONS. 

I. By the Equator (per Eclipticam) we understand 
that part of a rotating body, which as it turns on its 
axis, describes the greatest circle. 

II. By the Poles we understand those parts of a 
rotating body most remote from the Equator, or which 
describe minimum circles. 

III. By the Conatus to move (conatum ad motum) 
we do not understand some form of thought, but only 
that a part of matter is so placed and impelled to 
move that, if it is not impeded by some external cause, 
it will really move somewhere. 

IV. By an Angle we understand that part of a body 
which extends beyond its spherical form. 

AXIOMS. 

I. A number of spheres joined together cannot fill 
the space they occupy. 

II. A portion of matter divided into angular parts 
requires more space, if these parts each move about 
its own center, than if they are all at rest and the sides 
of all are immediately and mutually tangent to one 
another. 

III. A smaller part of matter is easier divided by 
a given force than a larger one. 

IV. Parts of matter moving in the same direction 
which do not in this motion recede from one another, 
are not really divided. 



ii2 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY 

Proposition I. 

The parts into which matter zvas first divided are 
not spherical but angular. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

In the beginning all matter was divided into equal 
and similar parts (per Postulate). Therefore (per 
Ax. i and Prop. 2, Part II.) they are not spherical 
but (per Def. 4) thus far angular. Q. E. D. 

Proposition II. 

The force which causes the particles of matter to 
move about their own centers, also causes the angles 
of these particles to be worn away. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

In the beginning all matter was divided into equal 
and angular parts, (per Postulate and Prop. 1). If the 
angles were not worn away when they began to move 
around their centers, all matter would occupy (per 
Ax. 2) more space than if they were at rest. But 
this is absurd (per Prop. IV., Part II). Therefore 
their angles begin to wear away as soon as they began 
to move. Q. E. D. 



APPENDIX 



CONTAINING 



COGITATA METAPHYSICA, 



In which are briefly discussed some questions 

and difficulties which occur in regard to 

Being and its Affects, God and His 

Attributes, and the Human 

Mind. 



BY 



BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA, 

Amsterdam. 

113 



APPENDIX 

CONTAINING 

COGITATA METAPHYSICA. 

Part I, 

In which some points relating to Being and its Affects 
are briefly explained. 

Chapter I. 

Concerning Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being 
of Reason. 

Concerning the definition of knowledge (Scientia) 
I shall say nothing, not even of the knowledge of the 
things here discussed. I shall only attempt to explain 
some obscure points in those authors who write on 
Metaphysics. 

We shall begin, therefore, with 

Definition of Being, by which I mean, all of that 

which, when it is clearly and distinctly 

conceived is found to exist necessarily, or at least to be 

able to exist. 

From this definition, or, if you pre- 

C] fe\ e ng?'lf% e u ing fer > from this description, it follows 

r f eai eason are wo * tnat chimeras, fictitious being and 

being of the reason can in no way be 

called real. For chimeras * by their nature do not 

1 By chimera is understood a being which by nature involves 
a contradiction as is clearly shown in Chapter III. 

ii5 



no THE COG1TATA METAPHVSICA 

exist. Fictitious being precludes any clear and distinct 
concept, because man by his mere power of Freedom, 
not unknowingly as in false concepts, but advisedly 
and intelligently, connects what he wishes to connect, 
and dissociates what he will. Finally, being of reason 
is nothing except a mode of thought which pertains 
most properly to the intellect, viz., to retention, to 
understanding, and to the imagination. It should 
here be noted that by mode of thought we mean, as 
was explained in Schol. Prop. Pt. I., all forms of 
mental states as understanding, joy, imagination, etc. 
That there are certain modes of 
in what way objects thought which serve the purpose of 

are retained in , . . . . , ~ . . . . 

memory. retaining objects firmly in the mind, 

and of recalling them when we wish, 
is evident to all who use the well-known rule of 
memory; viz., that by which, for retaining anything 
in memory and impressing it upon the mind, it is asso- 
ciated with some other thing familiar to us, either 
by name, or because of its contiguity with that object. 
In this way philosophers have reduced all natural 
objects to certain classes called genera, species, etc., 
and to these they refer all new objects as they are met. 
Then, for explaining things we have 
ln explain Zl%c7s. also modes of thought derived by com- 
paring one object with another. Such 
modes as these are time, number, measure, etc. Of 
these time serves for explaining duration, number for 
discrete quantities, and measure for continuous quan- 
tity. 

Finally since we have become accus- 

lH imZgiL W ?L7l tomed to picture all of those things 

which we understand, even the images 

of our fancy at times, it happens that we imagine non- 



PART I 117 

being positively, as an image of some real being. For 
mind considered as a thinking being has no more 
power to affirm than to deny. And since to imagine is 
only to perceive the traces in the brain produced by 
the movement of the spirits, which in turn are caused 
by the stimulation of the senses by an external object, 
such a sensation can only be a confused affirmation. 
Hence we imagine all the forms of thought which the 
mind uses for denying as blindness, the limits or 
termini, the end, shade, etc., are beings. 
, , . , It is thus evident that such modes 

Why beings of 

reason are not of thought are not ideas 01 things, nor 

ideas of things . 

but are so can they, in any possible way be so 

considered. . A , ^ '1 -, • 

considered. Ihey have no object, 
which necessarily exists, as the source of the idea, nor 
could such an object possibly exist. The reason such 
forms of thought are so often held for ideas of things 
is that they arise so directly from real things, that 
those who do not very carefully attend to their thought 
readily confuse such forms of thought with the things 
themselves. For this cause also, they give names to 
these ideas as if they signified some real extra-mental 
object, which being, or rather non-being, they call 
beings of the reason. 

It is easy to see how inapt is the 

It is not correct to ... . 1 • 1 ■>• • 1 t-> • • , 1 

divide Being into division which divides Being into real 
b7i!ig be o7 g reasoi. being and being of the reason. For 
they divide Being into being and non- 
being or into being and a mode of thought. How- 
ever, I do not wonder that philosophers sometimes fall 
into these verbal or grammatical errors. For they 
judge objects from the names and not names from the 
objects. 



n8 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

in what sense Those who say that being of the 

being of the J ° 

reason may be reason is nothing, however, are not 

called nothing, ° 

and in what less in error. If ) t ou seek for some 

sense real. . 

meaning for these terms apart from 
the mind you find nothing; but if we understand by 
the term a mode of thought, then it signifies something 
real. For if I ask what a species is, I only inquire 
for the nature of that form of thought as something 
real and to be distinguished from other modes. These 
modes of thought, moreover, cannot be called ideas, 
nor can they be said to be true or false, just as love, 
e. g., cannot be called true or false but only good or 
evil. So when Plato said that " man is a biped with- 
out feathers," he did not err more than if he had said 
that man is a rational animal. For Plato knew that 
man was a rational animal as well as he knew the 
other. He merely put man into a certain class, so 
that when he wished to reflect upon man by recurring 
to the class in which he had been classified he would 
come immediately to recognize certain characteristics 
as belonging to his nature. Aristotle, indeed, made 
a grave mistake if he thought that Plato in this defi' 
nition attempted to express the essence of human 
nature. Whether Plato did well we may question, but 
this is not the place to discuss that. 

From all that has been said above 

In our investigation . . 

of things, real it appears that there is no conformity 

being must not . 1 1 • 1 1 • <• 

be confused with between real being and being of rea- 

being of reason. ^ ^^f^.^ ft [& eagily seen hmy 

seduously we must be on our guard lest we confuse 
the two. For it is one thing to inquire into the nature 
of things and quite another to inquire into the nature 
of the modes of thought under which they are per- 
ceived. If we do not keep this distinction clear we 



PART I 119 

will be unable to understand modes of perception, or 
the nature of things in themselves. But what is more 
important, since this affects so many things, is that 
this is the reason we often fall into such great error. 

It should be noted also that many 

In what way being . . . 

of reason and confuse being of reason and fictitious 

fictitious being . . rp, ,-, • 1 ,, , ,1 

are distinguish- being. I hey think that the one is 
equal to the other because neither has 
an extra-mental existence. But if they would con- 
sider the definitions of each, great and important dif- 
ferences would be found, not only in respect to their 
cause, but in their nature apart from their cause. 

For we affirm that fictitious being is nothing but 
two terms connected by the mere act of volition with- 
out any dependence upon reason. Being of reason 
does not depend upon the will alone nor is it formed 
by terms, as is evident without a rational connection 
between them, from the definition itself. If one should 
ask, therefore, whether fictitious being, or being of 
reason is real it should be answered that it is wrong 
to divide all being into real being and being of reason. 
The question is fundamentally wrong for it presup- 
poses that all being is divided into real being and being 
of reason. 
~, ,. . . , But to return to the proposition 

1 he division of 1 r 

Being. from which we seem to have digressed. 

From the definition of Being or, if you prefer, from its 
description, it is now easily seen that Being should not 
be divided into Being which, because of its own nature 
necessarily exists, or Being whose essence involves 
■existence, and into Being whose essence involves only 
a possible existence. This last is divided into Sub- 
stance and Modes, the definitions of which are given in 
the Principles of Phil, Pt. L, Articles 51, 52 and 56. 



120 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

We need not, therefore, repeat them here. In regard 
to this, however, and I say it deliberately, I wish it to 
be noted that Being is divided into Substance and 
Modes, not into Substance and Accidents. For Acci- 
dent is nothing but a mode of thought and exists only 
in regard to this. For example, when I say that a tri- 
angle is moved the motion is not a mode of the triangle 
but of the body moved. Therefore, in respect to the 
triangle motion is only an accident but in respect to 
the body it is real being or mode ; for motion cannot 
be conceived without a body but it may without a 
triangle. 

Further, in order that we may the better understand 
what has been said and what is to follow, we will 
attempt to explain briefly what is meant by the terms 
essence, existence, idea, and power. We are the more 
urged to do this by the ignorance of those who do not 
recognize the distinction between essence and exist- 
ence, or if they do recognize it still confuse the terms 
essence with the terms idea or power. Therefore,, in 
order to help them and to make the matter plain we 
attempt to explain this as clearly as possible. 

Chapter II. 

What should be understood by the terms Essence, 
Existence, Idea and Power. 

In order that it may be known what content to give 
to these four terms, it is necessary that we should 
understand clearly what may be said of uncreated sub- 
stance, or God. Namely: 



PART I 121 

/ I. That God eminently contains 

Ail created things all that is formally contained in created 

are eminently _ ■ 

contained in God. things, that is, God has certain at- 
tributes in which these created things 
are more eminently contained than in the things them- 
selves. (Vid. Pt. I. Ax. 8, and Coroll. I. Prop. 12 ). 
For example, we can clearly conceive of extension 
without existing objects, and thus, since it has no 
power of existence in itself, we have shown that it 
was created by God (Prop. 21, Pt. I.). And, since 
there must be as much perfection in the cause as there 
is in the effect, it follows that God contains all the 
perfection of existence. But since we find later that 
extended matter is divisible, that is, that it contains 
a mark of imperfection, we cannot, therefore, attribute 
extension to God. We are thus compelled to admit 
that God has some attribute more excellent than all 
the perfection of matter and thus contains (Schol. 
Prop. 9, Pt. I.) what the defects of matter cannot 
supply. 

2. God understands Himself and all other objects ; 
that is, He holds all things objectively, in Himself 
(Pt. I. Prop. 9) 

3. God is the first cause of all things, and works 
from an absolute freedom of will. 

From these things it is evident what 

understood by we must understand by these four 

MTand foZr" terms. In the first place Essence in 

nothing else than that mode by which 

created objects are comprehended in the attributes of 

God ; an idea is Idea so far as all things are objectively 

contained in the idea of God ; Power is so called in 

respect to the power of God, by which, by an absolute 

freedom of will He was able to create everything that 



122 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

exists ; finally, existence is the essence of things 
apart from God, and, considered in itself alone, is 
attributed to things after they have been created by 
God. 

These four terms From this {t is evident that these 

are_ not distin- f our terms are not to be distinguished 

guishea the one & 

from the other except in created objects; in God, in 

except m created 

objects. no way can they be differentiated. 

For we cannot conceive that God is in the power of 
another, and His existence, and His understanding 
are not to be separated from His essence. 

From what has been said we can 
A quShns Ce con- n readily reply to certain questions 

Essen!e G ° d ' S which have been asked ' Such > for 

example, are the following : Whether 
essence is different from existence ; and if different, is 
it something diverse from idea; and if different from 
idea, does it comprehend something extra-mental ; 
which last follows from necessity. To the first in 
regard to distinction we would reply, that essence in 
God is not different from existence, indeed the one 
cannot be conceived without the other. In other 
things essence differs from existence, for the one may 
be conceived without the other. To the second point 
we respond, that things which can be clearly and dis- 
tinctly conceived as extra-mental are something differ- 
ent from idea. But then it is asked, whether that 
zvhich is extra-mental exists in itself alone, or whether 
it has been created by God. To this we reply, that 
formal essence does not exist by its own power, nor 
even when created. These two conditions presup- 
pose that the object exists in fact; but they depend 
upon the divine essence alone, in which all things are 
contained. So far we would assent to the opinion of 



PART I 123 

those who affirm that the essence of things is eternal. 
Again it may be asked, How can we understand the 
essence of things, when God's nature is not yet known; 
for all things, as we have just said, depend upon the 
nature of God. To this I reply that it is possible 
from the fact that things are now actually created. 
For if things were not yet created I would concede 
that it would be impossible until we had an adequate 
knowledge of God's nature. In the same way it is 
impossible, indeed more impossible then for us to 
know the orderly nature of the applications of a para- 
bola whose nature is not yet known. 

Although the essence of non-exist- 

Why the author in . , -.,.,., 

his definition of mg modes is comprehended in the 
the eH attributes of substance of these modes, and their 
God ' real essence is these substances, never- 

theless we desire to refer them to God in order to ex- 
plain the essence of modes and of substances in general 
terms, and because the essence of modes was not in 
substance prior to creation and we are seeking for an 
eternal essence. 

I do not think it worth while to re- 

Why the definitions fute those authors who think differ- 
ed others are 

not examined. entry from us, or even to examine their 
definitions or descriptions of essence 
and existence ; this would only make what is clear 
more obscure. What, indeed, is better known than 
the meaning of essence or existence? How can we 
give a definition of anything which does not at the 
same time explain its essence? 

Finally, if any philosopher is yet in 

H ZzTeL di tfeniT doilbt whether essence and existence 

Vasii^bTse^n ™ are distinguishable in created objects, 

he need not take much trouble to re- 



i2 4 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

move that doubt. For if he will merely approach 
some statue or object of wood, he will see how he 
conceives of the object not yet existing in a certain 
manner, and how he knows that it is really existing. 

Chapter III. 

Concerning tlwsc things which are Necessary, Im- 
possible, Possible, and Contingent. 

The nature of being as being hav- 
Wkat is here ing been explained we would next con- 

"he ^AffTcts y sider some of its affects. It may be 
remarked here, that by affects we 
understand what Descartes termed attributes (Pt. I. 
Prin. Phil. Art. 52). For being, considered merely 
as being does not affect us as substance. Wherefore 
it must be explained by some attribute which is recog- 
nized only by reason. Wherefore I cannot wonder 
enough, at the extreme subtlety of those who, not 
without deleterious consequences to truth, try to find 
some middle ground between being and nothing. But 
I will not delay to refute this error, seeing that it 
fades into their own vain subtlety when they attempt 
to give a definition of the affects. 

We then take up the matter at once 
De Affec°tl ° f the and sa - v: The affects of being are cer- 
tain attributes under which we come 
to understand the essence or existence of every single 
thing, which attributes, however, are only distinguish- 
able by reason. I shall attempt here to explain cer- 
tain things about these (for I do not assume that all 
understand this thoroughly) and to separate by proper 
terms those things which are not the affects of being. 



PART I i2S 

First I shall discuss what is meant by necessary and 
impossible. 

There are two ways in which a thing 

In hozv many ways . 

a thing may be may be said to be necessary or lmpos- 

said to be neces- M , . , J 

sary or impos- sible, viz., in respect to its essence- or 
its cause. In respect to His essence 
we know that God necessarily exists. For His essence 
cannot be conceived without existence. From the 
implicated essence of chimeras they cannot exist. In 
respect to their cause, things, i. e., materials, are either 
impossible or necessary. For if we merely regard 
their essence, it is possible to clearly conceive of that 
without their existence. Therefore, they cannot exist 
by the power and necessity of their own essence but 
only by the power of their cause, viz., God the 
creator of all things. If, thus, it is the divine decree 
that something should exist, it exists from necessity, 
or if less than this, it will be impossible for it to exist. 
For it is a self-evident fact that that which has no 
cause, internal or external, for its existence, cannot 
possibly exist. And an object under this hypothesis 
is so conceived that it cannot exist by the power of 
its own essence, by which I mean an internal cause, 
nor by the divine decree, the one external cause of all 
things. Whence it follows that objects under such 
condition cannot exist at all. 

It should be noted: I. A chimera 
a chimera is right- because it exists neither in the intel- 

lv called a mere , , ,, ...... 

verbal being. lect nor in the imagination is rightly 

called a mere verbal being ; for we can 

only express this idea in words. For example, we use 

the words " a square circle/' expressing it in words, 

but we are by no means able to imagine it, much less 



126 THE COGITATA METAPHYS1CA 

to understand it. Therefore chimera is only a word 
and cannot be numbered among the affects of being. 

2. We must remember that not only 
iects de ' does the existence of all created things 



their essence 
existe; 
from God. 



depend upon God's decree, but their 



essence and nature as well. This will 
be clearly shown in Part II. below. Whence it follows 
that created objects have no necessity in themselves, 
for their essence is not self derived. No more do 
they exist by their own power. 

3. Finally, it should be noted that 

T %e^d S %as is the necessity of created objects, such 

derived from as we £ n( } there from the power of 

their cause, and r 

relates to their the cause, is either in respect to their 

essence or exist- x 

ence. in God essence or to their extension. These 

these two things .-■'-. 

are not to be two must be distinguished m created 

distinguished. , . „.. .. , . 

objects. I he one depends upon the 
eternal laws of nature, the other upon the series and 
the order of its causes. In God whose essence and 
existence are the same, necessity of essence is equiva- 
lent to necessity of existence. Whence it follows that 
if we conceive of the whole order of Nature we will 
find that many things cannot exist whose nature we 
conceive clearly and distinctly, that is, whose nature 
is such of necessity. For we find that it is equally 
impossible for such things to be, as for example we 
know that it is impossible for a great elephant to pass 
through the eye of a needle. Nevertheless the nature 
of each is clearly conceived. 

Therefore things of this nature do not exist except 
chimeras, which we are able neither to imagine nor 
to understand. 



PART I 127 

So much concerning necessity and 
Possibility and con- impossibility; to which it seems best 
^Wct^of'thingl. to a dd a few remarks concerning what 
is possible and what is contingent. 
For by some, these two terms are considered affects 
of things, although, in truth, they are nothing more 
than defects of our intellect. This I shall clearly show 
after I have explained what should be understood by 
these terms. 

A thins; is said to be possible when 

What is possible, ° ■ . * 

zvhat is contin- zve understand its efficient cause, out 
do not know whether it is determined. 
Therefore, we may consider that to be possible which 
is neither necessary or impossible. If now we attend 
merely to the essence of a thing and not to its cause, 
we say it is contingent; that is, when we consider 
any things between the extremes God and chimeras. 
This is true, for from a part of their essence we find 
no necessity of existence in these things as in God, 
nor impossibility of existence as in chimeras. If any 
one wishes to call that contingent which I call possible 
and possible what I call contingent I shall not contra- 
dict him. For I am not accustomed to dispute about 
mere names. It will be sufficient if it is only admitted 
that these arise not because of something real, but 
only because of defects of our perception. 

If any one chooses to deny this his 

Possible and con- , . , J .. i . Jj1 

tingent only sig- error may be pointed out with little 
our understand- trouble. For if he will consider Na- 
mg ' ture and how it all depends upon God, 

he will find nothing contingent. That is, he will find 
nothing, which, from a part of the object is able to 
exist and not exist, or, as it is generally expressed, the 
contingent is the real. This is evident, also, from 



128 THE COGITATA' METAPHYSICA 

what was said in Ax. 10, Pt. I. namely, that no more 
power was needed to create the world than to con- 
serve it. Therefore no created object does anything 
by its own power for the same reason that it did not 
begin to exist by its own power. From which it fol- 
lows that nothing has been created except by the power 
of the Cause which has created all things, namely, the 
power of God, who by His concurrence procreates 
everything every single moment. And since nothing 
exists except by divine power alone, it is easily seen 
that the world as produced by God's decree is such as 
he wished it to be. So, too, since there is no change or 
inconstancy in God (per Prop. 18 and Coroll. Prop. 
20, Pt. I.), those things which He now produces, He 
has decreed from eternity that they should be pro- 
duced. Then since nothing more is needed for their 
existence than God's decree that they should exist, it 
follows that the necessity of the existence of all created 
things has existed from eternity. Nor can we say 
that these things are contingent since God might have 
decreed otherwise. For since in eternity there are no 
effects of time neither a future nor a past, it follows 
that God did not exist before that decree, so that he 
was able to decree something else. 

Whatever pertains to the freedom 
The reconciliation f the human will, which we have said 

of our Freedom 

with the predes- is free (Schol. Prop. 15, Pt. I.), that 

tination of God's . 

will surpasses also is conserved by the concurrence 

human under- r —, , -» T . , , , 

standing. of God. Nor is there any man who 

wishes or does anything who does not 
do as God has decreed from eternity that he should 
choose or act. In what way this is possible, human 
freedom being preserved, man is unable to understand. 
Since we clearly conceive this, our ignorance of how 



PART I 129 

it can be should not lead us to reject this truth. For 
we clearly and distinctly understand, if we consider 
our nature, that we are free in our actions, and we 
deliberate about many things simply because we choose 
to do so. And on the other hand if we consider the 
nature of God in the way we have indicated, we see 
clearly and distinctly that all things depend upon Him 
and that nothing exists except as it has been decreed 
from all eternity. In what way the human will can 
be thus procreated by God so that it retains its free- 
dom, we do not know. Indeed, there are many things 
which surpass our comprehension, and yet we know 
that they are so ordained by God • as for example, that 
there is a real division of matter into indefinite parts, 
which was sufficiently proven in Proposition 11, Part 
II. although we do not understand how such a divi- 
sion can be. These two motions, viz., possible and 
contingent, which we use in place of the thing known, 
only signify a defect of our knowledge about the 
existence of the given object. 

Chapter IV. 
Concerning Duration and Time. 

Because above, we have divided 

What Eternity is. « . . , « . < 

being into being whose essence in- 
volves existence, and being whose essence involves 
only a possible existence, there arises the distinction 
between eternity and duration. Concerning eternity 
we will speak at length below. Here we would only 
say that it is an attribute under zvhich we conceive the 

infinite existence of God. Duration is 

What Duration is. .. , 

an attribute tinder which we conceive 



130 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

the existence of created objects so far as they perse- 
vere in their own actuality. 

From which it clearly follows that 
duration is distinguished from the 
whole existence of an object only by the reason. For, 
however much of duration you take away from any 
thing, so much of its existence do you detract from it. 
In order to determine or measure this we compare this 
with the duration of those objects which have a fixed 
and a certain motion, and this comparison is called time. 
Therefore, time is not an affect of things but only a 
mode of thought or, as we have said, a being of rea- 
son ; it is a mode of thought serving to explain dura- 
tion. It should be noted under duration, as it will be 
of use when below we are discussing eternity, that it is 
conceived as greater or less, as it were, composed of 
parts and then not only as an attribute of existence 
but as the very essence of existence. 

Chapter V. 

Concerning Opposition, Order, etc. 

Because we compare objects one with another, there 
are certain notions that arise, which, however apart 
from the things themselves are only modes of thought. 
This is very evident, since, when we attempt to con- 
sider them as objects apart from forms of thought 
we hold the one for the other and render clear con- 
cepts obscure. Such notions are the following, viz., 
Opposition, Order, Relation, Diversity, Connection, 
Conjunction, and other similar ideas. These, I say, 
are perceived by us with sufficient clearness provided 
we do not conceive of them as something in the essence 



PART I 131 

of things, but only as modes of thought by which we 
can more easily retain these objects in memory and 
imagine them. Therefore, I do not think it necessary 
to speak further of this but pass to those terms com- 
monly called transcendental. 

Chapter VI. 

Concerning Unity, Truth and Goodness. 

By almost all metaphysicians these terms are held 
to be affects of being. For, they say, all being is 
one, true and good, although no one knows about 
this. By examining each one of these terms sepa- 
rately we shall be able to understand their proper use. 
We will begin with the first, viz., 
Unity. This term, they say, signifies 
some extra-mental reality. But what this adds to 
reality they are unable to say. Which sufficiently 
shows that they confuse being of reason with real 
being, so that what is perfectly clear becomes obscure. 
We, on the other hand, would say that unity is in no 
way to be distinguished from the thing itself, and 
that it adds nothing to being. But it is only a mode 
of thought by which we separate one thing from an- 
other, when they are similar or for some reason occur 
together 

To the term Unity we oppose the 

What Plurality is, term Plurality, which clearly adds 

ZYllf a l S 7afd nothing to things but is only a mode 

to be one and m of bought which assists us in under- 

what sense sui o 

generis. standing the objects of our experience. 

Nor do I see that anything remains 

to be said concerning a matter as self-evident as this. 



132 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

We may add, however, that God so far as we separate 
Him from other objects may be said to be one. But 
so far as we think of His nature as many-sided He 
cannot be called simple Unity (unum et unicum). If 
we examine the matter more accurately, we can show 
that God is improperly called simple unity. But this 
is not of sufficient importance to make it worth the 
discussion; it is a matter that affects not the reality 
but the names. Therefore we pass to the second 
point and explain what we mean by ' false.' 

In order to properly understand the 

Whac is true and termS triie aild f aUe We wiU be g in 

what is false as w ^h their signification from which it 

generally under- ° 

stood and as will appear that they are not names 

understood by 

philosophers. of qualities in the things themselves 

nor attributes at all except rhetorically. 
Since general usage first fixed their meaning, and 
they were only used afterward by philosophers, it 
seems best to inquire for their primary significance. 
Especially is this necessary since other sources from 
the very nature of language, are wanting. The sig- 
nificance of true and false seemed to have first arisen 
from narration. That narration was true which was 
in accord with the facts which it concerned; that was 
false which was not in accord with the facts of the 
case. This use of these terms was then borrowed by 
philosophers for denoting the correspondence of the 
idea with the thing it represents, and the contrary. 
Therefore, that idea is said to be true which repre- 
sents the thing, as it is in itself. That idea is false 
which does not so represent its object. For ideas are 
nothing else than mental narratives or histories of na- 
ture. Afterward these are metaphorically applied to 
other things. As for example, that gold is true or 






PART I 133 

false, as if we thought that gold which we perceive 
might tell us what was in itself, or what is not. 

Wherefore those who believe that 

True is not a . 1,1, 

-transcendental true is a transcendental term, or an 
affect of being, are plainly deceived. 
For we only apply this term to things improperly, or 
if you prefer, rhetorically. 

If you inquire further what truth 
a 7, /ilea Si." « Jbut a true idea, you do die same 
thing as to ask what whiteness is ex- 
cept a white object. 

Concerning the cause of the true and the false we 
have already spoken ; therefore nothing remains to be 
noted which would be worth the while, if writers, 
" seeking a knot in the bulrushes," did not so far en- 
tangle themselves in similar folly that they are unable 
to extricate themselves. 

The properties of truth or of a true 
What arc the Prop- idea are: 1. That it is clear and dis- 
Certitude iT not tinct. 2. That it is beyond all doubt, 
in tlings - or, in a word, that it is certain. Those 

who seek for certainty in the things themselves are 
deceived in the same way as when they seek there for 
truth. Although we say a thing is uncertain, we rhe- 
torically take the object for the idea, and in the same 
way we say that a thing is doubtful. Unless, per- 
chance, we understand by uncertainty, contingency or 
the thing which makes us uncertain or doubtful. But 
there is no need to delay about this point. Therefore 
we proceed to the third point and will explain what is 
meant by this term and its opposite. 

An object considered in itself is 
Good and Evil only neither gfood nor evil, but onlv in re- 

r dative terms. 

spect to another being, which it helps 



134 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

to acquire what is desired, or the contrary. Indeed, 
the same thing at the same time may be both good 
and evil in respect to different things. For example, 
the council of Ahithophel to Absalom is called good in 
the Sacred Scriptures. But it was the worst possible 
to David, whose destruction it would have caused. 
So there are many things which are good, but not good 
for all. Health is good for man, but neither good nor 
evil to senseless matter or to plants, to which it does 
not apply. God is called perfectly good because He 
preserves all things. He conserves all things by His 
concurrence, and no greater mark of goodness could 
be found than this. Nor is there any absolute evil, 
as is also evident in itself. 

Those who seek for some metaphysi- 

IV hy some conceive . . 1 • 1 1 11 1 r r 

of a metaphysical cal good which shall be tree irom 
relativity are laboring under a misap- 
prehension of the case. They confuse a distinction of 
Reason with a distinction of Reality or Modality. 
They distinguish between the thing itself, and its ccn- 
atus, by which each object is conserved, although 
they do not know what they mean by the term conatus. 
For these two things, although they are distinguished 
by reason, or by words, which fact deceives them, 
are not to be distinguished in the thing itself. 

In order to understand this we will 
How the thing notice a very simple example. Mo- 

conatus"^ 'wkich tion has the power of preserving itself 



every object en- 
deavors to coy 



in statu quo; this power clearly is 
S pZ e ent S %t7: are nothing else than the motion itself, 
g ui b shed. isHn ' i- e -> it: is in the nature of motion to 

do so. If I say that in A there is 
nothing else than a certain amount of motion, it fol- 
lows that as long as I consider only this body A, I 



PART I 135 

must consider it as moving. For if I should say that 
it has lost its power of motion, I necessarily attribute 
something else to it than that which, from the hypothe- 
sis, it possessed, and through this, it has lost its power 
of motion. If this reason seems obscure — well then 
we will concede that this conatus of self-movement is 
something more than the laws and nature of motion. 
If, therefore, you suppose this conatus to be a meta- 
physical good, from necessity you must suppose that 
this conatus will have in it a conatus of self-preserva- 
tion, and this another, and so on to infinity, than which 
I do not know anything more absurd. The reason 
some distinguish between the conatus of an object 
and the thing itself is this, namely, because they find 
in themselves the desire of conserving themselves, 
they imagine the desire is present in everything. 
Whether God could Moreover, it is asked whether God 
\7od h l e e n fore aUed could have been called good before 
creation. creation. From our definition it would 

seem that we could not predicate such an attribute as 
belonging to God, for we said that a thing considered 
in itself alone can neither be said to be good or evil. 
This will seem absurd to many; but for what reason 
I do not know. We attribute many things of this 
kind to God, which, before creation, could not exist 
except potentially; as for example, when He is called 
Creator, Judge merciful, etc. Wherefore similar ar- 
guments should be allowed us here. 

And further, as good and evil are 

In f^Sn ^relative, on ty relative terms, so also is perfec- 

aVot a te. sense ' tion, unless we take perfection for the 

essence of the thing; in this sense, as 

we have said before, God has infinite perfection, that 

is. infinite essence, and infinite beins:. 



136 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

It is not my intention to say much more. For the 
remaining remarks, which pertain to general meta- 
physics, I believe, are sufficiently well known. It is 
not worth while, therefore, to carry the discussion 
further. 



COGITATA METAPHYSICA, 

Part II. 

Wherein are briefly explained some points concern- 
ing God and His Attributes, and concerning the Hu- 
man Mind, 



137 



Chapter I. 

Concerning the Eternity of God. 

We have said above that in Nature nothing is given 
except substance and modes. Therefore it will not 
be expected that we shall say here anything about 
substantial forms, or real qualities ; for these terms, 
as well as other similar ones, are plainly inapt. We 
divide substance into two general heads, namely, Ex- 
tension and Thought. Thought is either created, the 
human mind, or uncreated, i. e., God. God's exist- 
ence we have above demonstrated a posteriori, that is, 
from the idea which we have of God, and a priori, or 
from His essence as the cause of His being. But, 
although we have already briefly considered His at- 
tributes, as the dignity of the argument requires, we 
will here repeat these and explain them more fully, 
and at the same time endeavor to answer certain ques- 
tions bearing upon the subject. 

The chief attribute, the one to be 
D T g naL iS to n Got considered before all others, is the 
Eternity of God. This term we em- 
ploy to explain His duration. Or, rather, as we can- 
not predicate duration of God, we say He is eternal. 
For, as we noted in the first part of this discussion, 
duration is an affect of existence not of the essence 
of things. And since God's existence is His essence, 
we cannot say that duration belongs to Him. For 
whoever predicates 'duration as one of God's attributes 

139 



140 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

differentiates between His existence and His essence. 
Nevertheless, there are those who ask if God has not 
existed longer than from the time of Adam, and this 
seems to them to be perfectly evident since they be- 
lieve that duration in no way is derived from God. 
But these persons beg the question; for they assume 
that God's essence is to be distinguished from His 
existence. They demand to know whether God, who 
existed before the creation of Adam, has not existed 
for a longer time than from the creation to the pres- 
ent. They attribute, therefore, a longer duration to 
God than to individual objects, as if they suppose that 
He is continually created by Himself. Did they not 
distinguish between God's essence and His existence, 
they would never attribute duration to God, since du- 
ration does not correspond to the essence of things. 
No one would say that the essence of a circle or a 
triangle, so far as it is eternal truth, has endured for 
a longer time than from the creation of Adam. Fur- 
ther, since duration is constantly conceived of as greater 
or less, or as consisting of parts, it clearly follows 
duration cannot be attributed to God. For qs His 
being is eternal, i. e., there is no past or future to His 
nature, when we find that we cannot attribute dura- 
tion to Him we have shown that our concept of God is 
true. If we attribute duration to God, we separate 
into parts what is infinite by nature and cannot be con- 
ceived except as infinite.- 

The reason some authors attribute 

Why some authors ■%.•'./-+' i • t> j_i 

attribute Juration duration to God, is i I. .Because they 
t0 God ' attempt to explain eternity without 

considering the nature of God : as if eternity could 
be understood apart from the divine essence, or, in- 
deed, as if it was anything except this. This error 



PART II 141 

arose from the fact that because of a defective termin- 
ology, we have been accustomed to attribute eternity 
to things whose essence is different from their exist- 
ence. As, for example, when we say that the world 
has existed from eternity, although this is not implied ; 
and also that the essence of things is eternal, although 
we do not think of the things as even existing. 

2. Because they do not attribute duration to things 
except so far as they are conceived to be under con- 
tinual change, and not as we do, only so far as their 
essence is to be distinguished from their existence. 

3. Finally, because they distinguish between God's 
essence and His existence just as in the case of created 
objects. These mistakes are at the basis of their error. 
The first error was a misapprehension of the nature 
of eternity, which was thought to be some form of 
duration. In the second, they -could not easily dis- 
tinguish between the duration of created objects and 
the eternity of God. Lastly, they distinguished be- 
tween God's essence and His existence, and attributed 
duration to God,' as we have said, as though it were 
an affect of existence. 

In order to better understand what 

What eternity is. 11 • 1 1 • 1 

eternity really is and why it cannot be 
conceived apart from the essence of God, we should 
remember what has already been said, viz., that all 
created objects or all things except God Himself ex- 
ist by the power and essence of God, not by virtue of 
their own essence. Hence the present existence of 
objects is not the cause of their future existence, but 
rather the immutability of God. So when we say that 
God has created an object we are compelled to believe 
that He will conserve it or continue His act of crea- 
tion. From this we conclude: I. That created ob- 



142 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

jects are said to exist because existence is not a part 
of their essence. We cannot affirm existence of God, 
for the existence of God is God Himself. So, also, 
concerning His essence. Hence, while created objects 
have duration, God does not. 2. Created objects, 
while they have a present duration and existence, do 
not have in themselves a future duration or existence, 
for this must be continually given to them. This, 
however, is not true of the essence of created objects. 
Indeed, since His existence and His essence are one, 
we cannot attribute a future existence to God. For 
we must attribute to Him now what He has always 
had. Or, to speak more properly, an infinite exist- 
ence pertains to God in the same way as an infinite 
intelligence. This infinite existence I call eternity, 
This can be attributed to God alone, not to created ob- 
jects, even though they have no end. So much con- 
cerning eternity. I shall say nothing of the necessity 
of God's being, for after we have demonstrated His 
existence from His essence this would be useless. 
Hence we proceed to unity. 

Chapter II. 

Concerning the Unity of God. 

We have often wondered at the futile arguments 
by which some have sought to establish the unity of 
God. For example, such as the following : " If one 
being is able to create the world, more than one would 
be superfluous ; and, if all things work toward some 
end, they must have a common source." Other sim- 
ilar arguments might be mentioned where proof is 
sought from relative or extrinsic elements. Since 



PART II 143 

such ideas are sometimes held, we shall, in the follow- 
ing order, and as clearly and as briefly as possible, 
give our demonstration. 

. , Among the attributes of God we 

God is a single 

being. enumerate perfect knowledge, and add 

that His perfection all arises from His own being. 
But if you say that there are many Gods or perfect 
beings, all of them must be omniscient. It would not 
be sufficient for each one merely to know himself. 
For as each is omniscient he must understand all other 
beings as well as himself. From which it would fol- 
low that the omniscience of each depends partly upon 
himself and partly upon another. Therefore such a 
being would not be absolutely perfect. That is, God 
would not be a being who derives all of his perfection 
from Himself. But we have already shown that God 
is in every way perfect and that He exists by virtue 
of His own power. From which we conclude that 
God is one being. For if there were many gods it 
would follow that the absolutely perfect being would 
have an imperfection, which is absurd. So much con- 
cerning the unity of God. 

Chapter III. 
Concerning the greatness of God. 



We said above that finite or im- 

is called infinite, 

in whi 

great. 



In what sense God perfect bdng cannQt be conce i ve d, ex- 
cept we first have some concept of in- 
finite and perfect being, i. e., of God. 
Therefore God alone can be said to be absolutely in- 
finite, since He alone possesses an infinite perfection. 
He may be called great, however, or interminable, so 



144 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

far as we think that there is no being able to impose 
limitations upon Him. From which it follows that 
the infinity of God — • an inapt expression — is some- 
thing essentially positive. For, so far as we conceive 
Him to be infinite, so far we have reference to His 
essence or His absolute perfection. The greatness of 
God is but a relative term; it is not used when we 
consider God as an absolute or perfect being, but only 
so far as He is considered as a " first cause." Here, 
although He may not be perfect except in respect to 
the creation of the world, nevertheless He is to be 
considered great. For no being can be conceived, 
and consequently there is no being more perfect than 
God by which He can be limited or measured. (Con- 
cerning this see Ax. 9, Pt. I.). 

There are some authors who, when 
what is generally they speak of the greatness of God, 

understood by the 

greatness of God. seem to attribute quantity to Him. 
They do this because from this attri- 
bute they wish to conclude that God is everywhere 
present. As if they thought that, were God not in 
every place He is limited. This is even more appar- 
ent in the reasons they adduce to show that God is 
infinite or great (for they confuse these terms). If 
God, they say, is actus purus, as from necessity He is, 
He is everywhere present and infinite ; for if He is 
not in every place either He is not able to be wherever 
He wishes or from necessity (N. B.) He must be 
moved. From this it is evident that they attribute 
greatness to God under the concept of quantity. From 
the properties of extension they look for their argu- 
ments for affirming the greatness of God, which is 
absurd. 



PART II 145 

If now you ask us how we prove 

God is proven to be . „ . . . 

everywhere that (jOu is everywhere present, we 

presenU respond that this has already been 

clearly proven above, when we showed that nothing 

could exist even for a single moment unless procreated 

continually by the power of God. 

Before we can fully understand the 

God's omnipresence . r ^ , , 

cannot be omnipresence 01 God, we must under- 

stand the nature of the divine Will. 
For by this all things have been created, and are con- 
tinually preserved. Since this is beyond the limits of 
human knowledge, it is impossible to explain His om- 
nipresence. 

There are some who think that 

God's greatness „, t , , r . t 

sometimes said to God s greatness is three-fold, namely, 

be threefold. tt • i tt- • tt- 

Me is great in His essence, in His 
power, and in His efficacy. But this is nonsense, for 
they distinguish between God's essence and His 
power. 

Others affirm the same thing more 
G t S bllStin- n0t openly when they say that God is 
essence. fr ° m *" everywhere in power, but not in es- 
sence. As if God's power could be 
distinguished from His other attributes or from His 
infinite essence, when it is nothing else but this. For 
if it were anything but this it would either be some- 
thing created or some accident of the divine essence, 
without which He could still be conceived. But these 
suppositions are both absurd. If it were something 
created it would need God's power to be conserved, 
and so a progression to infinity would be given. But 
if it were some accident of His being, God would not 
be a simple being, which is contrary to what was 
demonstrated above. 



146 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

Nor can his Finally, by the greatness of His efn- 

ommpresence. caC y ^y ^^ to un( j ers tand some- 
thing beside the essence of God by which all things 
are created and conserved. Which is clearly a great 
absurdity, and one into which they fall, because they 
confuse the divine intellect and the human, and com- 
pare God's power with the power of kings. 

Chapter IV. 
Concerning God's Immutability. 

By the term change we here understand all that 
variation which can be given, the essence of the object 
remaining the same. In general, this signifies the 
disintegration of the object, not absolutely,' but at 
least incipiently ; as when we say that turf is changed 
into ashes, or that men are changed into beasts. Phi- 
losophers have been accustomed to use another term 
for signifying this, viz., transformation. But we are 
here speaking of a change which is not a transforma- 
tion, as when we say the rock has changed its color, 
character, etc. 

We must ask now whether there is 
T ™o lsf pfaT\°n Got an >' changeableness in God. For con- 
cerning transformation it is not neces- 
sary to say anything more than that God exists neces- 
sarily ; that is, God cannot be limited in any way, or 
be transformed into another God. For as soon as He 
is limited there must be other gods, which proposition 
we have shown to be absurd. 
The causes of ^ n order that we may understand 

change. more fully what has just been said, we 

should remember that all change arises from some 



PART II 147 

external cause, the subject being willing or unwilling, 
or from some internal cause, viz., from the choice of 
the subject itself. For example, men are black, or 
they grow older and stronger, etc. In the former 
case the subject is unwilling, in the latter the sub- 
ject himself desires it. To desire to walk, to show 
oneself angry, etc., come from internal causes. 

Changes of the former kind, name- 

God is not changed , , 111 1 

by any other ly, those produced by some external 
eMg ' cause, are not found in God, for He 

alone is the cause of all things, and is not changed 
by anything He has made. Beside, created objects 
have in themselves no power of existence, and so much 
less of causality over other objects. And although in 
the Scripture it is said that God is angry and sad on 
account of the sins of men, the effect is here taken for 
the cause. In the same way we say that the sun is 
stronger and higher in summer than in winter, al- 
though it has not changed its position or increased its 
power. That such things are often taught in the Sa- 
cred Scriptures is seen in Isaiah when he says, ch. 
52 :2, accusing the people : " Your iniquities have 
separated you from your God." 

Nor even by We continue, then, and ask whether 

himself. there is any self-caused change in God. 

This also we at once deny, for all change that arises 
from volition is made in order that the subject may 
pass to a better state, which is impossible with a per- 
fect being. Such a change only arises as a means of 
avoiding something unpleasant or to acquire some 
good which is wanting. But neither of these condi- 
tions is possible with God. Therefore we conclude 
that God is immutable. 1 

1 Note. — It will be evident, also, that God is immutable, 



148 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA.. 

It will be noted that I have deliberately omitted 
the ordinary forms of change, although to some 
degree we have also considered them. For there is 
no need to show the impossibility of change in God 
in respect to every point, since we have demonstrated 
in Prop. 1 6, Part I., that God is incorporeal and that 
these ordinary forms of change apply only to matter. 

Chapter V. 

Concerning the Simplicity of God. 

We proceed to the simplicity of 
T tinltion of things God. In order to correctly under- 
ZrfatiTnah' stand this attribute of God we should 
recall what Descartes said in the 
" Prin. of Phil./*' Part I., Arts. 48 and 49, viz., that in 
nature we know only substances and their modes. 
From this comes the distinction, Arts. 60, 61, and 62, 
of things as real and modal, and rational. That is 
called real which distinguishes two substances from 
one another, whether two different substances, or at- 
tributes of the same substance ; as for example, 
thought and extension or different parts of matter. 
These we know are different because each may be con- 
ceived apart from the other, and consequently may so 
exist. Modal distinctions are of two kinds, namely, 
that between a mode of a substance and the substance 
itself, and that between two modes of one substance. 
The first we recognize because while one mode may be 
conceived without another, neither can exist apart from 
the substance whose modes they are ; the second be- 
when we have shown that His volition and His understanding 
are the same. This might be proven by other arguments also. 



PART II M'J 

cause while substance can be conceived without its 
modes, modes cannot be conceived apart from sub- 
stance. Finally, a rational distinction is that arising 
between substance and its attributes, as, for example, 
when duration is distinguished from extension. We 
recognize this distinction because substance cannot be 
understood without that attribute. 

From these three forms of things 

Wh tlons arlstand a11 forms of combination arise. The 
how many forms £ rst f orm j s t j iat ma de by the combina- 

there are. J • 

tion of two or more substances, the 
attributes being the same, as the combination of bodies, 
or the attributes being different, as in man. The sec- 
ond class is made by the union of different modes. 
The third is not made in reality, but only conceived 
as made in-order to better understand objects. What 
does not come under the first two of these heads is not 
composite, but simple in its nature. 

From this it may be shown that God 
G °PoJte but simple, is not composite, but simple being. 

For it is a self-evident fact that the 
component parts of a composite object are prior in na- 
ture to the object itself. Then those substances from 
which God is composed are necessarily prior in their 
nature to God Himself. Each could then be con- 
ceived in itself apart from the concept of God. Each 
part, therefore, could exist per se and we would have 
as many gods as there are substances from which God 
is supposed to be composed. For when each part can 
exist per se it must exist by its own power. Under 
these conditions (as we have shown in Prop. 7, Pt. 
L, where we demonstrated the existence of God) it 
will have the power of giving to itself all the perfec- 
tion of God. As nothing could be more absurd than 



i 5 o THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

this, we conclude that God is not composite, that is, 
made by the coalition and union of substances. The 
same conclusion is also evident from the fact that 
there are no modes in God's being; for modes arise 
from the change of substances (vid. Principles, Pt. I., 
Art. 56). Finally, if any one wishes to conceive of 
some other combination of the essence and of the ex- 
istence of things, we will not say him nay. Only he 
should remember that there are not two separate 
things in God. 

We may conclude, therefore, that all 

The attributes of .1 j- ,• ,■ 1 1 , 

God are only dis- the distinctions we make m regard to 

tingmshed by the attributes Q f God are not real but 

rational distinctions. Let it be under- 
stood that such distinctions as I have just made are 
distinctions of reason, which may be known from the 
fact that such a substance could not exist without this 
attribute. Therefore, we conclude that God is sim- 
ple being. We do not care for the other minor dis- 
tinctions of the Peripatetics, and proceed, therefore, 
to the life of God. 



Chapter VI. 
Concerning the Life of God. 

In order that we may rightly under- 

What Philosophers 1 1 • m <• 1 1 • r r /— 1 

in general under- stand this attribute of the life of God, 

stand by life. ., • ,< ... 

it is necessary that we explain in gen- 
eral what is meant by this term. Here we may ex- 
amine first the opinion of the Peripatetics. They un- 
derstood by life the continuance of support to the soul 
by means of heat (Vid. Aristotle, Bk. I., de Respirat. 
8). And, because they had three classes of minds, 



PART II 151 

viz., vegetative, sensative and intellectual, which they 
attribute to plants, animals and men respectively, it 
follows that they assume that other objects do not 
have life. But they did not dare to say that minds 
and God do not possess life. They feared perhaps 
lest if they denied life to them they must also deny 
death as well. Therefore, Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 
II., chap. 7, gives another definition of life peculiar 
to minds, namely : " Life is the operation of the in- 
tellect." In this sense he attributes life to God who 
is a cognitive being and is pure activity. We will not 
be delayed long to refute these conceptions, for what 
pertains to these three kinds of life which they attrib- 
ute to plants and animals and men, we have already 
shown to be mere fiction. For we showed that there 
is nothing in matter except mechanical form and ac- 
tion. Moreover, what pertains to the life of God re- 
lates no more to an act of the understanding than to 
an act of will or any other faculty. But since I ex- 
pect no response to what I have said, I pass on and 
endeavor to explain what life really is. 

Although this term life, by a trans- 
T °n$b.'!SS8J%. f erence of meaning, is often taken to 
signify the customs of a people or of 
an individual, we shall briefly explain its correct phi- 
losophical use. It should be noted that if life is at- 
tributed to corporeal things, then nothing is void of 
life; but if only to those objects where spirit is united 
to body, then only to men or perhaps also to the lower 
animals, but not to minds or to God. In truth, since 
the term is a broad one, it should doubtlessly be at- 
tributed to corporeal objects, to minds united to, and 
to minds separated from corporeal body. 



152 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

Therefore we will understand by 
general, and'what this term life, the 'power through 
which an object preserves its own be- 
ing. And although that power in different objects is 
very different, we still very properly say that those ob- 
jects have life. Moreover, the power by which God 
preserves His being is nothing else than His essence. 
Therefore they speak most truly, who say that God 
is Life. Nor are there wanting theologians who be- 
lieve that it was for this very reason that the Jews 
when they made a vow swore by living Jehovah, not 
by the life of Jehovah, as did Joseph when he swore by 
the life of Pharaoh and said the " life of Pharaoh/' 



Chapter VII. 
Concerning the Understanding of God. 

Among the attributes of God we 

God is omniscient. , , 

nave enumerated omniscience as neces- 
sary to His being. For knowledge is an element of 
perfection, and God, who is in every way perfect, must 
possess this attribute. Therefore knowledge to the 
highest degree must be attributed to God, a knowledge 
so complete that it allows no ignorance or defect of 
intelligence. Were it not so we would have an im- 
perfection in the attributes of God and so in God 
Himself. From this it follows that God's knowledge 
is immediate, and that He does not reason by logical 
processes. 

And further, from God's perfection, 

The objects of . f . i 

God's knowledge it follows that His ideas are not lim- 

apart from His ited like ours to objects apart from 

emg ' Himself. On the contrary, God by 



PART II 153 

His own power has created objects existing apart from 
Himself, but they were determined by His under- 
standing. 1 Otherwise they would have their nature 
and essence in themselves and would be by nature 
prior to God, which is absurd. Certain ones, because 
they have not remembered this, have fallen into egreg- 
ious blunders. There are some who think that matter 
exists in its own power apart from God, and yet co- 
eternal with Him, and that God, knowing this, has 
merely set it in a reproducing order and impressed 
other forms on it from without. Then others believe 
that things are by nature necessary, or impossible, or 
contingent, and so far as God knows them as con- 
tingent is ignorant whether they exist or not. Finally, 
others say that God recognizes contingent being from 
its environment because, perchance, He has had a long 
experience. Beside these, there are other errors of 
like nature, to which I might refer were it not useless 
to so do. For from what has been said, the falsity of 
these is evident. 

We revert now to our proposition, 

But God himself. . \, l . 

namely, that independent of God there 
are no objects of His knowledge, but that He Himself 
is the object of His Knowledge, indeed He is that 
knowledge. Those who think that the world is the 
object of God's knowledge are far less wise than those 
who wish some building planned by a great architect 
to be considered the object of their knowledge. For 
the artificer is compelled to seek for suitable material 
outside of himself; but God sought no material out- 



1 It clearly follows, therefore, that the understanding of 
God by which he knows all created objects, and His will and 
power which determined them are one and the same thing. 



154 



THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 



side of Himself, but things, in essence and in exist- 
ence, were made by His understanding or will. 
in what way God It may be asked, then, whether God 
tZ7on Si vf' dlS ' knows evil and sin > and distinction of 
reason, etc. reason, etc. We reply that God nec- 

essarily must know those things of which He is the 
cause. Especially since nothing can exist for a single 
moment except by the concurrence of the divine will. 
Therefore, since evil and sin are nothing in things, 
but only in the human mind as it compares things 
with one another, it follows that God does not know 
these independent of the human mind. Distinctions 
of reason we have said are only modes of thought, 
hence they, too, should be known so far as He con- 
serves the human mind. Not, however, that God has 
such modes of thought in order that He may the more 
easily retain what He knows. Provided one carefully 
attends to these few remarks, there is no question 
that can be asked about God's understanding which 
cannot easily be answered. 

But meanwhile, we must not over- 
God's knowledge of look the error of those who think that 

universals, and of ^ + < , , . . •', 

particular truths. God knows nothing except eternal 
truth, e. g., angels and the heavens 
which they think are by nature without beginning and 
without end. Beside, in this world nothing but ideas 
are without a beginning and unchanging. They seem 
to err from choice and to wish to keep up some ob- 
scurity. What, indeed, is more absurd than to deny 
God's knowledge of individual things, which cannot 
exist for a single moment without His sustaining 
power ! Then they maintain that God is ignorant of 
things which actually exist, but knows universals 
which do not exist or have any essence apart from 



PART II 155 

these individual objects. On the contrary, we would 
attribute to God a complete cognition of individual 
things, but deny the knowledge of universals except 
so far as He understands the human mind. 

Finally, before ending this discus- 

Tkere is but one 

simple idea in sion, it seems necessary to give some 
answer to those who inquire whether 
God has many ideas or only one simple idea. To this 
I respond that the idea of God because of which He 
is called omniscient is one and simple. For God is 
called omniscient only because He has an idea of Him- 
self. This idea, or knowledge, since it exists with 
God, is nothing else than His essence, nor, indeed, 
could it possibly be anything but this. 

God's cognition of created objects 

What God's knowl- , , . , 1 1 ' 1 

edge of created cannot properly be said to be knowl- 
jec> edge. For if God so chose, these ob- 

jects might have some other essence which has no 
place in His cognition of them. Nevertheless, it is 
often asked whether His cognition of objects is mani- 
fold or simple. To this we would reply, that this 
question is like those which inquire whether God's 
decrees and acts of will are one or many ; and whether 
God is omnipresent, or whether His concurrence, by 
which separate objects are preserved, is the same for 
all things. Concerning such questions, as I have al- 
ready said, we have no certain knowledge. Yet, in 
the same way, we very certainly know that this con- 
currence of God, if it is correlated with his omnipo- 
tence, must be unitary, although its effect is manifested 
in various ways. So also the voluntary acts and de- 
crees of God (for we may so call His cognition of the 
world), considered as in God, are not many although 
through created objects (or better in created objects), 



I.S6 THE CO GIT AT A METAPHYSICA 

they are variously expressed. Finally, if we consider 
the analogy of nature as a whole, we are able to con- 
sider it as one being, and consequently the idea or 
decree of Natura naturata will be but one. 

Chapter VIII. 

Concerning God's Will. 

We cannot distin- The will of God, by which He 

guish between ' J 

God's essence, chooses to love Himself, follows nec- 

His understand- 
ing by which He essarily from His understanding, by 

knows Himself, , 

and His will by which He knows Himself. But we 

which He loves , , , * TT . ., TT . 

Himself. do not know now His essence and His 

understanding, by which he knows Himself, differ 
from His will, by which he chooses to love Himself. 
Nor does the term personality, which theologians use 
to explain this, escape our notice. Although we are 
not ignorant of the term, we are ignorant of its sig- 
nificance, and unable to form any clear and distinct 
concept of its content. Nevertheless, we consistently 
believe in the beatific vision of God, which is promised 
to faithful ones that this would be revealed to them. 
God's will and As is sufficiently clear from the 

aTZje^'cat preceding, God's will and power con- 
not be distin- s id ere d objectivelv cannot be distin- 

guished from His J 

understanding. guished from His understanding. 
For we have made it clear that God has not only 
decreed that things should exist, but also what char- 
acter they should have, i. e., their essence and existence 
depend upon the will and power of God. From this 
we see that God's understanding and power, and will, 
by which He created and understands, and conserves 



PART II 1 5.7 

or loves the world, cannot be distinguished from one 

another except in respect to our understanding. 

it is improperly Moreover, when we say that God 

said that God 111 , • , 1 • • 1 • r 1 

hates certain holds certain things in disiavor, and 

things and loves 1 .1 .1 • ■ 1 r 

others. loves others, this is spoken figura- 

tively, as when the Scriptures say that the earth shall 
bring forth men. That God is not angry with any 
one, nor loves any one in the sense that people 
ordinarily believe, is evident from the Scriptures 
themselves. So Isaiah says, and more clearly the 
Apostle to the Romans, chapter 9 : "For the children 
being not yet born, neither having done any good or 
evil, that the purposes of God according to election 
might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth, 
that the older shall serve the younger, etc." And a 
little below : " Therefore, hath he mercy on whom he 
will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. 
Thou wilt say then unto me : Why doth he yet find 
fault? For who hath resisted his will? Nay, but, 
O man, who art thou that repliest against God? 
Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, 
Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter 
power pver the clay, of the same lump to make one 
vessel to honor, and another to dishonor ? " etc. 
TJ/ , n . . If then, you ask : Why, then, ddes 

Why God admon- ' J J ' ' 

ishes men; why God admonish men? To this it mav 

He does not save 

them without ad- be responded, that God has decreed 

monishment ; and . . 

why the wicked from eternity to admonish them at a 
given time in order that those whom 
He wished to save might be converted. 

If you inquire further : Whether God was not able 
to save them without this admonishment, we respond 
that He was. Why, then, does He not thus save them, 
you might inquire. To this I will reply after you 



158 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

have told me why He did not make the Red Sea pass- 
able without a strong east wind, and why He does not 
make things to move without the agency of other 
things, and an infinite number of other things which 
He does by means of mediating causes. Then you 
will ask : Why are the wicked punished, since, because 
of their nature, they clearly fulfill the divine decree? 
I respond that it is also according to the divine decree 
that they should be punished. And if only those 
whom we believe to sin from choice should be pun- 
ished, why do men attempt to exterminate venomous 
serpents? for they only act according to their nature, 
nor are they able to do otherwise. 

Finally, if there are other things 

The Scriptures 1 • 1 ,1 1 r> • 1 

teach nothing which occur in the sacred Scriptures 
To l the % Ltma 1 of y which may be mentioned as points 
Nature - worthy of examination this is not the 

place to explain them. Here we would merely inquire 
into those things which we are able to deduce with 
certainty from Natural Reason, and it is sufficient if 
we make it evident that the Sacred Pages ought to 
teach the same things. For truth is not at variance 
with truth, nor do the Scriptures teach the nonsense 
that the multitude believe. For if we find anything 
in them contrary to the laws of Reason we should 
refute that with the same freedom that we refute such 
statements in the Koran or the Talmud. However, 
there is no reason to think that the Sacred Writings 
contain anything opposed to the Natural Reason. 



PART J I i-sg 

Chapter IX. 

Concerning the Power of God. 

We have demonstrated above that 

How we should ^ , TT M1 

understand God's God is omnipotent. Here we will 
only briefly explain in what terms this 
attribute shall be understood. There are many who 
discuss this that do not speak with sufficient fullness. 
They say certain things are possible from God's 
nature not from His decrees, and that some things are 
impossible, others necessary. God's omnipotence has 
a place only in regard to possible things. But we, 
since we have already shown that all things depend 
absolutely upon the decrees of God, say that He is 
really omnipotent. And, since we know that He has 
decreed certain things from His freedom of will and is 
immutable, we conclude that nothing can happen con- 
trary to His decrees, and that nothing is impossible 
except that which is opposed to the perfection of 
God. 

Ail things are neces- But perhaps some one will argue 
\he y deoZTof f ° that we find some things necessary 
God; not some f rom t h e decrees of God and others 

in themselves, 

and others in for some other reason. For example, 

respect to these . 

decrees. that J osiah should burn incense upon 

the altars of the idols of Jeroboam. For if we con- 
sider merely the will of Josiah, we will adjudge the 
thing to be merely possible ; nor can it be said to have 
been necessary in any other sense than that the 
Prophet had commanded it as being the decree of God. 
But that the three angles of a triangle are equal 10 
two right angles is self-evident. It is only on account 



160 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

of man's ignorance that these distinctions are made. 
For if men clearly understood the whole order of 
Nature they would find all things as determined and 
as necessary as Mathematics. But as this is beyond 
human power we conceive some things to be merely 
possible, others necessary. Therefore, we must either 
say that God is powerless, since all things are deter- 
mined, or that He is all powerful, and that all neces- 
sity rests upon the decrees of God. 
if God had made If now, it is asked if God had 
HTZJfhZT' created the world different from its 
given us other present order, and what is now truth 

powers of under- r 7 

standing. were error, would we still believe the 

same things to be true? We would if God left our 
nature as it is. But it would also be possible, if He 
wished to give us such a nature, as He has indeed 
done, for us to understand the nature and laws of 
things just as they are planned by God. Indeed, if 
we consider God's veracity He ought so to create us. 
This is also evident from what we have said above, 
namely, that Natura 'naturata must be considered as 
unitary. Whence it follows that man is a part of 
Nature, and ought to be in accord with the world 
about him. Therefore, from this simplicity of God's 
decrees it follows that if God had created things in 
some other way He would have so made us that we 
would understand them as they Avere created. So 
while we desire to retain this distinction which 
philosophers in general lay down, viz., the power of 
God, we are compelled to explain it differently. 
How many kinds of We > therefore, divide God's power 

power in God. j nto two classes. His regulative 
power, and His absolute power. 



PART II 161 

God's power is called absolute when 

What absolute, . . TT . . .,, 

what regulative, we consider His omnipotence without 
and what™ regard to His decrees. We call it 

extraordinary. regu \ at i ve wnen we have regard to 

His decrees. 

We also say God's power is natural or supernatural. 
That is natural by which the world is preserved in its 
fixed order. That is called supernatural which causes 
something outside of the order of Nature, as for ex- 
ample, all miracles, such as various appearance of 
angels, etc. Concerning the latter point there is 
evidently some room for doubt. Still it would seem 
to be a greater miracle if God should always govern 
the world by the same fixed and unchanging laws, 
than if at times, on account of the foolishness of men, 
He should interrupt the laws and order of Nature 
which He from free choice has ordained. (This no 
one, except he be mentally blind, can deny.) But we 
leave this for theologians to discuss. 

Finally, there are some other questions often asked 
concerning the power of God : For example, whether 
God's power extends to events already past ; or 
whether He might not have created more objects than 
he did? We do not answer these, however, for their 
answer is easily seen from what has been said. 

Chapter X. 

Concerning Creation. 

It has already been said that God has created the 
world. We shall only attempt here, therefore, to ex- 
plain what is meant by the term creation, after which 
some opinions on the subject will be carefully ex- 
amined. We will begin at the beginning. 



162 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

We say, therefore, that creation is 

What creation is. , ,. . , . T 

an operation in zvhich no causes ex- 
cept an efficient one concur. Or, a created object is 
one which presupposes for its existence nothing 
except God. 

It should be noted (i) that we have 
The ordinary defini- here omitted those words which 

tion is rejected. 

philosophers insert in their definition, 
viz., ex nihilo, as if nothing were some matter from 
which things are produced. Because they are accus- 
tomed to speak in this way, and to think always of 
something preceding the given objects, they are not 
able, in speaking of creation, to omit this particle ex. 
The same thing is true concerning matter. Because 
all bodies are seen in some position, and surrounded 
by other objects, when they are asked where matter 
is, they reply, that it is in some imaginary space. 
Therefore, it is clear that they do not consider nothing 
as a mere negation of all reality, but believe or im- 
agine it to be a something real. 

2. It should be noted also, that I 
^%7ained? Perly said in creation no causes concur ex- 
cept one efficient one. I might have 
said that creation negates or excludes all causes except 
this one. I 'did not choose to do this, however, lest I 
should be compelled to respond to those who ask 
whether God had no predetermined end in Himself 
for the sake of which He created the world. To make 
the definition clearer I added that the created object 
presupposes nothing except God. For, if God had 
predetermined some end it evidently was not inde- 
pendent of Him, for there is nothing apart from God 
by which His decrees are influenced or changed. 



PART II 163 

3. It follows from this definition 

Accidents and . . t 1 j , 

modes were not that accidents and modes were not 
created, for they presuppose some 
created substance beside God. 

4. Finally, it should be noted that 

Time or duration . . . , . -. . 

did not exist before creation time or duration did 

before creation. • . ,1 1 • 

not exist, nor can they even be im- 
agined. For time is a measure of duration, or rather 
it is only a form of thought. Therefore, it not only 
presupposes the created world, but it depends espe- 
cially upon human thought. Moreover, duration is 
limited by the existence of created objects, and hence 
began when the world began. I say limited by the 
existence of created objects for eternity alone relates 
to God as we have shown sufficiently above. Hence, 
duration presupposes that the world has been created 
or at least that it exists. 

It is evident that they who think duration and time 
existed before the world was created, are laboring un- 
der the same prejudice as they who conceive of space 
apart from matter. So much for the definition of 
creation. 

The work of creat- There is n ° need t0 re P eat what is 

ing and preserv- g[ yen j n Axiom io, Part I. viz., that 

mg the world ° ' 

are the same. no m0 re power is needed to create 
than to preserve the world. God's work in creating 
and preserving the world is the same. 

Having recalled this point, we proceed to inquire 
first, what is created and what uncreated, and second, 
whether what is created has existed from eternity. 
To the first inquiry we respond 
W %tatld? gs are briefl y> tha t everything has been created 
whose essence is clearly conceived 
even without existence, and yet is conceived per se ; 



i<54 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

as e. g., matter of which we have a clear and a distinct 
concept when we conceive it under the attribute exten- 
sion, whether we think that it exists or not. 

But perhaps some one may say that 

How God's knowl- . . . , . . . . . 

edge differs from we nave clear and distinct knowledge 
even when the object does not exist, 
and yet attribute this knowledge to God. To this we 
reply that we do not say that God's knowledge is like 
ours, limited by nature, but is pure activity involving 
existence, as we have shown over and over. For we 
have shown that God's understanding and will cannot 
be distinguished from His power or from His essence 
which involves existence. 

Nothing independ- S ince everything, the essence of 
e cV-ete f mui° d iJth which does not involve existence, has 
Him - been created in its existing form and 

continually conserved by the power of God, we will not 
pause to refute the opinion of those who think that the 
world as chaos, or as matter devoid of form, is co-eter- 
nal with God, and so far independent of Him. There- 
fore we pass on to the second point, and ask whether 
what has been created could have existed from eternity. 
What is meant by In order to understand the point just 

the expression . , . ... 

from eternity. raised we must consider the expression 
from eternity. For we wish to signify by these words 
something different from the eternity of God. By this 
expression we now mean duration from the beginning 
of duration, or such a duration that although numbers 
were multiplied through thousands of years, and this 
product again by millions of millions, we would still 
be unable to express its magnitude. 

It is evident that such duration is 

The world cannot . .« 

have existed from impossible ; for if the world could have 
begun at any fixed time then its dura- 



PART II 165 

tion were too short to satisfy these conditions. 
Therefore, the world cannot have endured from such a 
beginning to the present. But perhaps you say since 
God is omnipotent nothing is impossible, and He could 
have given to the world a duration than which no longer 
can be conceived. We reply that God, because He is 
omnipotent, would never have given such a duration 
to the world. For the very character of duration is 
that it can always be conceived as greater or less, as in 
the case of number. You may insist, however, that 
God has existed from eternity, and since He has per- 
dured all this time there is a duration given, so great 
that no greater is conceivable. But in this way a dura- 
tion composed of parts is attributed to God, which idea 
has been refuted sufficiently when we demonstrated 
that eternity, not duration, belongs to God. Would 
that men might remember this ! For then they could 
easily extricate themselves from many arguments and 
absurdities, and would turn with the greatest delight 
to the blessed contemplation of God. Nevertheless we 
proceed to respond to the arguments of those who 
attempt to show the possibility of such an infinite 
duration from some fixed time in the past. 

„ , . In the first place it is said that the 

Because God is 

eternal, it does thing produced must be co-existent 

not follow that •,-,•. a 1 • r* 1 1 

the things he has With ltS caUSC Alld SlllCe God lias 

TsteY from^ existed from eternity the effects of His 
being ought to be eternal. This argu- 
ment is supported by reference to the Son of God, who 
has existed with the Father from eternity. It is 
evident that they confuse eternity with duration, and 
only attribute to God a duration from eternity. This 
is shown, too, in the example cited. The same eter- 
nity which they attribute to the Son of God they think 



166 THE COGITATA METAPHYS1CA 

can be attributed to created objects. They imagine 
time and duration to have been instituted before the 
world began, and think of duration apart from created 
objects as some think of eternity as independent of 
God. That both opinions are wrong is now evident. 
So we respond that it is not true that God was able to 
communicate His eternity to the world. Neither was 
the Son of God created, but was eternal like the Father. 
When we say that the Father had begotten the Son 
from eternity we only mean that the Father has always 
shared His eternity with the Son. 

In the second place it is argued that 
if God acts from when God acts from choice, He is not 

necessity he is not 

infinite in virtue, less powerful than when He acts from 
necessity. But if God acts from neces- 
sity, since Fie is infinite in virtue, He must have created 
the world from eternity. It is easy to reply to this 
argument if we consider its basis. For these same 
good men presume that they may hold conflicting ideas 
concerning a being of infinite virtue. They conceive 
of God, a being of infinite virtue, as acting both from 
necessity and from choice. But we deny that God, if 
He acts from necessity, is a being of infinite virtue. 
Which action is justified, indeed, and must of necessity 
be conceded even by those same men when we have 
shown that a perfect being must be free, and can only 
be conceived as unitary. Should they reply that it is 
possible to suppose that God acting from necessity is 
still infinite in His virtue, we would reply that we are 
not at liberty to suppose this, any more than we are at 
liberty to suppose a square circle in order to conclude 
that all lines drawn from the center to the circumfer- 
ence are not equal. And this, we repeat, is sufficiently 
proven from what has been said above. We have 



PART II 167 

proven that there is no duration that may not be con- 
ceived as greater or less or even double as great. If 
God acts from free choice it may be created as greater 
or less. But if God acts from necessity this by no 
means follows. Under the latter supposition only those 
things which follow from His nature can be realized, 
not an infinite number of hypothetical results. There- 
fore, it may be argued in a few words : If God should 
create a duration so great that no greater could be 
given He necessarily diminishes His own power. And 
this is impossible for His essence and His power are 
one and the same thing. Therefore, etc., and further, 
if God acts from necessity, He must have created a 
duration, than which no greater can be conceived. 
But had God created such a duration He would not 
have been of infinite virtue. For we are always able 
to conceive of a duration greater than the one given. 
Therefore, if God acts from the necessity of His nature 
He is not of infinite virtue. 

A point which may be a difficulty 

Whence we have a . . r . - 

concept of a du- to some here presents itseli, viz., that 
r than n any ea actuaiiy although the world has only been 
gtven ' created some five thousand years, if 

our chronology is correct, we are nevertheless able to 
conceive of a much greater duration, and this notwith- 
standing we have said above that duration depends 
upon created objects. The difficulty will disappear 
if we remember that our ideas of duration arise not 
only as we contemplate created objects, but from' re- 
flection upon God's infinite power, in creating them. 
For we do not think of objects existing per sc, but 
only through the infinite power of God. Vid. Prop. 
12, Pt. I. and Coroll. 

Finally lest we consume too much time with these 



i68 THE C0G1TATA METAPHYS1CA 

futile arguments, but two things need to be kept in 
mind : ( I ) The distinction between duration and 
eternity, and (2) that the former without created ob- 
jects, and the latter without God are non-intelligible. 
These things being kept in mind it is easy to answer 
all these arguments. So we need delay no longer upon 
this point. 

Chapter XI. 
Concerning the Concurrence of God. 

About this attribute of God little or nothing remains 
to be said after we have shown that each single mo- 
ment God creates things as if anew. From this we 
have shown that objects have no power of self deter- 
mination or of operation in themselves. And this 
holds true in the human will. as well as in all other 
objects. Then we replied to certain arguments per- 
taining to this. And, although many other objections 
are often raised, since these relate more especially to 
Theology we shall not discuss them here. 

Nevertheless, since there are many who admit and 
believe in this conserving power of God, but in a 
different sense from us, we shall recall what has 
already been proven in order that we may detect this 
fallacy. We have already clearly shown that present 
time has no connection with future time (Vid. Ax. 
10, Pt. I.). Provided we consistently remember this, 
we shall be able without difficulty to reply to all the 
objections of these philosophers. 

H 7on h lUsZ se de. a ' But lest we take up this subject 

\Ttct ng things without result we will reply in passing 

to the inquiry whether an additional element of God's 



PART 11 169 

power is needed to begin some action in things. When 
speaking of motion this same question appeared and 
we then gave our answer. For we said that God con- 
stantly preserves the same amount of motion in nature. 
If, therefore, we consider the total amount of matter 
in motion nothing is added. But in respect to particu- 
lar things there is an additional element given. It 
does not seem, however, that the same thing can be 
said of mental phenomena. For it does not appear 
that they are related the one to the other in this way. 
Then, finally, since the parts of duration do not have 
a casual connection, we speak more truly to say then 
that God continually procreates than to say that he 
conserves them. Therefore, if man at a particular 
moment is free to choose some course of action it must 
be said that God at the present time so creates him. 
To this it is no objection that the human will is often 
determined by external influences, and that all nature 
is inter-related and mutually determining. For this 
also is so ordained of God. Indeed, nothing deter- 
mines the will nor does the will determine anything ex- 
cept through the power of God. We confess that we 
are ignorant of how this may not be opposed to human 
freedom, or how God can ordain this and still preserve 
the freedom of man. This we have already admitted. 
These are the things I had decided 

The ordinary ax- 

vision of the at- to say concerning the attributes of 

tfibtltSS is YiXOYQ 

of name than of God. No satisfactory division of 
them has yet been made. The divi- 
sion given by some, who divide God's attributes into 
incommunicable and communicable attributes seems 
more nominal than real. For the knowledge of God 
is no more like human knowledge than the Dogstar is 
like a barking dog, and perhaps it is even less similar. 



.;o THE COGITATA METAPHYS1CA 

We would offer this classification : 
T1 7he Cl author H ° n ° f There are some attributes which ex- 
plain God's essence, and others that tell 
nothing- of His reality but only explain the modes of 
His existence. Of the latter kind are Unity, Eternity, 
Necessity, etc. ; of the former Understanding, Volition, 
Life, Omnipotence, etc. This division is clear and 
perspicuous and comprehends all the attributes of God. 

Chapter XII. 

Concerning the tinman Mind. 

We pass now to created substance which we classify 
as extended and as thinking substance. By the 
former we understand matter or corporeal substance. 
By thinking substance we understand only human 
minds. 

Although angels are also created, 

Angels are objects ,, . i i , 

for consideration since they are not known by our nat- 
Vt% T the l °M7a. tural powers, they should not be re- 
physician. garded in Metaphysics. For their 

essence and existence are only known through revela- 
tion and so far they pertain only to Theology. Since 
the cognition of these beings is so entirely different 
from our ordinary form of knowledge the two should 
not be confused or classed together. No one should 
expect us, therefore, to discuss angels in this connec- 
tion. 

The human mind Wc turn, therefore, to the human 

d traLl7iln a , } tut \s mind concerning which a few things 
created by God; rem ain to be said. It will be noted 

but now, we do 

not know. that we say nothing concerning the 

time of its creation, for it is not clear just when it is 
created since it can exist without the body. But it is 



PART II 1 71 

evident that it does not arise by traduction for it would 
then have a place only in things already created, 
namely in modes of some substance. But substances, 
as we have plainly showed above, can be created only 
by the power of omnipotence. 

We shall add a few words concern- 
in what sense the ing immortality. It is evident that we 

human soul is r , , . . 

mortal. cannot say 01 any created object that 

its nature implies that it cannot be 
destroyed by the power of God. For he who has the 
power of creating an object has also the power of 
destroying it. Beside, as we have sufficiently shown 
above, no created object has in itself the power to 
exist, even for a moment, but in every case is con- 
tinually procreated by God. 

Although this is all true we all 
I '\mmo t rtai lse know that we have no concept of a 
destroyed object, as we have of an 
object disintegrated or of a generation of modes. For 
we can conceive clearly enough of the human organ- 
ism being destroyed but not of the annihilation of its 
substance. Then philosophy does not inquire what 
God by His omnipotence is able to do, but seeks to 
determine from nature itself what laws God has really 
given to the world. Therefore, what it concludes is 
rational and fixed it concludes is so from the laws 
of nature. However we would not deny that God is 
able to change these laws and all other things as well. 
Therefore, when speaking of the soul we do not in- 
quire what God is able to do but what follows from 
the laws of nature. 

Since it is true, as we have abun- 
its immortality dantly proven, that substance cannot 

demonstrated. J l . 

be destroyed either by its own power, 



172 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

or by the power of any other created substance, unless 
I am mistaken, it follows that we are compelled to 
believe from the laws of nature that the soul is im- 
mortal. And if we choose to investigate further, w r e 
can very clearly demonstrate that it is so. For as we 
have just shown, it follows from the laws of nature 
that the mind is immortal. And these laws of nature 
are the decrees of God, appointed by his will, as we 
have already made evident. Then beside, these laws 
are unchangeable. From all of this we conclude with 
certainty that God has revealed His immutable will 
concerning man's immortality, not only by revelation, 
but also by natural reason. 

It is no objection to this opinion, if 

GO cont°ran n tt but some one should say that at times God 
above Nature and sets as j ( j e t h ese natural laws in work- 

God is its author. 

ing miracles. For there are many 
thoughtful theologians who concede that God does not 
act contrary to, but above the laws of nature. That is, 
God has many laws of action which He has not made 
known to man ; and these if revealed to man would 
seem equally natural with the ones he already knows. 
Therefore it is evident that minds are immortal. I 
do not see that anything remains to be said concerning 
its nature. Nor, indeed, concerning its specific func- 
tions is there anything to add unless I respond to the 
argument of certain authors who attempt to show that 
our sense of perception is not to be accepted as true. 

There are some who think they can 

W tl S wTll 'to? free. sllOW that the wil1 is n0t free but 

always determined by something from 
without. They believe this because they think of the 
will as something distinct from the mind, a substance 
whose sole nature it is to be indifferent. In order to 



PART II 173 

remove all confusion on this subject we will explain 
the matter in such a way as to easily detect the fallacy 
of their arguments. 

We have said that the human mind 

What the will is. . . . . . 1 • , un -±. r 1 

is a thinking object. Whence it iol- 
lows that from its nature, and that alone considered, 
it is able to do something, viz., to think; that is, to 
affirm and to deny. These forms of thought are de- 
termined either by something extra-mental or by the 
mind itself. But since the mind is a substance itself 
whose essence it is to think, it follows that thought can 
and should arise from the mind itself. Those mental 
acts which know no other cause than the mind itself, 
are called volitions. And the human mind so far as 
it is considered as a sufficient cause for producing these 
thoughts is called Will. 

That the mind, though excited by 

There is a Will. 1 1 • - 1 

no external object has power to act, 
is sufficiently proven by the example of the ass of Buri- 
danus. For were a man instead of the ass placed in 
such a condition of equilibrium he would be regarded 
not as a thinking being but as a most stupid ass if he 
perished with thirst or hunger. Then this is evident 
also from the fact mentioned above, that we have 
willed to doubt everything, and not only to hold as 
doubtful those things which can be called in question, 
but also to expose what is false. (Vid. Principles of 
Descartes, Part I. Art. 39). 

Further, it should be remembered 

that, although the mind is influenced 
by external objects to affirm or deny, it is not com- 
pelled even here but retains its freedom. For nothing- 
has the power of destroying its essence. What it 
affirms or denies it is always free to. affirm or to denv 



174 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA 

as was shown by Descartes in the fourth Meditation. 
Therefore, if any one asks why the mind w T ills this or 
that, we reply that it is because the mind is a thinking 
being- whose very nature it is to wish, or to affirm 
or to deny. This is what it means to be a thinking 
being. 

Having stated our position we will 

It fu^dwith be desir n e: notice some arguments opposed to 
such a view. ( I ) Such is the argument : 
// the will can choose contrary to the last judgment 
of the understanding, if it is able to choose contrary to 
that which is best as determined by the understanding, 
it is able to choose evil for the sake of its evil. 
But this conclusion is absurd. Therefore in the first 
place it is evident that they do not understand what 
the will is. They confuse it with the desire the mind 
has after it affirms or denies something. They were 
taught this by their teacher who defined the will as 
desire for the sake of some good (appetitum sub ra- 
tione boni). We would say on the contrary that the 
will is the affirming that this is good or bad, as we 
plainly showed when discussing the cause of error, 
and found that this arises because the will extends 
further than the understanding. If the mind did not ', 
affirm this or that is good, thus exercising its free- J 
dom, it would not desire it. Therefore we would] 
reply to this argument by conceding that the mind 
cannot choose anything contrary to the last judgment 
of the understanding, that is, it cannot choose any-> 
thing so far as it is unwilling ; as is here supposed^ 
when we say that this thing is evil or that the mind 
does not choose it. But we deny that it is impossible^ 
for evil to be chosen or be considered good, for this | 
would be contrary to all experience. For many evil / 



PART II 175 

things arc thought to be good and many good things 
are considered evil. 

2. The second argument is (or the 
Nor is it anything, first if you prefer, since the other 

except the mind. J x 

amounted to nothing) : If the will is 
not determined by the last practical judgment of the 
understanding it is self determined. But the will does 
■not determine itself because in itself and from its na- 
ture it is indeterminate." From this they proceed to 
argue: "// the will by nature is indifferent to acting 
it cannot be determined by itself. That which deter- 
mines anything must be determined, and that which is 
determined must be indeterminate. But the will con- 
sidered as determining itself would be considered both 
as determinate and indeterminate. For these oppo- 
nents presuppose nothing in the determining will that 
is not the. same in the will cither as determined or as 
about to be determined. Nor indeed can anything be 
affirmed. Therefore, the will cannot be determined by 
itself. But if not by itself then otherwise." These 
are the words of Professor Heereboordius of Leyden, 1 
in which he clearly shows that he understood by voli- 
tion not the mind itself, but something else outside of 
the mind, a tabula rasa, as it were, free from all forms 
of thought and capable of receiving images upon itself. 
Or rather as a weight in equilibrium, which, as much 
as it is determined at all, from without, may be in- 
clined to one side by another weight. Or finally as 
something which cannot be understood by the cogni- 
tion of any mortal. We have just said, and indeed 
shown, that the will is nothing but the mind itself. 
That is, it is the thinking being, a being who affirms 
and denies. So we find when we consider the nature 

1 Vid. ejus Meletemata Philosophica, ed. alt. Lugd. Bat. 1659. 



i-6 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICS 

of mind that it has an equal power of affirming and 
denying. For this, as I have said, is the meaning of 
thought. We conclude, therefore, that the mind 
thinks, that it has this power of affirming and of deny- 
ing. Why then should we seek extra-mental reasons 
for doing what is sufficiently explained by the nature 
of the mind itself ? But you say, " the mind is not 
determined more to affirm than to deny; hence some 
extra-mental cause for volition is necessary." But I 
argue the contrary; if the mind were by nature only 
capable of affirming (although such a conception is 
impossible as long as we conceive of the mind as think- 
ing being) so that, however many causes concur, it is 
impossible for it to deny anything. Or if it could 
neither affirm or deny, it would be able to do neither. 
Or, finally, if it had the power, as we have shown it 
has, it would be able to do both from its nature alone, 
no other cause assisting. This is evidently the case 
for all who really give to a thinking being the power 
of thought. Those who separate the attribute of 
thought from the thing itself from which it is only 
distinguished by the reason, denude the thinking being 
of all thought and regard what remains as the funda- 
mental substance of the Peripatetics. Therefore, I 
respond that if they understand by will something 
independent of thought, we will concede that their 
will is indeterminate. But we deny that the will 
is something void of understanding; on the other 
hand, we believe that it is thought, i. e., it is the power 
of affirming and of denying. Certainly nothing else 
will satisfy the conditions. Then, too, we deny that 
even if the will is indeterminate it is therefore de- 
spoiled of thought, and can be determined by any 
external object except God's infinite power. For to 



PART 11 177 

conceive of a thinking being without thought is the 
same as to conceive of an extended body without 
extension. 

Finally, there is no need to consider 
Why philosophers ot h er arguments, but I shall only say 

confuse mind <=> > J J 

with corporeal fa^ opponents of this view confuse the 
mind with corporeal objects because 
they do not understand the will, or have a clear and a 
distinct concept of the mind. As has been said, this 
error arises from the fact that words properly used 
only to describe corporeal objects have been applied to 
spiritual things. For they have been accustomed to 
call those bodies indeterminate which are acted upon 
by two equivalent external forces acting in opposition 
to one another. Therefore, since they think that the 
will is indeterminate they seem to think of it as a 
body in equilibrium. And, because those bodies have 
nothing except what they receive from external causes 
(from which it follows that they are always deter- 
mined by an external cause ) , they think that the same 
thing is true concerning the will. But as we have 
already made sufficiently clear why these things are 
so, we shall say no more. . 

Concerning extended substance we have already 
spoken sufficiently and beside these two forms of 
created substance we know no others. What pertains 
to real accidents and to other qualities has also been 
sufficiently criticised nor is there need to take any fur- 
ther time in refuting them, so we take our hand from 
the table. 



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